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This thesis examines the transition from the Roman republic to the Principate of Augustus 
through the lens of the pontifex maximus, the office of the head of the pontifical college. 
Despite burgeoning interest in this role, current scholarship still regards the elevation of the 
chief pontiff to a politically significant position as a by-product of Caesar’s ambition and, 
subsequently, Octavian’s quest for both power and legitimacy. It is my contention that the 
trajectory of this priesthood’s ascendancy has been incorrectly plotted and that a proper 
understanding of the pontificate requires an analysis of the events surrounding the politically 
motivated murder of a tribune by the chief pontiff in 133 and subsequently over the next 
century. 
 
After a survey of literature and a summary of the key features of the office, the thesis argues 
that the position of chief pontiff had long since conferred a stable prominence which was 
unique in the Roman republic. This prominence brought with it a particular kind of power 
which interacted with the auctoritas of the men who occupied the priesthood: in this way, the 
holders of an office which was bound up with some of the most revered traditions of the city 
were empowered to improvise courses of action which further enhanced the standing and 
influence of the chief pontiffs. It was through this cycle of action and perception that the 
pontifex maximus became a mechanism of political change – and was itself transformed in the 
process. In considering this cycle, particular emphasis is placed on the phenomenon of 
‘sacro-political’ violence which, as a novelty instigated by one chief pontiff, became a 
recurrent motif in Roman political life thereafter. 
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I argue that Scipio Nasica Serapio made deliberate use of his office to sanction an 
intervention which would have serious consequences for the republic and which radically 
altered how the Romans saw this priesthood. The thesis then explores how subsequent 
holders of the office either negotiated or exploited this ‘legacy’ to further their careers, to 
respond to unprecedented constitutional crises or simply to stay alive.  
 
Although all the pontifices maximi from 141 B.C. to 14 AD are considered, this thesis focuses 
on the lives and times of Nasica Serapio, Quintus Scaevola, Julius Caesar and Augustus as 
their tenures are particularly emblematic of the tensions between the mos maiorum and an 
increasingly extreme political climate. I argue that the new dispensation established by the 
first princeps, with all the restorationist rhetoric which accompanied it, relied decisively on 
Augustus’ assumption of the role. Even if Augustus had absorbed virtually all of the available 
priesthoods, the long wait he had to endure for the office of chief pontiff says a great deal 
about the nature of the pontificate and its strategic value to the heir of Caesar. 
 
Two case-study Appendices discuss the disputed pontificate of Q. Servilius Caepio and the 
relationship between Cicero, Clodius and the pontifical college. These studies exemplify the 
prosopographical challenges in reconstructing republican priesthoods (even the most 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Abstract          Page 2 
Acknowledgements          Page 7 
Author’s Declaration          Page 8 
Introduction          Page 10 
Methodological Considerations      Page 14 
(a) Prosopography        Page 14 
(b) Source Problems       Page 17 
A Conspectus of Scholarship      Page 19 
(a) The ‘End’ of the Republic      Page 20 
(b) Religion and Politics in the Republic     Page 21 
(c) Auctoritas        Page 25 
(d) Violence in the ‘Late’ Republic     Page 27 
Chapter One – The pontifex maximus in the Life of the City    Page 33 
The Etymology of pontifex maximus      Page 36 
 The pontifices and the Pontifical College     Page 39 
 The Development of the office of pontifex maximus    Page 47 
  (a) The pontifex maximus and the rex sacrorum   Page 49 
  (b) The pontifex maximus and the flamines    Page 52 
  (c) The pontifex maximus and the Vestals    Page 55 
 Entering the Pontifical College      Page 56 
 The pontifex maximus and the Other Priesthoods    Page 59 
  (i) The College of Augurs      Page 59
  (ii) The viri sacris faciundis and septemviri epulonum  Page 60 
 The pontifex maximus and the Public Life of the City   Page 62 
  (a) The pontifex maximus as ‘Quasi Magistrate’   Page 62 
5 
 
  (b) The Annales Maximi      Page 65
 (c) The Calendar       Page 69 
            (d) The Law        Page 71 
 Conclusion: The pontifex maximus in 141 B.C.    Page 75 
Chapter Two – Scipio Nasica Serapio: absens pontifex maximus   Page 79 
 Life and Career of Publius Cornelius Scipio Nasica Serapio   Page 80 
 The Crisis of 133: Mounting Tensions     Page 87 
 The pontifex maximus: dux privatus      Page 90 
 Priest and Victim        Page 97 
 Further Analyses        Page 106 
 Sacrum and Expiation        Page 110 
 Spiriting Nasica from Rome       Page 113 
 Conclusion         Page 115 
Chapter Three – Quintus Mucius Scaevola Pontifex     Page 118 
 Pontifical Predecessors       Page 119 
 Quintus Mucius Scaevola: cursus honorum     Page 127 
 Scaevola in Asia        Page 129 
 Scaevola the Lawyer        Page 136 
Scaevola pontifex maximus       Page 145 
Scaevola the Target        Page 152 
Scaevola the Theologian       Page 156 
Scaevola the Martyr        Page 165 
Conclusion         Page 172 
Chapter Four – Pontiff and Dictator       Page 174 
 Metellus Pius         Page 175 
 Gaius Julius Caesar        Page 189 
 Early Career, Early Priesthoods?      Page 190 
From Subura to Regia        Page 197 
6 
 
Caesar as pontifex maximus       Page 201 
Pontifex maximus and Demagogue      Page 205 
The Civil War and its Aftermath      Page 210 
The Primacy of Caesar       Page 214 
The Cult of Caesar        Page 220 
Chapter Five – Lepidus and Augustus      Page 226 
 ‘Finding’ Lepidus        Page 227 
 A Restrained Pontificate       Page 234 
 Pontifex maximus at Last       Page 240 
 Conclusion: The Trajectory of Augustan Religion    Page 250 
Conclusion          Page 252 
Appendix A – Quintus Servilius Caepio: pontifex maximus?   Page 257 
Appendix B – Case Study: Cicero, Clodius and the pontifices   Page 260 
List of References         Page 264







Any thesis undertaken on a part-time basis will inevitably display some of the tell-tale signs 
of its long gestation. If these are less apparent in this finished product, then the credit is 
mainly due to my principal supervisor at the University of Glasgow, Professor Catherine 
Steel. She has been a diligent and critical friend throughout and her vast knowledge of this 
period has ensured that my ‘big thinking’ approach to certain issues has counterbalanced by 
attention to the detail of events. I have been similarly fortunate to have had the invaluable 
contribution of Professor Matthew Fox, my second supervisor: his expertise in the literary 
and cultural background of the Roman republic has been of great assistance in considering 
the wider sources of evidence. Both supervisors have helped me remember that a thesis is not 
an artefact but an argument, and in the process have reined in most (if not all) of those 
instances of florid exposition which have threatened to obscure the essential points of the 
thesis. I am grateful also to Dr Costas Panayotakis and Dr Luke Houghton who have also 
read and offered thoughtful criticism of some of the chapters; Professor Olivia Robinson was 
also kind enough to review my comments on the legal activity of Scaevola pontifex. I also 
wish to record my gratitude and esteem for the external examiners of this thesis, Dr Federico 
Santangelo of Newcastle University and Dr Anna J. Clark of Christ Church, Oxford: their 
thorough and insightful scrutiny, informed by their renowned expertise in this field, ensured 
that recommendtions for refinement of this thesis – both in the short and longer term – were 
forthcoming. Dr Ian Ruffell of the University of Glasgow’s School of Humanities put in 
place all the practical arrangements for the examination of the thesis and carried these 




My colleagues in the School of Education at the University of Glasgow have also been a 
source of encouragement. I am particularly grateful to Professor Robert Davis and Dr 
Stephen McKinney for their kind support; Professor James Conroy, Dr Roisin Coll, Mary 
Lappin, Clare Fodey, Leon Robinson, Dr Leonardo Franchi and Denise Porada have also, at 
various points, ‘lightened the load’ to allow me to make progress. My ecclesiastical 
confrères, especially have also provided a robust network of support and the community of 
St. Joseph’s Parish in Clarkston have been stalwart in accompanying me along this path. 
 
I would also wish to acknowledge the influence of my Latin teacher at school, Joseph Hogan. 
He first instilled in me a love of all things Roman and this thesis is in no small measure the 
fruit of his infectious enthusiasm. I was captivated by his ability to conjure an erupting 
Vesuvius through a schoolroom window or to impress upon a class of easily distracted 
teenagers the dreadful weight of Cicero’s ‘uixerunt’ (Plutarch, Cicero, 22). 
 
Finally, to friends and family: Christopher Morris and David Melvin deserve my particular 
thanks for their unstinting support and sympathetic ear. To all my friends, both near and far, I 
owe you a debt of gratitude. My sisters and wider family have been, in so many ways, the 
chief source of my encouragement and the providers of company and relaxation: I am so very 
grateful to Evelyn, Helen and their families. The happiness of completing a work such as this 
is tempered by sadness that my mother, who took delight in listening to the most obtuse 
points of this thesis, did not live to see it finished. To paraphrase Cicero, speaking of Cornelia 
Africana and her sons, I too have been educated ‘in sermone matris’ (Brutus, 58). Bereft of 
her speech, but grateful for her unstinting love, I respectfully dedicate this work to my mother 












I declare that, except where explicit reference is made to the contribution of 
others, that this dissertation is the result of my own work and has not been 












In the Roman Republic, although… sources of religious authority were highly diffuse, there 
was considerable political competition to hold a priesthood, and the position of “chief priest” 
(pontifex maximus), in particular, came to be coveted by ambitious politicians as the basis for 
political influence and manipulation. Priests were expected to acquire and deploy expert 
religious knowledge, but that knowledge gave them an authority which could be transferred 
into the political realm (Osborne, 2009: 125). 
 
Osborne neatly captures the issue at the heart of this thesis: the development of the office of 
pontifex maximus and its usefulness to men of ambition. He writes with Caesar explicitly in 
mind and there is no question that Caesar used the position to further his own political 
influence and to manipulate affairs to his advantage. What he does not say, however, is how 
this influence came about or how these interactions between knowledge, authority and 
manipulation influenced both the office and an increasingly sclerotic Republic (Mackie, 
1992: 57). To attempt to answer this question, we need to survey events and actors from the 
preceding generations. 
 
This thesis is concerned with the period which began with the disorder surrounding the death 
of Tiberius Gracchus at the instigation of Scipio Nasica, the pontifex maximus in 133 B.C. 
Much of what ensued over the course of the next century and a half can be traced back to this 
clash, as a series of increasingly violent disputes led to the disintegration of the Republic 
which only ceased when Augustus emerged as victor, both ideologically and militarily. I 
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must emphasise that I am subscribing to a ‘disintegration model’, not the former, discredited 
‘collapse model’ of the end of the Republic: by this I mean that what we now come to regard 
as the last century of the res publica was characterised by an increasing failure of the former 
mechanisms of integration which had held the Senatus Populusque Romanus in relative (and 
productive) balance. 
 
This thesis sets out to examine this transition from Republic to Principate through the lens of 
the pontifex maximus. Despite the burgeoning interest in the interplay between religion and 
politics during the final phase of the Republic1 and increased scholarship on the legal activity 
of the pontifical college as a whole, comparatively little attention has been focused on this 
individual office in terms of its status and powers. Osborne (2009) is a rare challenge to the 
consensus that the pontifex maximus, despite his nominal superiority in religious matters, was 
no more significant a figure in Rome’s public life than the other senior religious personnel 
who had their own areas of competence and unique functions to perform. According to this 
same view it was Augustus who, with his genius for infusing moribund institutions with the 
vigour of his own appetite for power, transformed the office of chief pontiff into the fulcrum 
of sacro-political power it would become and remain for centuries thereafter. What such a 
position fails to account for is why, of all these religious offices, it was this particular role 
and not one of the other priesthoods (which Augustus also held) which became central to his 
religious policy? Why, for example, did the Augurate not come to dominate the landscape?2  
                                                          
1
 The on-going research of John Scheid and Jorg Rüpke in this field has been augmented by new 
publications by Santangelo and Pollini. 
2
 Given Cicero’s (admittedly) self-serving estimation of the augurate - Maximum autem et 
praestantissimum in re publica ius est augurum cum auctoritate coniunctum (Cicero, de Legibus 2:31) 
– would it have not have been more sensible for Augustus to predicate his new powers on his control 
of the auspices rather than some notional bureaucratic precedence? 
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It is my contention that the ‘chief priesthood’ was not merely primus inter pares for Augustus 
when he alighted upon it as the conduit for his reforms: he was not so much investing this old 
office with a raft of new powers and a fresh veneer of prestige, as he was exploring and 
extending the opportunities it already afforded the pontifex maximus. The thesis will argue 
that, for the century preceding Augustus’ ascendancy, features of the office which had always 
been present, though latent, were cast into sharp relief by the actions of successive pontifices 
maximi.  Through their involvement in political crises with obvious religious implications, or 
in addressing religious controversies which had clear political ramifications, these chief 
pontiffs intervened in ways which had a profound impact on the office itself. To borrow 
Hölkeskamp’s metaphor of language to express the tension between what is happening on the 
surface of politics and what underpins it, there is, he argues 
 
a vocabulary of images, metaphors, rituals, assumptions and performances and a grammar, a set 
of conventions governing the appropriate use of this vocabulary… This language is 
instrumental not only in representing power, but also in stabilizing and even generating it. 
(Hölkeskamp, 2010: 55) 
 
Central to this exercise of ‘authorship’ is the notion of auctoritas which 
 
conveyed something like a stamp of approval and so served in a sense to guarantee that the 
course of action advocated or the advice offered by someone who possessed it (an auctor) was 
right and proper by virtue of his record of achievement and the superior judgment and insight it 




It is my argument that these Roman priests used their own personal auctoritas to legitimise 
courses of action which would have enduring consequences – both for the office of pontifex 
maximus and for Rome itself. There is even a sense in which this capacity to refashion the 
language and grammar of religious and political action results in the office itself acquiring a 
kind of auctoritas in its own right. As a consequence, I argue that the unique status of this 
‘highest’ priesthood as a quasi-magistracy meant that the notion of auctoritas, seldom 
associated with priesthoods,3 should be applied to the chief priesthood in a particular way: in 
this regard, the former, somewhat rigid, understandings of auctoritas require some revision. 
 
Finally – and crucially – a study of this nature cannot ignore the way in which violence 
became a recurring motif in the life of the city, either as a way of effecting or inhibiting 
political change. In the period of particular interest to this thesis, one pontifex maximus is 
credited with the invention of a new form of sacro-political violence, two others fell victim to 
it, while yet another was accused of opportunistically benefiting from his predecessor’s 
bloody demise. This culture of violence can be shown to have a very particular relationship 
with the way in which the chief pontificate came to be viewed and exercised. 
 
The resulting argument is this: the office came to be associated with a status of stable 
prominence at the heart of Republican life and institutions. Such a position gave the holders 
of the office unrivalled scope to take advantage of the tension between tradition (mos) and 
innovation which was becoming increasingly a feature of politics during this period. The 
auctoritas of the men who became chief pontiff shaped the perception of the office but so too 
                                                          
3
  Although Cicero speaks of the ‘auctoritas’ entrusted to the pontiffs in religious matters (de 




the office changed as a result of the perception of the people who witnessed the creative – 
and sometimes transgressive – actions of these public figures. I will demonstrate how 
personal auctoritas began to ‘stick’ to the pontifex maximus, not necessarily adding to the 
powers of the office, but most definitely maximising its scope. This will go some way to 
explaining how certain individuals did a great deal with the office and made a considerable 
mark with it, while others did comparatively little during their tenure. Such a contrast may be 
accounted for by the pontificalis honor (Ovid, Fasti, 3.420) being seen as an end in itself. So 
tradition and innovation, auctoritas and the perception of power are the matrices in which 
this priesthood grew and consolidated itself as a prize of considerable worth and, as I argue, 
came to constitute one of the central mechanisms of the Augustan ‘reintegration’ of the res 
publica. 
 
Methodological considerations:  
(a)  Prosopography 
One feature of this dissertation is the extent to which the personal and family histories of 
these pontiffs and their political careers influenced – and were influenced by – this religious 
office. It is important to consider the contribution which prosopography can offer this 
research.  
 
My thesis seeks to carry out a thematic analysis of the key issues and, although the argument 
is not teleological, it is inevitably diachronic to some extent. Furthermore, as we have already 
indicated, to approach these themes merely as discarnate principles without considering the 
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lives of the men who explored the possibilities of the office, is to furnish a partial account. 
According to Stone: 
 
…the purpose of prosopography is to make sense of political action, to help explain ideological 
or cultural change, to identify social reality, and to describe and analyze with precision the 
structure of society and the degree and the nature of the movements within it (Stone, 1971: 46). 
 
This is still, with the necessary modifications, the purpose of adopting a partly 
prosopographical approach in this thesis: it is by exploring the careers of individuals that we 
hope to illuminate political, cultural and social movements (or ‘transformations’) in the office 
of the chief pontificate. Although prosopography may have fallen into disrepute in some 
quarters, especially given its reliance on lacunose primary sources and the inherent bias of the 
winner in shaping Roman historiography, it is also 
 
‘a method of research we cannot do without if we want to open up broad swathes of Roman 
history and culture in a scientific way’ (Eck, 2010:157). 
 
The pioneering work of Mercklin (1848) and Bouché-Leclercq (1871) which, in turn, enabled 
Broughton to collate his prosopography of Roman republican magistrates, continues to 
influence more recent forays in this field. 4  Indeed Broughton’s decision to include the 
priesthoods in his lists – and his justification for doing so – still remains the most cogent 
                                                          
4
 Linderski has bemoaned the use of priests as ‘quarries for the prosopographical hunt’ with abundant 
lists of names and marriage connections, but hardly a reference to ritual context of their lives 
(Linderski, 1990: 49). 
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argument for surveying the late republic through this particular lens (Broughton, 1951:x). 
Jörg Rüpke, while questioning the utility of some of Broughton’s lists, is emphatic about the 
value of the prosopographical method (Rüpke, 2008:2). Indeed it is Rüpke’s stated desire and 
intention that ‘a more thorough biographical investigation of religion in Antiquity’ be 
forthcoming (ibid.). 
 
Sandwiched between Broughton and Rüpke’s fasti, stands Szemler’s essays on 
prosopography and priesthoods, especially his 1972 study ‘The Priests of the Roman 
Republic’. Although roundly (and harshly) dismissed by Wiseman (1973:266-267), Szemler 
deserves credit for attempting to go beyond the compilation of lists and speculate on the 
interaction between priesthoods and magistracies. Even if, as Wiseman observes, the line 
between inference and speculation is too blurred, he at least argues for the possibility of 
pontifices maximi setting their mark upon the office as individuals as well as members of the 
ruling nobility (Szemler, 1972: 84). 
 
It is worth considering, however, the limits and even the temptations of the prosopographical 
method. The gaps in our knowledge and the reliance on secondary authorities, however 
persuasive, can lead to the perpetuation of subjective or modish preferences in reconstructing 
Roman religion. Even apparently objective sources, such as numismatic evidence and 
inscriptions, are open to subjective readings. It goes without saying that, even when a man’s 
dates are certain, his thoughts and motivations are not. Especially with regard to 
prosopography, Linderski sounds a cautionary note regarding the likelihood of reliably 
‘inferring from a general pattern to the likely behaviour or situation of an individual’ 




(b)  Source problems 
A study of this nature must also make clear its approach to the ancient sources. Any attempt 
to ‘recreate’ the religious landscape of Rome will always prove elusive: the gaps in the 
surviving material impose their own limits and those analysing what sources we have should 
be aware of their own interpretative bias (to say nothing of the bias of the ancient authors 
themselves). The sources closest to the events which are relevant to this thesis are the 
anonymous Rhetorica ad Herennium and the various works of Cicero. Although very 
different in their sympathies, both authors are presenting history within a rhetorical context 
(Várhelyi, 2011; Goodyear, 1983: 96) and, as will be of particular relevance in discussing 
Cicero’s commentary on events, it should be remembered that much of what Cicero writes 
about notable figures is really about Cicero himself (Lintott, 2008: 11). 
 
Given that this is an argument about the place of the pontifex maximus in the final century of 
the Republic, we must also acknowledge that the rest of our sources are from the early 
Principate or the reigns of the adoptive emperors. Livy, whose Ab Urbe Condita is perhaps 
our most significant single source, was writing in the shadow of Augustus. It is sometimes 
objected that Livy, who held neither elected office nor priesthood, had no direct access to the 
wealth of material that being an ‘insider’ allowed (Ogilvie, 1983: 163). What is important for 
my purposes is that he provides a narrative in which a wealth of religious material is 
intricately interwoven with the other events and behaviour he is discussing: although 
sometimes careless about fact-checking (Ogilvie, 1983: 164), Livy has been considered as a 
more or less reliable source on religious matters – even though his ‘specifically religious 
methodology’ has not always been a focus of attention (Davies, 2004: 21). Livy’s lack of 
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exposition on certain religious matters rests on the assumption that his audience would 
already have been familiar with such things. His frequent recourse to oratio obliqua creates a 
certain distance between Livy and the events or beliefs he describes, with the result that our 
reading of these texts can make him either a sceptical reporter or a ‘conventionally pious’ 
narrator (Levene, 1993: 23). The other writers who follow not long after Livy, such as 
Valerius Maximus and Velleius, are no less conscious of the princeps-pontifex maximus (in 
their case Tiberius) and more focused on offering vignettes instead of coherent narrative 
(Vessey, 1983: 5; Goodyear, 1983b: 143). 
 
The remaining significant sources, Plutarch and Appian, are still further removed from events 
but are not to be disregarded for that reason: Plutarch displays a keen interest in religious 
matters and is sensitive to the relationship between the archaic forms of power in Rome and 
the new dispensation whereby the pontifex maximus is now also monarch (Stadter, 2002: 17). 
Appian too, for his remoteness in time, clearly engages with sources which take us into a 
detailed analysis of the Gracchan crisis – indeed in a way which is considered unique (Cuff, 
1967: 178). As Davies observes: 
 
Our criteria are no longer centred on the search for some ‘original’ ‘authentic’ Roman religion, 
but the urge to understand the dynamic creation of identity and systems of meaning by and 
within a society (Davies, 2004: 9). 
 
So, rather than simply treat these texts and their religious content as literary artefacts – a 
characteristic of a ‘phase of scholarship (which) is thankfully passing’ (Feeney, 2007b: 130) 
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– I will approach these sources as representing not only the preoccupations of their authors 
but also as a reflection of how the dynamic process of creating a ‘system of meaning’ 
influenced perceptions of the pontifex maximus. In the process of doing so, I accept that a 
cultural familiarity with the ideas and events described (or, equally, left in shadow) in these 
texts is taken for granted among their intended audience. Apart from the necessary 
methodological caveats already mentioned, I reject an outright ‘hermeneutic of suspicion’ in 
my reading and use of the primary sources (Stewart, 1989: 296). 
 
A conspectus of scholarship 
This thesis is concerned with the remarkable clustering of power around the pontifex 
maximus in a crucial phase of Roman history. The relationship between the religious and 
political dimensions of life in the Republic has been an area of growing interest, but my 
contention is that the office of pontifex maximus is still not sufficiently recognised as one of 
the most important offices of all. Indeed, I am convinced that the chief pontificate offers a 
distinct vantage point from which to survey this well-studied period of Roman history. 
Although we will consider the most relevant insights of contemporary scholarship throughout 
the thesis, it is worth highlighting the principal concepts which have informed the debate. 
a) The ‘end’ of the Republic 
In this thesis I consider some of those events which, since antiquity, have been reckoned as 
signalling the start of the demise of the Republic and its gradual replacement by a settlement 
which, however subtle the apparent changes, was substantially different. Syme (1939) has 
remained an unmatched narrative (Millar, 2000: 1) which continues to exercise considerable 
influence on scholarship in this field. As Bowersock, writing in a 70th anniversary edition of 
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Syme’s landmark study observed, the impact of The Roman Revolution was such that it 
eclipsed the ‘old masters’ such as Theodor Mommsen and the prevailing interpretations of 
republican decline (Bowersock, 2009: X). The inherent disadvantage in this, for all the 
brilliance of Syme’s reconstruction and commentary, was that it located the start of the 
republic’s slow dissolution from the dominance of Sulla down through the struggles between 
Pompey and Caesar. Other impressive surveys, such as Gruen (1974), while setting out to 
challenge Syme’s model, implicitly accept his chronology of decline and focus on the first 
triumvirate. Gruen, however, was not only dissenting from Syme’s conclusions but was also 
rebutting Brunt’s thesis (1971)  that the dissolution of the Republic stemmed from a failure 
on the part of the senate to address the competing demands of various disaffected groups both  
within the city and in Italy as a whole. Crucially, this narrative goes back to the Gracchan 
crises and indeed predates the upheaval of the 130s. Brunt had earlier contended that the root 
cause of the Republic’s eventual collapse was its success as a military power and the uneven 
distribution of the fruits of conquest. Although the evidence for economic decline among 
Rome’s soldier class is not so robust as Brunt suggested in The Army and the Land in the 
Roman Revolution (1962), there is still merit in recognising that two of the major fault lines 
in the ‘late Republic’ – the shift of allegiance and authority from senate to individuals and the 
increasingly entrenched blocs of senatus and populus – did radiate from Rome’s recently-
acquired status as an imperial power. The crisis of the 130s B.C. is, at least in part, 
occasioned by the fragmentation of senatorial consensus on issues such as the Gracchan 
reforms and the unresolved grievances of the Italians. This is clearly germane to my 
argument that the actions of Scipio Nasica in response to the ‘provocation’ of Tiberius 
Gracchus are illustrative of this attempt by prominent individuals to derive legitimacy from a 
personal auctoritas. To this end, Hölkeskamp (2010), while rejecting the polarisation of the 
Roman people and the political class, argues convincingly for a new way of understanding 
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political culture in this period in which a hierarchical power structure was crucial to the 
integration of Rome’s constituent groupings (2010: 134). This is also consistent with Flaig’s 
analysis of the power of the elite to use symbols and elements of ritual to direct the people in 
a political consensus (2003). Successive pontifices maximi, from Nasica to Augustus, will 
make use of this ‘language’ to legitimize their actions and foster a new perception of their 
office which exemplifies the relationship between religion and politics in this period. Indeed, 
as I argue with reference to Quintus Mucius Scaevola in particular, this innovation actually 
operates on the level of language itself and the way in which a high pontiff can influence the 
meaning of words and ideas. 
 
b) Religion and Politics in the Republic 
For many years, especially in those circles most influenced by an reductivist approach to 
matters of religion, the standard conception of Roman religiosity was of a hollow formalism 
which was prey to political manipulation or as a revered conceit altogether separate from the 
‘reality’ of the state (Stroumsa, 2010:150). Mommsen, so interested in the other aspects of 
Roman republican history, felt little enthusiasm for questions of religion beyond its 
intersection with his true passion, Roman law. Wissowa (1912) stands out as a landmark in 
the study of Roman cult but, like Mommsen, regards the period from the Gracchi to Caesar to 
be one marked by the decline of religion – a decline Wissowa lays at the door of the 
priesthoods (Ando, 2003: 342). According to Wissowa’s analysis, the cause of this 
weakening of the religious system lies in the priesthood becoming ‘purely political 
authorities’ (Wissowa, 1912:70). This estimation, even by way of hyperbole, rightly 
identifies the relationship between religion and politics as key to the understanding of both; 
Wissowa, as others before and since have done, clearly felt that the relationship between 
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politics and religion was somewhat parasitic. It should be noted that this reservation was not 
confined to German scholarship: Warde Fowler (1911), a contemporary of Wissowa, also 
traces a process of ‘secularisation’ which is synonymous with a split between the genuine 
religious sensibilities of the Roman people and the suffocating effect of politically motivated 
interference.  
 
This characterisation of Roman religion now appears overly simplistic, especially in its 
representation of the relationship between politics and religion. More recent scholarship, such 
as Liebeschuetz (1979), has allowed an enhanced appreciation of the complex interactions 
between the public cult of Rome and its impact on the public business of sustaining and 
governing its burgeoning empire. The individual and collective scholarship of Beard, Price 
and North has ensured that a more nuanced – and fruitful – appreciation of religion and 
politics has emerged. Other more recent works have carried out a more in-depth study of 
specific elements of Roman religion through a political lens, Rüpke (1995) and Scheid (2003) 
being emblematic examples. Phillips questions this tendency towards micro-analysis at the 
expense of ‘the large-scale’ in Roman religion (2007:26). We will return to the contributions 
of some of these ‘micro theorists’ in subsequent sections of this introduction. Perhaps of 
greatest interest to our argument, however, and one which neatly mirrors Phillips’ 
preoccupations, is the way in which the pontifex maximus effectively ceased to be one 
specialist among many and became ‘the chief priest’ in the most expansive sense of the term. 
 
Rüpke observes that the religion of Rome served the interests of the élite by maintaining the 
city’s social stratification while at the same time allowing for cohesion during moments of 
national peril (2004: 193). The purpose of religion was, therefore, as much a matter of social 
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and political ordering as appeasement of the gods. Another strand of more recent scholarship 
has been the establishment of manubial temples and their dual function as political as well as 
religious spaces (McDonnell, 2006: 218); as well as the fulfilment of vows, the creation of 
these temples afforded competing families the opportunity to make significant claims on 
political – and urban – landscape (Orlin, 1997:178). The overlap between these aspects of life 
is also demonstrated in the activities of the senate. Rome’s chief political assembly had to 
convene on consecrated ground which had been designated a templum by being ‘defined and 
freed’ as such (effatum et liberatum) by the augurs (Beard, North & Price, 1998: 22);  it was 
not as though the sacred spaces were being invaded by politics, so much as the res publica 
being transacted as a kind of liturgy. Cicero elaborates on the public and political impact of 
religion in the second book of de Legibus, acknowledging that the religious ‘constitution’ 
precedes the political settlement (Scheid, 2001:58). Having no concept comparable to 
‘revelation’, Roman religion advanced by way of ‘amalgamation, elaboration and 
systematisation’ (Linderski, 2000:462), a process which resulted in a distinct scientia in 
which the priests were the specialists. 
 
Similarly, as Beard and Crawford (1999) discuss at some length, the symbiosis between 
religion and public life was such that those whose policies are adjudged to be inimical to the 
State (although in practical terms this can be a fairly subjective judgement) could be 
dismissed as being equally unfriendly towards the gods. Cicero was only too aware of the 
political benefit that could accrue from co-opting the support of Rome’s tutelary divinities 
against his personal and ideological opponents. Even the meetings of the senate (and other 
public business) could be suspended or its acts invalidated by inauspicious omens. The 
dramatic, or some would say farcical, high-point of such religiously coloured interventions 
occurred during a consulship of Caesar. While it is tempting to be cynical in surveying the 
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relationship between religion and politics in Roman life, Bendlin argues for the need to 
transcend ‘the civic compromise’: 
 
The link between magistracy and priesthood formed one crucial element in the self-definition 
of the Roman elite. What has been called ‘the civic compromise’ symbolises the elite’s 
perception of an inseparable connection between priestly and civic office, between religion in 
the city-state and political life, in short: between religion and the state (Bendlin, 2000:119).   
 
It is Bendlin who, according to Gildenhard, offers the most helpful distinction between the 
concepts of ‘Roman religion’ and ‘Roman civic religion’, enabling us to separate out 
religious activity in general from the specifically political dimensions of Roman religion 
(Gildenhard, 2011:247). In this regard, however, it seems that Gildenhard somewhat 
undersells Bendlin’s main thesis, namely that ‘personal’ religion and ‘state’ cult can still be 
treated as dimensions of the same pluralistic reality (Bendlin, 2000: 135).  Naturally it is 
important to my thesis to appreciate the current state of the arguments surrounding religion in 
Roman political life, especially vis-à-vis the pontifex maximus. Although the inextricability 
of religio and res publica is now well established, the authority and general standing of key 
personnel is still far from settled. Gildenhard is wedded to a narrow construction of 
auctoritas which is strictly denied to the pontifices, whereas Beard overstates the priestly 
powers of the senate at the expense of the collegium (Beard, 1990: 30). My contention is that 
the missing piece of this mosaic is the pontifex maximus, who must have exercised a 
particular function as the senate’s ‘point man’ with the college and who could operate 
without an explicit mandate ex auctoritate senatus (Cicero, de Domo 136). But what was the 





For an idea so important for the functioning of politics in Rome, auctoritas is notoriously 
hard to render in English. As we have already seen, it has the weight of ‘authority’, but also 
signifies an entitlement to a hearing and the serious consideration of what a person is saying – 
indeed ‘clout’ is not so far from the mark (Pomeroy, 2012: 142). This credibility is bound up 
with the performative nature of so much of public life in the Republic (David, 2006: 421): 
auctoritas was a matter of stage presence as well as the technical requirements of eloquence. 
The credibility of an individual was also enhanced by his family connections. van der Blom 
(2010) notes that auctoritas could be ‘passed on’ from one generation of a family to the next. 
It is for this reason that inherited auctoritas facilitated a public career, thereby creating 
further opportunities for bolstering an individual’s own standing or, to use a modern 
equivalent, profile (van der Blom, 2010: 126). Because of its association with the mos 
maiorum, auctoritas came to be associated with those who had descended from the most 
prestigious gentes and had, no doubt with some help from their ancestral imagines, attained 
the very highest offices. In the structured hierarchy of the senate, this meant that those who 
had been consuls and censors and were regarded as the ‘leading citizens’ enjoyed the greatest 
dignity and authority (Hölkeskamp, 2010: 91).5 It must be remembered that the senate itself 
was the subject of its own auctoritas, the auctoritas patrum by which legislation and 
elections were properly authorised (Jehne, 2011: 220; Loewenstein, 1973: 157); furthermore, 
it was the effective seat of religious authority in the Republic. 
                                                          
5
 The status of censors as religious authorities is somewhat overstated. Although they had care for 
temples, they had to defer to the opinion of the pontifex maximus and derived any religious authority 
from the express mandate of the people (Palmer, 1965: 323). Curiously, few pontifices maximi were 
elected to the censorship and only Marcus Aemilius Lepidus and Domitius Ahenobarbus after their 





Santangelo (2013b) explores the relationship between the auctoritas of priesthoods and that 
of individual priests. He acknowledges that  
 
priests exert a level of influence that other centres of power cannot attain. Their actions can 
have strong political implications, but may be justified as actions that have a religious 
significance and cannot fall into the fold of partisan controversy… priests have to be prepared 
to defend their action and their craft from external pressures and interferences. (Santangelo, 
2013b: 762) 
 
In the de Domo, while Cicero addresses the authority of the pontifical college as a whole 
(since distribution of power is considered a fundamental principle of the Republican system), 
he appears to be making a case for the senior members of the college enjoying an enhanced 
position relative to that of their less experienced colleagues. A senior pontifex who had scaled 
the heights of the cursus honorum would have been a formidable proposition: the 
combination of more than one type of auctoritas in a single figure opens up the possibility 
that these manifestations of ‘clout’ could be made to interact in new ways. I would argue, 
therefore, that the traditional understanding of auctoritas needs to be reevaluated in order to 
embrace these interactions between tradition and improvisation which will be discussed in the 
course of this thesis. 
 
All of the pontifices maximi we shall consider had a particular personal auctoritas, quite apart 
from whatever prestige they derived from their presidency of the college. All, to some extent, 
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had powerful family connections – even if these were not strictly gentilicial. The scope of this 
study argues that certain cardinal points occur at which the authority of the senate or the 
custom of the ancestors becomes incapable of dealing with a challenge to the old 
dispensation. It was precisely at these points that the pontifex maximus showed himself to be 
an ‘auctor’ who drives forward a resolution or who, by virtue of his standing, represents an 
obstacle in the path of those forces trying to effect some change. As has already been noted, 
the overcoming of this impasse was almost always through acts of violence. 
 
d) Violence in the ‘late’ Republic 
Lintott’s (1968; 1999) remains a classic treatment of the phenomenon of the use of violence 
as a political tool. Lintott attempts to reconstruct the intellectual categories in which a Roman 
of this period would have ‘processed’ violent activity in the public square, concluding that 
personal enemies were invariably presented as enemies of the state. This is clearly the tactic 
which will be adopted by the pontifex maximus Scipio Nasica Serapio as he rallied the crowd 
against the tribune Tiberius Gracchus. Although we will discuss this episode in greater detail, 
it is worth noting how some theorists, including Flaig (2003), would see this as an instance of 
elite-led ‘consensual’ violence in which the people themselves would have been mobilised 
against the tribune’s assault on the most cherished principles of Republican democracy. 
Nippel (1995) notes that the higher magistrates enjoyed the means of controlled violence, as 
represented by the fasces: the fundamental spatial distinction of what lay either side of the 
city’s sacred boundary, the pomerium, meant that civil and military forms of discipline were 
kept separate (Nippel, 1995:4). What is problematic about Nasica’s actions was the importing 
of a stylised martial violence to the very heart of the civic space. Flower (2010) also observes 
the additional element of ‘transgression and pollution’ in the violent death of Tiberius and 
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these religious motives will recur throughout the remainder of the Republic. Although, as 
Woolf (2012) notes, it was at this point that the novelty of political murder was introduced, 
the seeds of violence had already been sown in the conflict between Octavius and Tiberius 
(Flower, 2010: 83). Of course the cycle of violence claimed many more victims in the 
century which follows and the murders of the pontifices maximi Scaevola and Caesar would 
be an occasion for many of the same arguments and justifications to be advanced by the 
perpetrators. So too, the religious aspects of these violent deaths will be a feature among 
contemporary (i.e. ancient) authors as well as theorists of our own day. The ways in which 
attempts have been made to legitimize and even restrain the tendency towards violence are 
exemplified in the ritual of consecratio and the measure of the senatus consultum ultimum. 
Many see Nasica’s actions on the Capitol as an attempt at rendering his cousin homo sacer, 
thereby casting him outside the realm of legal protection (a striking reversal for someone who 
had enjoyed sacrosanctitas) and the object of lawful killing. Agamben (1995) retrojects his 
philosophical interest in the place of the individual against the reality of ‘sovereign power’ 
into the origins of sacratio, exploring the seemingly contradictory categories of this ancient 
practice. The sanction of killing with impunity an individual who cannot be sacrificed offers 
an insight into the archaic operations of Rome’s laws which were, on many levels, religious 
in origin. Although the precise outlines of this practice had become blurred through 
infrequent use – a fact which left them open to political extemporisation – it is striking that 
the legitimizing force of such precedents could still be invoked in times of crisis. The Senatus 
Consultum ultimum is described as ‘another moment of homo sacer’ (van der Valt, 2005: 
135). It is a matter for conjecture whether the SC ultimum, an innovation of the second 
‘Gracchan crisis’, might not have emerged at this earlier juncture if there had been greater 
consensus within the senate, but Gaughan (2010) notes that much of the ‘blurred category’ 
issues affecting consecratio also engender a certain ambivalence on the part of the Romans 
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with regard to the final decree. Golden (2013) argues that, by the late Republic, the SC 
ultimum had institutionalized violence, ‘providing political cover to the executive’s decision 
to employ armed force even in situations where it would normally be unacceptable and 
illegal’ (2013: 221). 
 
Although much of the literature relating to religious violence tends to focus on late antiquity 
(Gaddis, 2005; Drake et al., 2006), some recent interest has been shown in the sacral 
dimension of officially sanctioned violence in the republican period. The clearest instance of 
this is the punishment of those found guilty of incestum with a Vestal (Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus, Antiquitates, 8.89.5. and 9.40.4, Livy 22.57.3). It was the responsibility of the 
pontifex maximus to order the beating to death of anyone convicted of sexual relations with a 
Vestal virgin.6 This particular sentence, an extreme form of the beating administered to a 
priestess for more minor lapses in her duties, took place within the sacred boundary of the 
city (Rüpke, 1992: 65). The Vestal herself would be tried before the pontifices and, if found 
guilty, would be buried alive (again within the pomerium); this may be understood as a 
response to the various levels on which Vestal ‘unchastity’ was considered offensive. Not 
only was it a breach of priestly discipline; the breaking of her vows made the Vestal a 
prodigium in herself. Mirroring the impenetrability of the sacred bounds of the city, the 
continued visibility of her ‘possessed’ body made her an intolerable sign of contradiction. 
Moreover, this symbolic representation of the city and its safety meant that her infidelity was 
also an act of treason (Parker, 2004: 585). These infractions – disciplinary, religious and 
‘political’ – collectively assumed the proportions of an offence which could only be remedied 
by a particularly elevated kind of violence: sacrifice. This action, however, did not derive 
                                                          
6
 Some – for example Rüpke (1992) and Coarelli (2011) – argue that it was the chief pontiff who 
carried out the sentence in person. 
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from the category of sacratio which we mentioned above; this was a reversal of the process 
by which the Vestal was first ‘seized’ by the chief pontiff. Now she would be handed back to 
the goddess and the earth of the patria, both of whom had been betrayed by her desecration 
(Kroppenberg, 2010: 431-432). Although the ‘blood’ of the Vestal would not be on his hands, 
the pontifex maximus was instrumental in the excision of this threat to the wellbeing of the 
state. 
 
Osiander (2000), following Galtung (1996), offers a template for analysing violence both in 
antiquity and in modern society. There is a distinction to be made between direct violence 
(caused by ‘identifiable individual actors’), structural violence (‘institutionalising an unfair 
distribution of advantages’) and cultural violence (where those structures of inequality are 
‘legitimated by belief systems’). The deepest substratum of violence, the cultural, in turn also 
legitimizes direct and structural violence, rendering them less ‘wrong’ than they otherwise 
might appear. All these forms of violence are, according to Osiander, strongly influenced by 
religious belief (2000: 762). Although Osiander’s grasp of the relationship between religion 
and politics is less sure,7 he does recognise the pontifex maximus as a figure of prominence in 
the wider culture of public life at Rome. We should recall of course, the etymological links 
between cultus, cultura and culter.8 The worship of the gods, so essential to the development 
of the ‘culture’ of Roman society, was often predicated on the use of the sacrificial knife: 
Várhelyi (2011: 137) argues that the phenomenon of political murder during the Republican 
period came to be framed in sacrificial terms. Recourse to such categories enabled diverse 
                                                          
7
 Osiander consistently opposes ‘secular’ authority (the senate) and ‘sacred’ power (the priests); he 
considers a function of the pontifex maximus was ‘to keep the priesthood under the control of the 
secular power’ (2000: 765). 
8
 All three words are predicated on the blade: both worship (including sacrifice) and the 
accoutrements of civilised society hark back to a link with the land and the practice of cutting the 
earth with the blade of the ploughshare (also culter). (Pliny, Hist. Nat. 18:48; Puhvel, 1964: 180). 
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groups to mark out ‘the other’ and to seek religious legitimation for turning ‘the knife’ on 
those who posed a threat to the peace of the gods (and whatever notion of order coincided 
with their own position). Várhelyi cites Publius Cornelius Scipio Nasica Serapio and Lucius 
Cornelius Merula as two emblematic examples of this use of violence dependent on the 
visible demonstration of priestly status. I shall also consider their actions – and the questions 
raised by them – at greater length, arguing that there is even more to say about sacro-political 
violence during this period.  
 
In this Introduction we have noted that, as popular unrest and competition among the elite 
intensified, the balancing mechanisms of the Republic struggled to cope. Vis increasingly 
became the default solution to settling both political and personal scores. The fact that the 
pontifex maximus was publicly associated with this violence from the outset, lending 
authority to its execution, meant that the failure of the res publica showed also in an 
undermining of confidence in the apotropaic power of religio. To put it bluntly, if a chief 
pontiff could be a ‘killer’, he could be killed: if the forms of ritual could be coopted in the 
suppression of one’s opponents, then one’s opponents could set aside vows and violate 
sanctuaries without scruple. I intend to show that the eventual process of rebalancing the res 
publica had to be seen to involve the pontifex maximus – and all that he represented – in an 
explicit way. 
Before doing so, however, it is necessary to take a closer look at just what the office of 
pontifex maximus represented and its imprint on the life of the city, using the ‘matrices’ 
outlined above. In order to better understand how the chief pontiff emerged as a distinct 
religious position – and was taken in different directions by successive holders of the office – 
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it is important to flesh out the development of its powers and prerogatives, as well as its 





The pontifex maximus in the Life of the City 
Although, as I have already indicated, scholarship on Roman religion and the pontifical 
college has gradually expanded in recent years, literature on the pontifex maximus is diffuse 
and focused on elements of activity rather than the office itself or the careers of significant 
figures as pontiffs. While these contributions will be considered throughout the rest of the 
thesis, a brief overview of the main literature will serve as a departure point for our argument. 
 
According to Mommsen, the chief pontifex was the titular head of the college and the other 
pontiffs assume the nature of an advisory council (Mommsen, 1887: 23); Mommsen was of 
the view that the high pontiff was possessed not only of a kind of imperium but also 
auspicium (the right to determine the ‘auspiciousness’ of the assemblies he was empowered 
to convoke [1887: 28; Linderski, 1986: 2215]): these were real and substantial quasi-
magisterial powers. For Wissowa, however, the pontifex maximus is more of a symbolic 
figure, embodying a somewhat more opaque priestly ‘Würde’ which he shares with his 
fellows (Wissowa, 1912: 509). By the time we reach the 1950s, German scholarship has 
revised the scope of the office in more restricted terms, the ‘chief’ priest is the servant of 
collegiality and unable to take decisions without the consent of the body as a whole 
(Bleicken, 1957:364); it should be remembered, however, that academic revisions are as 
subject to external influences as the office of pontifex maximus itself. At what point the 
pontifex maximus becomes a figure of real prominence in Roman religious life, eclipsing the 
other office of influence, the rex sacrorum, is hard to determine. Christopher Smith captures 
this narrative ambiguity, but makes a virtue out of it in linking it with a diffusion of religious 
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power and prerogative (Smith, 2007: 40). For Beard, this lack of central authority is wholly 
reflective of the ‘elusive and intangible’ nature of the Roman religious system itself (Beard, 
1990: 42). Similarly Rüpke, while recognising the enhanced position of the pontifex maximus 
due, in part, to his publicly elected status, maintains the view that all the pontiffs were 
possessed of a ‘distributed religious competence’ (Rüpke, 2006: 227). However his 
contention that priests were not as extensively involved in religious communication as is 
widely thought seems based only on the ‘spare time’ nature of priestly functions; the 
conclusion he then draws, that priests did not therefore benefit from their religious status so 
much as from their other public roles, is open to question. Rüpke is interested in the 
politicization of religion in the third century and argues that the lex Ogulnia of 300 B.C. 
marks a watershed in this process, much of it surrounding the pontificate itself.9 His analysis 
of the many factors at work, especially in the concentration of important priesthoods among a 
small number of noble families, is highly plausible; however, his assertion that the pontifex 
maximus ‘later became the highest priestly office’ (Rüpke, 2007:55) after (or as a result of) 
the lex is perplexing. John Scheid is of the view that the lex Ogulnia derived its importance 
from the offices it affected and not because the law somehow made this priesthood more of a 
prize or increased its relative standing (Scheid, 2001:87). Although Scheid is more emphatic 
in his treatment of the chief pontiff’s authority over the pontifical college, he is equally robust 
in maintaining the strict separation of roles between priest and magistrate (Scheid, 1998:111). 
While this distinction is wholly consistent with the broad framework of Roman magistracies 
and their competences, it does not entirely reflect the symbolic communication at the heart of 
Roman religion. This was not merely communication with the gods: the Romans were saying 
                                                          
9
 The lex Ogulnia, in reality a plebiscite, opened the pontifical and augural colleges to plebeians, as 
well as increasing their numbers. Our only ancient source is Livy, who mentions the lex in 10.6 and 
10.7. d’Ippolito (1985) sees the law as a stabilising and consolidating counter measure to Flavius’ 
publication of the legis actiones and dies fasti. For other commentary, see Valgaeren, 2012. The lex 
Ogulnia occupies a significant position in the timeline of ‘egalitarian’ law-making, predating the lex 
Hortensia – which made plebiscites binding on all citizens - by over a decade: however it took nearly 
fifty years before a plebeian was appointed pontifex maximus. 
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something about themselves in the exercise of the public and private cults. These religious 
activities mirror a complex range of social, as well as hieratic transactions. As we shall argue, 
a great deal of what Augustus was able to achieve in consolidating his position was rendered 
possible by the osmosis of priestly and political personae. Indeed, Scheid acknowledges as 
much in describing Augustus’ reviving of the rites surrounding the compita, the cult places of 
the crossroads: here, after his election as pontifex maximus, he was able to able to authorise 
religious activities which were part of a longer term political strategy (Scheid, 2009:296). Yet 
far from being an Augustan invention, there are signs that a symbolic ‘aura’ could be – and 
had been – attached to political actions by Republican pontifices maximi for quite some time. 
 
Linderski (2002) extensively examines Scipio Nasica’s involvement in the death of Tiberius 
Gracchus. In a minute analysis of Nasica’s actions, Linderski finds them curiously deliberate 
for a supposed crime of oligarchic passion. Most interesting, for our purposes, is his 
evocation of the pontifex maximus in Festus’ emphatic phrase – iudex atque arbiter rerum 
divinarum humanarumque (Linderski, 2002: 365; Festus, 200 L.). Although Festus was 
writing at the high-point of the emperor-pontiffs, Linderski is certainly correct in seeing this 
episode as an exercise in pontifical power which crossed a political boundary and would 
continue to cross such boundaries in the succeeding centuries. While there are some 
conclusions drawn by Linderski which are open to question, this contribution to the debate 
remains one of which every subsequent researcher in this field must take account: Wiseman 
(2009) is a case in point, taking Linderski’s study as near normative. 
 
In terms of the functions of the pontifex maximus, Van Haeperen (2002) offers an invaluable 
technical overview; although, as her title Le Collège Pontifical suggests, the emphasis is very 
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much on the collegial activities of the chief pontiff. She is scrupulous in avoiding discussion 
of the swirl of politics around the pontifices maximi of the late Republic. In this regard, Van 
Haeperen illustrates a lingering tendency in some circles of classical scholarship to focus on 
the procedural aspects of Roman religion and keep the complex web of political and personal 
interactions as far out of the picture as possible.  
 
Many of these interactions depended on the how the pontifices maximi and those around them 
understood the nature of the office. As we shall see, there was ‘room for manoeuvre’ even in 
the meaning of the word pontifex itself. 
 
The etymology of pontifex maximus 
The origins of the pontifices have been lost in the period where myth meets history. One 
suggestion, indeed the theory with widest currency in contemporary scholarship (as well as 
being favoured by Varro), is that the pontiffs originally had a particular connection with the 
notion of bridges – hence the combination of pons and facere (Van Haeperen, 2002: 44). The 
creation of these structures which spanned perilous or impassable spaces, allowing the 
transfer of people and goods from one ‘side’ to another is an activity with clear religious 
parallels. Support for this (meta)physical bridge-building etymology can be found in the 
pontifical ritual surrounding the pons sublicius: nam ab his Sublicius est factus primum ut 
restitutus saepe, cum ideo sacra et uls et cis Tiberim non mediocri ritu fiant (Varro, de 
Lingua Latina, 5.83).10 The Sublician bridge was an object of particular reverence for the 
Romans as the first to span the Tiber. Rendered something of a symbol of Roman resistance 
                                                          
10
 For the Sublician bridge was first built by them and repaired frequently by them, and for that reason 
religious rites are carried out on both sides of the Tiber with no small ceremony. 
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by Cocles’ legendary defence of the city, the bridge remained a wooden structure long after 
construction in stone became the norm. According to Varro, it was the pontifex maximus and 
his colleagues who attended to the repair and ritual upkeep of what must at times have been a 
fragile crossing. Servius, in his commentary on the Aeneid, also mentions the pons Sublicius, 
albeit linked – somewhat confusingly – with the Palladium (Servius Auctus, Aen. 2:166). The 
Mid-May rites of the Argei, perhaps a substitute for human sacrifice, involved the pontiffs 
and the Vestals in casting wicker effigies from the bridge into the Tiber (Hallett, 1970: 223; 
Takács, 2008: 46).  
 
Such well-attested ‘pontifical’ activities do not exhaust the possible understandings of this 
office. Although less current, partly due to the slightly more strained etymology, Varro also 
offered an alternative: Pontufices, ut Scaevola Quintus pontufex maximus dicebat, a posse et 
facere, ut potentifices.11 This was, Varro notes, the preferred etymology of Quintus Mucius 
Scaevola, himself both pontiff and chief pontiff: This rendering, as if the term were ‘a 
syncopation of pontentifex’ (Hallett, 1970: 220) offers an interesting insight into the way the 
office was understood ‘from within’. Scaevola seems to have been struck by the potential of 
the office: here, it seems, was a way of conceiving an individual’s capacity to act in ways 
which others could not or, to continue the analogy of language, to inflect existing 
formulations of religious and political action in ways which not only symbolised a kind of 
power but created it. Scaevola’s understanding of the ‘priest of the possible’ is especially 
interesting given the way he responded to the tug-of-war between Sulla, Marius and Cinna. 
 
                                                          
11
 The pontifices, as Quintus Scaevola the pontifex maximus said, were named from posse ‘to be able’ 
and facere ‘to do’, as though from potentifices. 
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Moreover, allusions to power are also to be found in the etymologies proposed by Dionysius 
of Halicarnassus (ἐξουσία 2.73:1) and Plutarch, although here Plutarch attributes the ‘potens’ 
aspect (actually transcribing the Latin) to the service of the gods themselves ‘who are 
powerful and supreme over all the world’ (Numa, 9:1).  
 
The fact that these ancient sources identified a connection with power, authority and freedom 
to act is of interest to us as we discuss the perceptions and interpretations of those who held 
the office. Yet no matter how intellectually appealing (and, for the purposes of this thesis, 
convenient) the Scaevolan etymology might be, in the last analysis it does not entirely matter 
which derivation is favoured by current philologists.  Arguably of greater significance is the 
further designation maximus. Romans were seldom given to superlative appellations in public 
life: the honorific of the Fabii Maximi is a rare instance and, outwith the field of religious 
offices, we do not find ‘maximus’ appended to any public official in Republican Rome.12 The 
fact that the headship of the priestly college was not automatically conferred on the eldest or 
most experienced member but could, in theory and frequent practice, be won by a much 
younger man suggests that the prospect of becoming ‘maximus’ would not have been a 
matter of indifference to an ambitious Roman. No one who held the office of chief pontiff 
before his first consulship failed to reach it thereafter.  
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 The chief Vestal was sometimes referred to as virgo Vestalis maxima. The office of curio maximus 
had become largely defunct by the end of the Republic; the notion of augur maximus is dubious and 
now widely disregarded, Linderski, 1986: 2154); the precise nature (indeed the existence) of a praetor 




The pontifices and the pontifical college 
Although, unlike other contemporary cultures, a specifically priestly order was unknown at 
Rome, the religious life of the city was itself highly organized. The creation of different 
priestly collegia was as much a reflection of élite competition as the product of increasing 
specialization within the functions of cult, divination and prodigy expiation. Ensuring that a 
range of options was available to ambitious individuals and influential clans was key to 
regulating a system in which priestly office was an accompaniment to the cursus honorum. 
 
To this end Walsh offers a fair account of the Roman religious environment: 
 
Though private households maintained their own shrines and made modest offerings to their 
household gods, Roman religion was predominantly the province of the state, conducted 
scrupulously by ritual and cult… The conduct of Roman religion was managed by the 
politicians. The senate was endowed with supreme authority in all matters religious. They 
delegated decisions to the four main priesthoods… but the individuals appointed to these 
offices were not a priestly caste, but men active in public affairs. (Walsh, 1997: xxiii-xxiv)   
  
It is worth emphasising Walsh’s point that those who held priesthoods, apart from a very few 
exceptions, were not precluded from engagement at all levels of Roman political life. It was a 
regular occurrence that a consul who also happened to be a pontiff would be called to carry 
out a sacrifice in the name of the people, but he would be acting in his capacity as consul, not 
as priest. Magistrates could offer sacrifices as competently as priests – indeed in offering 
sacrifices they were exercising a priestly function. In terms of a hierarchy of prestige, despite 
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some attempts to argue for the augurs as the pre-eminent group (Hahn, 1963: 75, of course 
following Cicero), the majority of the ancient sources agree that the pontiffs ‘scrutinize all 
the offices to which sacrifice or service to the gods is assigned’ (Dionysius of Halicarnassus 
2.73) and held first place. Even within the college there was a clear differentiation of roles 
and responsibilities: the collegium pontificum consisted of (in terms of ‘priority’) – 
 
1. The Rex Sacrorum 
2. The flamines maiores (the flamen Dialis, or priest of Jupiter; the flamen Martialis, or 
priest of Mars; the flamen Quirinalis, or priest of Quirinus) 
3. The pontifex maximus and the pontifices 
4. The pontifices ‘minores’ 
5. The flamines minores (twelve in number, attached to specific but obscure deities) 
6. The Vestal Virgins. 
 
Another reason for the pontifical college to be ranked first among the four principal collegia 
was the fact that it boasted the largest number of religious specialists and, as a consequence, 
had the widest ‘reach’ of all. There were originally three pontiffs, all patrician, who perhaps 
played an advisory role during the monarchic period (Van Haeperen, 2002: 69). This 
patrician dominance was to be a feature of the office for centuries. 
 
The lex Ogulnia increased the number of pontiffs to nine and ensured that four had to be of 
plebeian origin. As Lintott argues, this was probably because plebeian families had had their 
sights on those priesthoods with the greatest political clout, and that is why popular election –
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or a form of it – was gradually introduced (Lintott, 1999a: 185). In the middle of the 1st 
century B.C., however, the process of co-optation still held good, whereby vacancies in the 
college were filled by the members choosing their preferred candidates from among the ranks 
of senators (Rüpke, 2007:217). An unsuccessful attempt to introduce elections to the college 
had been attempted by the tribune Crassus in 145 but this initiative had been defeated by the 
praetor Laelius (Cic. de Am. 25, Brut. 21, de Nat. Deor. 3.2). 
 
The pontifices were charged with the general supervision of the public cult in its various 
expressions and exercised a teaching function vis-à-vis the people in the matter of religious 
‘explanation’ and instruction (Livy 1.20.6-7; Wiseman, 2008: 32). This entailed the 
maintenance of Roman religion in its traditional forms and the scrutiny of imported cults; 
provided they were not a source of disruption, foreign religions were allowed to proceed 
according to their own lights (Rüpke, 2007:30).  
 
An obvious – and extreme – example of this was the measures taken by the consuls Quintus 
Marcius and Spurius Postumius against the Bacchanalia in 186 B.C. Although there are some 
inconsistencies in the vivid Livian account (Livy, 39.8-19), we know that the senate took 
decisive action in the face of a pluriform threat to the Roman way of life. In its broadest 
outlines, this threat arose from the expansion of the cult of Bacchus – expansion both in terms 
of geography and in the numbers of adherents from all strata of Roman society – which came 
to assume the characteristics of an intestina coniuratio. The excesses of the Bacchanalia were 
well known to the authorities, but the relatively discreet nature of the cult meant that it 
seldom posed a serious problem to the moral stability of the res publica, nor did it deprive the 
native rites of their proper place and rightful esteem. Among the inconsistencies in Livy is the 
42 
 
idea of a sudden discovery of the scope of the problem by the senate; more probable is that 
the senate took advantage of a rare pause in foreign wars to turn its attention to this internal 
matter (Beard et al., 1998a: 93). This does not quite explain why the decision was taken to 
carry out what proved to be a brutal repression of the Bacchic movement. The alleged 
activities of the initiates – from forgery of wills to murder – were objectively illicit (Bayet, 
1992: 168), but it is probable that other factors were influential in the decision to act with 
such decisiveness. Livy’s emphasis on the subversive prominence of women is less likely to 
have been a factor than the potential influence of the cult on Rome’s political class (Schultz, 
2006:83; Nippel, 1995: 29) and there is always the possibility that punitive action was being 
taken against a Greek cult at a time when suspicion of Hellenism was in the ascendant 
(North, 2000: 64). 
 
Against this background of social, political and religious upheaval, it is important to note the 
influence of the pontifical college in the drawing up of the senatus consultum which 
addressed the Bacchanalian ‘menace’.13 Of the three senators listed as present at the drafting 
of the decree, two, Valerius Flaccus and Claudius Marcellus were pontiffs. Bauman notes that 
the pontifex maximus at the time, P. Licinius Crassus Dives had been an ordinary member of 
the college in 213 and had influenced the decreta pontificum used by the consul Postumius to 
reassure the people in the wake of the suppression nearly thirty years later (Bauman, 1990: 
345). It was also the pontiffs who intervened with a decree to carry out religious observances 
to appease the gods and calm the worried populace when menacing portents were seen in the 
wake of this fraught episode (Livy 39.22.3-4; Février, 2009: 233). 
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 ILS 18; ILLRP 511. 
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The response to this crisis, real or invented, permits an insight into the way in which 
pontifical opinions would be crucial in determining the senatorial decision. As Pagán 
observes, the perceived threat had more to do with the creation of a counter-state than the 
religious cult itself (Pagán, 2004: 55); that said, the fact that this parallel republic already had 
a defined priestly structure which crossed both class and gender lines meant that a 
fundamental principle of the Roman religious establishment was at stake. Such subversion 
could only conflict with all that the collegium pontificum, with all its legal and procedural 
gravitas, stood for. The restrictions which were placed on the cult clearly bear the imprint of 
pontifical expertise, perhaps most clearly in the provisions of the decree concerning the 
destruction of existing Bacchic shrines exstrad quam sei quid ibei sacri est (‘unless they 
contain anything which is sacred’); this is wholly consistent with the pontifices’ 
preoccupation with the inviolability of cult spaces, tombs, altars etc. Again, typically, such 
measures ensured that a legitimate cult could be allowed to continue within the parameters set 
for it until such time as another pontifex maximus, Caesar, saw fit to liberalise the worship of 
Bacchus once again (Luisi, 2006: 155).  
 
Collectively, the pontifices constituted an advisory body of the senate and offered advice on 
matters remitted to it by the senate as a whole or by individual magistrates. This might, for 
example, be a sensitive matter of sacred law, such as the investigation of the Bona Dea affair 
in 62 B.C. or the precise formulation of the indigitamenta, the ‘function specific’ invocation 
of the gods.14 Lipka argues that this privileged access to ritual procedure dated from a time 
when the ‘bridge builders’ would have been technical experts and, crucially, able to write and 
perform calculations. Thus, he argues, the sacred expertise of the pontifical college had its 
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origins in the very practical ‘skills set’ of royal officials (Lipka, 2009: 71-72). By the middle 
of the second century B.C., however, the skills of the college were very much directed 
towards the governance of activities which would have only the most tenuous links with 
Lipka’s constructed past. Some measure of calculation was required for the process of 
intercalation, the insertion of days and even whole months to ensure the correct passing of 
seasons and proper observance of festivals. Alongside the sacra publica, the pontiffs also had 
a watching brief over the religious implications of family life: certain forms of marriage, 
adoption and the very important field of testamentary law and the maintenance of tombs 
(Crook, 1984:134). 
 
Although all the sacerdotes publici, those designated by Varro as ‘sacerdotes universi a 
sacris dicti’ (L.L.5.15.83), namely the pontiffs, augurs and decemviri sacris faciundis, shared 
a concern for the religious dimension of daily life, there was a clear sense of delineated 
responsibilities. Cicero notes the distinction between sacra and auspicia (de Natura Deorum 
3.2.5) and the respective competences of the pontifices and the augurs. As an augur himself, 
Cicero had an understandable tendency to elevate the status of the augural college: Rome 
was, after all, founded on the principles of auspicy and augury (Takács, 2000: 302). The fact 
remains, however, that the collegium pontificum had assumed a different profile by Cicero’s 
day precisely because its structure – with a pontifex maximus at its head – lent it cohesiveness 
and a standing which no other priestly grouping could equal.  
 
One area in which the particular competences of Roman priests came closest to overlap was 
in the identification and, if necessary, expiation of prodigia: ‘divagations from the order of 
nature, eclipses, earthquakes, monstrous births and so forth’ (Nock 2003 [1939]: 94) which 
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were routinely interpreted as expressions of displeasure among the gods. Since the gods were 
also, in a sense, citizens of Rome (Scheid, 2001:69-70), the senate took the task of classifying 
these portents and repairing the pax deorum very seriously and was mindful of the different 
strands of expertise to which it had recourse. In addressing the implications of a prodigium, 
the senate could turn to the haruspices, ancient experts in the Etruscan discipline of 
divination, as well as the proponents of the ritus Graecus, the consultation of the Sibylline 
texts by the decemvirs. Livy (27.37) records an incident in 207 B.C. in which these schools of 
practice made parallel interventions; after a series of unsettling omens in which the pontiffs 
had made their own recommendations, the birth of a hermaphrodite caused the haruspices to 
advise that the infant be cast alive into the sea – dealing with Androgynes was their field of 
particular competence (Rosenberger, 2007: 295). The pontifices, however, had devised a new 
ritual in which twenty-seven virgins were to process through the city singing a specially 
commissioned hymn. While this ritual was being performed, a lightning strike on the temple 
of Jupiter Stator brought the expiation rites to a halt and necessitated the involvement of the 
decemviri who, in their turn, prescribed additional measures. Rasmussen (2003: 182) 
considers this illustrative of ‘a division of labour and parity among the three priesthoods 
without any hint of enmity, competition of ranking hierarchy’. Although Livy draws no 
conclusions about this threefold expiation and the interactions of the specialists (Santangelo, 
2013a: 167), the fact that new rituals are created demonstrates that neither pontiffs nor 
decemvirs were constrained by their ‘discipline’ and so could be innovators as well as 
conservators. But even in this respect the pontifical college enjoyed greater freedom.  
 
Although the Sibylline books conferred a particular authority on their keepers, the over-
arching juridical authority of the pontiffs meant that, whatever the origin of the measure 
indicated to appease the gods, the ritus patrius often predominated (Février, 2002: 33). This 
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is perhaps because the libri kept by the pontiffs came to constitute a repository of lore and 
expiatory practices (Berthelet, 2011: 3); while the texts of the decemvirs remained, of 
necessity, always the same, the pontifical books were an expanding corpus of knowledge and 
it was the same college which was consulted as a matter of course in the drafting of the 
senate’s consulta. Berthelet argues that this primary role of the collegium pontificum means 
that, in those instances where no particular group of priests is credited with an intervention, 
we should attribute the ‘resolution’ of the case to the pontifices (Berthelet, 2011:6).15 Given 
that augurs also kept written records of their scientia (Linderski, 1986: 2233), it is not clear 
why these augural texts did not assume the same profile or authority as the pontifical annals; 
nor can we easily account for the dearth of reference to augural activity in the process of 
procuratio. One potential hypothesis is that the incorporation of elements of these records in 
the Annales Maximi meant that the pontiffs, under the presidency of the chief pontiff, came to 
be the channel for public dissemination of prodigies and their expiation. Not only would this 
be a reference for the public at large, but it would also be indispensable to the incoming 
consuls who had to undertake a procuratio prodigorum at the start of the year (Pina Polo, 
2011b: 100). The fact that Cicero, who was of course an augur, is unable to furnish much 
information about the content of the Annales Maximi suggests that he did not have immediate 
access to the text itself (Drews, 1998: 297). While the chief pontiff Scaevola may have 
produced a definitive collation of the pontifical records in the aftermath of the Gracchan 
crisis, we may assume that the college continued to set down their activities and opinions in a 
separate archive. The diminishing interest in the recording of prodigies from the start of the 
first century B.C. may have something to do with the equally prodigious political upheavals 
of the time (Bollan, 2012: 341) or the increasing Academic scepticism which interested 
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 Rosenberger’s assertion that ‘Pontiffs played a marginal role’ in expiatory practices (2007: 295) is 
an argumentum e silentio based on Livy’s lacunose sources and does not take account of the more 
recent scholarship of Février (2002) and others. 
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Cicero (Schofield, 1986: 47). Still, although this one aspect of pontifical activity may have 
entered upon a trajectory of gradual decline, the pontiffs continued to exercise a not 
insignificant role in the senate’s religious deliberations. Although not all pontifices were 
members of the senate (there is still some vagueness about this in certain quarters, e.g. Orlin, 
2007:6016), they were, as we have seen, collectively associated with its authority and with the 
auctoritas of the pontifex maximus. 
 
The development of the pontifex maximus and its relationship with the collegium 
pontificum 
As we have seen, a fundamental preoccupation of the Roman people, from their earliest days, 
was the maintenance of harmonious relations with the gods – especially Rome’s tutelary 
deities. This concern for the pax deorum demonstrates a typically Roman micro/macro 
approach to its constituent relationships, whereby the formal dependencies of individuals and 
clans are replicated in the diligent cultivation of divine patrons. (Or, it might also be argued, 
the concordia civium was underwritten by the clear lines of benefaction and support between 
the gods and their ‘clients’; Scheid, 2013: 214). The pontifex maximus was one of a number 
of religious personnel with a key interest in maintaining these lines of communication in 
good order; indeed according to the quasi-mythical accounts, the chief pontiff is one of a 
small number of ‘proto-specialists’ from the pre-republican period.  
 
Numa, the legendary second king of Rome, emerges as a figure of singular importance in the 
history of Roman religious practices, both as an innovator and a consolidator of existing ideas 
– not least in his creation of the pontifical college. Gordon notes that Livy’s treatment of the 
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 Cicero states explicitly that some were not: cf. ad Atticum 4.2.4. 
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far-reaching power of religion at Rome is made with Numa in mind (1990: 193; cf Livy 
1.20). Warde Fowler (1911) operates on the presumption that the pontifical college existed 
during the Monarchy and supported the rex in his sacral functions as the embodiment of 
priestly power. The expulsion of Tarquinius Superbus and the establishment of Republican 
institutions did not substantially affect the nature of Roman religion, merely the officials 
charged with overseeing its functions. 
 
In both etymologies of pontifex mentioned above, we noted the emphasis on doing, and this is 
entirely consistent with the Roman understanding of religion as performative and based on 
prescribed actions. Szemler (1971:106) emphasises the pontifex maximus’ role in pre-
announcing the indigitamenta, the propitious ritual formulae, to the magistrate carrying out 
the sacrifice. Yet the really distinct contribution of the pontifex maximus to Roman life lay 
more in his jurisdiction of religious (and some civil) matters than in the exercise of cult which 
was as much the province of Rome’s patresfamilias and magistrates as its priests. The chief 
pontiff held a position of pre-eminence over the principal functionaries of Roman religion, 
the quattuor collegia amplissima of the pontiffs, augurs, decemviri (later quindecemviri) and 
tresviri epulonum (later septemviri).17 Although a member of the pontifical college, the chief 
pontiff’s more extensive oversight is attested by Livy’s enumeration of the college’s 
membership at eight instead of nine (Broughton, 1951: 282, 393). The fact that Livy omits 
the pontifex maximus suggests that he was perceived as standing over and above these other 
groupings.  Despite this pre-eminence, the chief pontifex was technically ranked below four 
of his colleagues (Carter, 1915: 9), appearing fifth in Festus’ ‘ordo sacerdotum’ after the rex 
and the three major flamines (Ridley, 2005: 281). 
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 On jurisdiction of the weightiest matters, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Antiquitates, 2.73.1-2; on the 
particular duties of the pontifex maximus towards the gods, Plutarch, Numa, 9.4. 
49 
 
(a) The pontifex maximus and the rex sacrorum 
The real ascendancy of the pontifex maximus may be traced, at least according to Livy, to the 
expulsion of the kings and the gradual erosion of the prestige of the rex sacrorum (or rex 
sacrificulus). According to our best estimates, the office of rex – as the name implies – 
assumed most of the religious duties of the king. To what extent this role was a public 
function of the rex as ‘head of state’ or the gradual expansion of his cultic responsibilities as 
paterfamilias of the domus regia to the nation as a whole, is impossible to reconstruct 
(Dumézil, 1996:576).18 As Livy records, the architects of the nascent Republic wished to 
ensure that potestas sacra was kept separate from the civil power and devolved many of the 
former royal religious prerogatives to the rex sacrificulus (Livy 2:2.1-2).19 Although perhaps 
initially an expression of that preference for shared office so central to the Republican 
system, the pontifex maximus was always superior to the rex. Given the negative connotations 
of the appellation ‘rex’, effective measures were put in place to ensure that no other means of 
acquiring political power were open to the holders of this priesthood. 20  With no such 
restrictions placed upon the pontifex maximus, the foreclosing of public office may well have 
been the root-shock which led to the eventual withering of the rex sacrorum as a prized 
position. Moreover, the chief pontiff’s power to select the rex was not only an opportunity to 
exercise political clout but, just as with the appointment of flamines, an occasion to indulge in 
strategic instances of promoveatur ut amoveatur. 
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 Like the flamines, and perhaps a further indication of the domestic parallels of some aspects of 
Roman cult, the rex sacrorum was complemented by his wife as regina. Warde Fowler suggests that 
the flamines, ‘the kindlers’, corresponded to the sons of the royal household (1899: 147). 
19
 Attempting to resolve the question of why the office of rex sacrorum was created in the first place, 
Cornell (1995) makes an interesting but ultimately speculative case for a dual monarchy in 6th century 
B.C. Rome. In Cornell’s view, the rex sacrorum was indeed the ‘old king’ in a much reduced 
ceremonial role, while a magister populi exercised political power. What was overthrown by the 
‘republic’ was the rule of the tyrant, while the rex was allowed to retain his functions under the 
supervision of the pontifex maximus. (Cornell, 1995: 236). 
20
 This also seems to have been the case with the flamen Dialis, who may have acquired some of the 
king’s duties during the monarchical period (Livy 1.20:2; Holleman, 1973:226). 
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Livy offers an account of an interesting dispute between the pontifex maximus and a reluctant 
rex in 180: 
 
de rege sacrificulo sufficiendo in locum Cn. Cornelii Dolabellae contentio inter C. Seruilium 
pontificem maximum fuit et L. Cornelium Dolabellam duumuirum naualem, quem ut 
inauguraret pontifex magistratu sese abdicare iubebat. recusantique id facere ob eam rem multa 
duumuiro dicta a pontifice, deque ea, cum prouocasset, certatum ad populum. cum plures iam 
tribus intro uocatae dicto esse audientem pontifici duumuirum iuberent, multamque remitti, si 
magistratu se abdicasset, uitium de caelo, quod comitia turbaret, interuenit. religio inde fuit 
pontificibus inaugurandi Dolabellae. P. Cloelium Siculum inaugurarunt, qui secundo loco 
nominatus erat. exitu anni et C. Seruilius Geminus pontifex maximus decessit: idem 
decemuirsacrorum fuit. pontifex in locum eius a collegio cooptatus est Q. Fuluius Flaccus: 
creatus indepontifex maximus M. Aemilius Lepidus, cum multi clari uiri petissent (Livy 
40.42:6).21 
 
This episode is illuminating in many respects, not least in recording a phase of rapid change 
in the major colleges, but also in the insight it may offer into the inner working of the 
pontifical college itself. The fact that Lucius Dolabella is unwilling to follow his brother and 
yet is still subject to a fine suggests that the chief pontiff’s nomination was sufficient to bring 
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 The filling of the vacancy caused by the death of Gnaeus Cornelius Dolabella, the rex sacrificulus, 
led to a dispute between the pontifex maximus C. Servilius and L. Cornelius Dolabella, one of the two 
naval duumvirs. The pontiff required him to resign his post so that he might inaugurate him. Upon his 
refusal, the pontiff imposed a fine upon him, and on his appeal the question of the fine was argued 
before the people. When several of the tribes summoned had declared that the naval duumvir should 
comply with the pontiff's ruling, and that if he resigned his post the fine should be remitted, a 
thunderstorm interrupted the assembly. The pontiffs were thus prevented on religious grounds from 
appointing Dolabella, and they inaugurated P. Cloelius Siculus, who had the next largest number of 
votes. At the close of the year the pontifex maximus died. C. Servilius Geminus was not only pontifex 
maximus, but also one of the Decemvirs. Q. Fulvius Flaccus was co-opted by the college as one of the 
pontiffs, and M. Aemilius Lepidus was made pontifex maximus in place of Geminus from among 
many distinguished competitors. 
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him into the college, albeit without the formal inauguration: to all intents and purposes, 
Dolabella was the rex sacrificulus and his failure to comply with the pontiff’s wishes was a 
matter of internal indiscipline. Dolabella’s resistance to his appointment further suggests that, 
even by this relatively late stage, those post-monarchical career restrictions imposed on the 
rex had not been relaxed, marking an abrupt end to the cursus honorum. It is also worth 
noting that Servilius Geminus was both pontifex maximus and decemvir (a position he must 
have held since youth; Rüpke, 2008: 891); there seems to have no mechanism to force 
someone who had been co-opted into a ‘higher’ college to relinquish their position in a lower 
one, perhaps because of the rarity of such an occurrence. Szemler argues that such ‘dual 
priesthoods’ were a feature of the state of emergency which characterised the Hannibalic 
Wars and that it was not until the time of Caesar that the combination of priesthoods became 
a ‘normal’ practice (Szemler, 1974: 73). 
 
What is also interesting about this conflict is not merely the disciplinary intervention of the 
pontifex maximus, but the way in which it underscores how the ancient ‘royal’ priesthood had 
been both symbolically and literally displaced by the chief pontificate. This change had 
already been reflected in the use of the regia at the heart of the forum. What was to become 
the centre of operations of the pontifical college had prior occupants: no doubt Dolabella had 
been summoned to appear before the college at the regia.  The regia, as the name suggests, 
was a building with regal associations; even if it cannot be ascertained if it was originally the 
king’s residence – Ovid has it the dwelling of Numa 22  - it came to be the official 
‘headquarters’ of the rex sacrorum. At some indeterminate point, however, it ceased to serve 
this purpose and the only other location we have for the ‘king of sacrifices’ is his home on the 
Velia (Richardson, 1994:328); thereafter the complex on the lower slopes of the sacra via 
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 Ovid, Fasti 6.263-264. 
52 
 
became permanently associated with the office of the pontifex maximus.  Although the entire 
forum could be considered a sacred space, the precincts of the regia, adjoining the domus 
publica (the chief pontiff’s grace-and-favour residence) and the house of the Vestals, were an 
area of particular resonance. 
 
(b) The pontifex maximus and the flamines 
The three flamines maiores – priests of Jupiter, Mars and Quirinus – were always patrician 
and, as well as an array of privileges (such as travelling by carriage to the sacra publica), 
they were also subject to a number of taboos which hampered the pursuit of a normal political 
career. Even though these limits were less stringent for the priests of Mars and Quirinus than 
for the flamen of Jupiter,23 it would be late in the life of the Republic before they too could 
have their duties delegated to the pontiffs, ‘governed by priestly law under the supreme 
responsibility of the pontifex maximus’ (Turcan, 2000: 53). As well as being empowered to 
carry out the inauguration of new flamines, the chief pontiff was also instrumental in 
receiving the flamines into the college (captio) – and this was a prerogative which could also 
lead to internal conflicts, particularly if this selection was not willingly accepted. Livy speaks 
of forced inauguration as a moral corrective: 
 
et flaminem Dialem inuitum inaugurari coegit P. Licinius pontifex maximus C. Valerium 
Flaccum; decemuirum sacris faciundis creatus in locum Q. Muci Scaeuolae demortui C. 
Laetorius. causam inaugurari coacti flaminis libens reticuissem, ni ex mala fama in bonam 
uertisset. ob adulescentiam neglegentem luxuriosamque C. Flaccus flamen captus a P. Licinio 
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pontifice maximo erat, L. Flacco fratri germano cognatisque aliis ob eadem uitia inuisus. is ut 
animum eius cura sacrorum et caerimoniarum cepit, ita repente exuit antiquos mores ut nemo 
tota iuuentute haberetur prior nec probatior primoribus patrum, suis pariter alienisque, esset 
(Livy, 28:8.4-10) 24   
 
This pontifex maximus is Publius Licinius Crassus Dives, head of the college from 213/2 until 
183 B.C. Some seven or eight years before attaining the consulship, he accomplished a 
prodigious victory in the election for chief pontiff, defeating two censors. His activity in the 
office attests to a thorough grounding in pontifical law (proposing several leges de 
sacerdotiis) and an awareness of his disciplinary powers, punishing a Vestal for allowing the 
sacred fire to go out (Livy, 28.11:6) as well as other ritual interventions (Livy 33.44: 1). 
Crassus also seems to have been conscious of the restrictions placed upon him by his office, 
declining a consular posting outside Italy on account of his religious duties (Szemler, 1972: 
99). It is hard to determine whether his intervention in the life of Gaius Flaccus – in 209 - was 
indeed born of a paternalistic concern for his welfare or the emergence of a pattern for later 
conflicts with reluctant flamines and others within the college. In 189 Crassus restrained the 
flamen Quirinalis, Quintus Fabius, from abandoning his religious responsibilities to the city 
to take up a province (Livy, 37.51:1). A year earlier, during a period of heightened religious 
sensitivity, the consul who had been awarded the province of Macedonia was instructed to 
                                                          
24
 P. Licinius, the pontifex maximus, obliged C. Valerius Flaccus to be consecrated Flamen of Jupiter 
against his will. C. Laetorius was appointed one of the decemviri in place of Q. Mucius Scaevola, who 
had died. I would have preferred to keep silence as to the cause of this forced consecration were it not 
for his bad reputation giving way to a good one. It was because of his careless and dissolute life as a 
young man, which had estranged his own brother Lucius and his other relations, that the pontifex 
maximus made him a Flamen. When his thoughts became wholly occupied with the performance of 
his sacred duties, he threw off his old way of life so completely that amongst all the young men in 
Rome, none held a higher place in the esteem and approval of the leading sentors, whether personal 
friends or strangers to him.  
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vow games to Jupiter. Sulpicius Galba, the consul in question, had promised a votum ex 
incerta pecunia (a vow based on an unspecified sum of money) but the pontifex maximus had 
objected to this on the grounds that the costs of war should be kept separate from the costs of 
peace (with the gods). As Livy reports, ‘quamquam et res et auctor mouebat’, this dispute 
was remitted to the judgement of the rest of the pontifices who found in Galba’s favour (Livy 
31.9: 5). This is significant for two reasons: firstly it demonstrates some of the practical 
issues confronting even the most assertive pontifex maximus. What could the chief pontiff do 
if, as seems to have been the case here, there were pontifices with other vested interests?25 
Crassus seems to have accepted the majority view and, either in a show of magnanimity or 
simply reasserting his status, dictated the vow to the consul. Although Crassus represents a 
high pontiff with a clear sense of his own auctoritas, it would appear that his exercise of this 
authority was circumscribed by a sense of precedent and process. His namesake (by adoption) 
in 131 would have no such qualms: although it reads like a replay of the events of 189, the 
later conflict between pontifex and flamen was different in one significant respect:  
 
Cum Aristonico bellum gerendum fuit P. Licinio L. Valerio consulibus. Rogatus est populus, 
quem id bellum gerere placeret. Crassus consul, pontifex maximus, Flacco collegae, flamini 
Martiali, multam dixit, si a sacris discessisset: quam multam populus [Romanus] remisit, 
pontifici tamen flaminem parere iussit. (Cicero, Philippic 11.18) 26 
 
                                                          
25
 There were two other Sulpicii in the pontifical college at this time (Rüpke, 2008: 768). 
26
 War was to be waged against Aristonicus in the consulship of Publius Licinius and Lucius Valerius. 
The people consulted as to whom it wished to have the management of that war. Crassus, the consul 
and pontifex maximus, threatened to impose a fine upon Flaccus his colleague, the priest of Mars if he 
deserted the sacrifices. And though the people remitted the fine, still they ordered the priest to submit 
to the commands of the pontiff. 
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This Crassus is dealing with the flamen not simply as a subordinate but also as a rival. An 
apparent disciplinary measure is also a political tactic, one which has been made possible by 
a significant change in the relationship between the chief pontiff and the city. As we will 
discuss further in chapter two, by this time is no longer unthinkable for the pontifex maximus 
to be absent from Italy for extended indefinite periods. 
 
(c) The pontifex maximus and the Vestals 
The proximity of the chief pontiff’s residence in the domus publica to the house of the 
Vestals has been read as an indication of the pontifex maximus’ quasi-paternal authority over 
them: not even a sacrosanct household was exempt from some form of patria potestas. Beard 
et al. (1998a:58) suggest that, while the pontifex maximus did not have an extensive range of 
religious or ritual functions which he alone could perform, the exclusivity of his relationship 
to the Vestals is a mark of a superiority which may antedate the end of the Monarchy.27 It 
was the pontifex maximus who inducted new entrants into the ranks of the Vestals in a 
ceremony which included a gesture of captio, recalling the ritual seizing of the bride found in 
the Roman marriage ceremony. A further potential allusion to marriage is noted by Beard 
(1980:14), who sees the pontifex maximus addressing of the child-candidate as Amata (if it 
does indeed mean ‘beloved’ in this context) as suggestive of his role as father-husband.28 A 
lex Papia (not the lex Papia Poppea, possibly a lex Popilia) introduced a ballot into the 
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 While it is true that many aspects of the pontifex maximus’ activity are either indistinguishable from 
his pontifical colleagues or may be characterised as an exercise of a primus inter pares, I would not 
agree with their assertion that ‘he had no elaborate programme of rituals which he alone could carry 
out, as for instance did the flamines’. For example, only the pontifex maximus could perform the 
rituals associated with confarreatio. 
28
 Beard is sensitive to the limits of these parallels: the pontifex takes the child from her father, not her 
mother. The title Amata may be a corruption of ἀδµήτη (unsubdued) and therefore a reference to the 
child’s virgin status. Any attempt to directly map the roles and functions of the rex and regina onto 
the pontifex maximus and the Chief Vestal would be partial and simplistic. (cf. Beard 1980:15) A 
connection between the pontifex maximus’ use of ‘Amata’ and the Etruscan consecration of the 
‘Hatrencu’ is briefly considered by Lundeen (2006: 54).  
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selection of Vestal candidates and this has been interpreted by some as an attempt to limit the 
chief priest’s power of captio (Gellius, Noctes Atticae 1:12). It should also be remembered 
that the expression captio is also the term used to describe the process whereby new 
pontifices were added to the College.  
 
Entering the Pontifical College 
The process of becoming a pontiff (and more particularly becoming the chief pontiff) 
underwent some important transformations. Initially, as far as can be ascertained, the 
pontifices were chosen by the king and, after the extinction of monarchy, by a process of 
cooptation. A system of cooptatio naturally led to something of a ‘closed shop’ and, with it, a 
lack of accountability to anyone outside it. Then, at some point during the Republican period, 
the priesthoods became elected offices (albeit ad vitam and the preserve of patrician 
candidates). As we have already seen, it was only with the lex Ogulnia of 300 B.C. that four 
of the pontifices could be recruited from the ranks of the plebeians.29 The same measure also 
legislated the opening up of the augural college. Billows (1989:120) rightly interprets this as 
a recognition of the political clout associated with both the pontificate and the augurate and 
shows a determination to do in the priestly sphere what the lex Genucia (342 B.C.) had 
attempted for the consulate. Although we are uncertain as to the mechanism by which it came 
to pass, by the third century B.C. the pontifex maximus was elected by the comitia tributa 
(specifically the comitia pontificis maximi) with seventeen of the thirty five tribes casting 
their ballot. Did the election ‘heighten the profile’ of the pontifex maximus and make the 
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 Cicero makes a comment which suggests that being of patrician status is potentially a disadvantage 
in joining the pontifical college. Cf. De Domo 37: Cur enim quisquam vellet tribunum plebis se fieri 
non licere, angustiorem sibi esse petitionem consulatus, in sacerdotium cum possit venire, quia 
patricio non sit is locus, non venire? Given that it was Sulla who expanded the college to fifteen 
members, this turn of events could only be described as ironic. 
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office a more desirable proposition,30 or was it simply a reflection of its increasing prestige?  
Involving the people in what had hitherto been a collegial activity was an event of real 
significance and one whose electoral arithmetic enshrined and defended an important 
principle. The arrangement, whereby the chief priest was elected by the minor pars populi, is 
described by Linderski as  
 
a compromise between the democratic principle of popular election and the religious principle 
of the augural law that the priesthoods cannot be given by the people (Linderski, 1972: 192).31 
 
Such religious scruples had been adroitly exploited by the oligarchy for some time32: in the 
convulsive events following the tribunates of Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus, appeals were 
made to ius divinum to sanction moves which were clearly aimed at curbing the power of the 
plebs. From this point onwards religious legislation begins to assume the character of a tug-
of-war. The lex Domitia de sacerdotiis, promoted by Gnaeus Domitius Ahenobarbus as 
tribune of the plebs in 104 (although himself becoming pontifex maximus a year later) 
ensured, among other measures, that an individual could not accumulate major priesthoods 
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 cf. Beard, North and Price (1998a: 100). The rise of plebeian pontifices maximi is noted as one sure 
outcome of the change. 
31
 P. Servilius Rullus, tribune of the plebs in 63 B.C., proposed as part of his land bill that the agrarian 
commissioners be elected by seventeen instead of eighteen of the thirty-five tribes as was the case 
with the pontifex maximus (Cicero, de Lege Argraria II.16). We do not know why Rullus wished this 
form of election, but Cicero was able to portray it as an attempt to subvert the will of the majority 
(Williamson, 2005:73). 
32
 Perhaps this struggle worked ‘both ways’. The struggle between the pontifex maximus Servilius and 
the recusant Dolabella, mentioned above, may be an example of this. Since the accession of Tiberius 
Coruncanius, four of the five pontifices maximi had been plebeian. Dolabella’s appeal (to whom?) 
was referred to the concilium plebis, who voted to support the decision of the pontifex maximus; the 
intervention of a thunderstorm led to the process being set aside (by whom? An augur sympathetic to 
Dolabella?) and a compromise found whereby the other candidate, P. Cloelius Siculus, was 
inaugurated (why did this assume the characteristic of an election?) This was also a period of 
heightened sensitivity to prodigies, with Servilius carrying out a variety of piacula, propitiatory rituals 
to appease the gods. 
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nor could one family ‘stack’ a college with its members. But by far the most important 
provision of the Domitian law was its insistence that all vacancies in the priestly colleges 
should be filled in the same manner as the headship. That said, we should not forget that the 
patrician hold on some of the most ancient levers of religious life remained steadfast. The rex 
sacrorum and the flamines still had to be products of confarreate marriages and therefore of 
solid patrician stock. 
 
The religious interventions of Sulla reflect his antipathy towards the populares. In 81 B.C. he 
suppressed popular election of the pontifices, reviving the practice of cooptatio as the normal 
means of returning the colleges to their full complement, as well as raising their number (the 
pontifices, augures and decemviri all increased their membership to fifteen). Sulla’s action, 
viewed as an attempt to return to the situation before the lex Domitia, hints at his own 
understanding of these offices. Scheid (2001:85) points out that the proportional increase in 
both ‘civil’ magistrates and priesthoods is suggestive of Sulla’s view of these religious posts 
as quasi magistracies. It is a common assumption that Sulla also suppressed the election of 
the pontifex maximus by popular assembly but, as Taylor argues, there is no evidence for this 
(Taylor, 1942a: 421-424).   The implications of this assumption will be discussed later in the 
context of Caesar’s campaign for the chief pontificate. One question that remains 
unanswered, however, is the role Sulla adopted vis-à-vis the nominatio of the pontifex 
maximus. Although the election may have continued to be entrusted to the comitia, Caesar’s 
predecessor in the post (Quintus Caecilius Metellus Pius) is customarily referred to as 
‘Sulla’s nominee’. What are we to make of this ‘nomination’? Although Sulla was a deeply 
religious figure – and an augur - he was not a member of the college of pontifices (Keaveney, 
2005: 30). So it would seem that his manoeuvring in favour of Metellus was either an 




The pontifex maximus and the other priesthoods 
We have already discussed the relationship between the pontifex maximus as president of the 
collegium pontificum and the priests and priestesses who composed this most diverse and 
ritually significant group. The chief pontiff’s standing vis-à-vis the other colleges is less 
direct and more nuanced. Beard et al.’s assertion that the chief pontiff had no authority over 
the other priests is mostly correct (1998a: 21) but requires some qualification. 
 
(i) The College of Augurs  
The Augurs were charged with the examining of signs, both in deciphering the behaviour of 
animals, such as the flight of birds, and the reading of naturally occurring phenomena: the 
pleasure or disapproval of the gods could be divined by applying strict rules of interpretation. 
It has been suggested that the activity of the augurs complemented that of the pontiffs in so 
far as one was concerned with the sacred properties of physical space, whereas the other was 
responsible for overseeing the unfolding of time and its religious implications. Just as the 
pontifices were expert in a variety of laws, both religious and ‘secular’, so too the augurs 
were custodians and interpreters of the augural law; augural control of the auspicia mirrored 
the pontiffs’ control of the sacra (Cicero, de Natura Deorum 1:122). Both colleges were 
thought to be features of Numa’s religious architecture 33 and the augural college, like the 
pontifical college, was exclusively patrician until the lex Ogulnia both expanded it and 
provided for plebeian augurs.  The real power of the augur in the public forum was his ability 
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 Or effectively reconstituted by him (Cicero, de Re Publica, 2.26), if we accept the foundation of the augural 
college by Romulus (Cicero, de Re Publica, 2.9, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Antiquitates 2.5.1 and 2.73.1-3); 




to pronounce on the favourability of certain undertakings - or the lack of it. It merely required 
the intervention of an augur, declaring a course of action ill-starred, for it to be set aside or 
dismissed as defective after the fact. This power affected not only the peaceful functioning of 
the organs of the state, but also the prosecution of war (Poma, 2009: 110).  
 
One area in which it could be argued that the pontifical college depended upon the services of 
the augurs was, as the name suggests, the inauguratio of a new flamen or rex sacrorum. The 
chief pontiff had to request the inauguration of the priest in the comitia calata curiata – 
which signalled the last stage of his selection.34 Augural law recognised the chief pontiff’s 
power of condictio, a binding prerogative to force an augur to carry out his instruction 
(Delgado Delgado, 2009: 30); a dilatory augur had three days to comply or face sanction 
(Van Haeperen, 2002: 305). Even if the pontifex maximus had the power of spectio, the right 
to observe his ‘own’ auspices at the assemblies under his presidency (Szemler, 1971: 105), 
this would have been more by virtue of his quasi-magisterial status than his priesthood, 
preserving the augural nuntiatio (the public utterance of the auspices).   
 
(ii) The viri sacris faciundis and septemviri epulonum 
As well as being responsible for overseeing certain rituals, the viri sacris faciundis were the 
custodians of the Sibylline books: these three books of prophecies by the Sybil of Cumae, 
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 The comitia calata curiata met under the presidency of the pontiffs (and in some circumstances 
only under the chief pontiff): this archaic  form of assembly met to hear the proclamation of dates, 
witness religious inaugurations and vote upon adrogatio and the transfer of individuals to plebeian 
status (c.f. Lintott, 1999: 49). 
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written in Greek hexameters, were housed in the Temple of Jupiter 35 and consulted in times 
of crisis. At the behest of the senate, the books would be opened and the requisite course of 
action to appease the gods or ensure the most successful outcome was recommended by the 
priest-interpreters. Such interventions often followed the patterns of Greek religion, perhaps 
unsurprisingly since these texts were steeped in the religious culture (and language) of 
Greece; the introduction of lectisternia (Livy, 22.9:7-10) is an example of the ritus Graecus 
penetrating Roman practice. Although the pontifex maximus had no direct influence over the 
work of the duoviri (subsequently decemviri and quindecemviri), the fact that the texts were 
only ever referred to by order of the senate would imply that the pontifex maximus (who 
invariably gained entry to the senate by virtue of other elected offices) would be in a strong 
position to advise the consuls for or against consulting them. We know that, as pontifex 
maximus, Augustus took a more direct hand in controlling the Sibylline oracles, instructing 
the quindecemviri to purge suspect texts and transcribe the ‘authorised version’ for posterity 
(Turcan, 2000: 55). Despite the fact he had been a quindecemvir for some years, the lack of 
hierarchy within the college meant that he could not instigate such executive action until he 
became chief pontiff. 
 
The last of the ‘higher colleges’ to be founded, in 196 B.C. (Rüpke, 2007: 45), the epulones 
were entrusted with the supervision of the rituals surrounding the proliferation of games 
dedicated to the gods (Livy, 33.42; Orlin, 2007: 63). The introduction of such fairly late 
innovations to the array of religious specialists at Rome is due, at least in part, to the 
prodigious activity of the then pontifex maximus Publius Licinius Crassus Dives. Given the 
number of leges de sacerdotiis emanating from the chief pontiff, it is highly likely that this 
                                                          
35
 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Antiquitates, 4.62.5; Cicero, de Diuinatione, 2.54; cf. Warrior, 2006: 
49. On the general consultation of the books: Cicero, de Diuinatione, 1.43; Livy 22.57, 43.13; on the 
nature of the texts, Cicero, de Diuinatione, 2.110. 
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particular instance of specialization was conceived - or at the very least permitted – by his 
genius for ordering the structures of Roman religion. 
  
The pontifex maximus and the Public Life of the City 
a) The pontifex maximus as ‘quasi’ magistrate 
We have already mentioned the discussion around the auctoritas of priests. While the 
collective authority of the pontifical college is well attested in Cicero’s speeches, there has 
been on-going debate over the extent to which this authority was distinct from that of the 
pontifex maximus and how far, if ever, he could act on his own initiative without reference to 
his colleagues. Much of this debate turns on the unique – and to an extent problematic – 
status of the high pontiff among the magistrates of Rome with imperium. Mommsen was of 
the view that this office constituted the Grenzlinie between priesthood and magistracy and, as 
a result, enjoyed a species of authority strongly analogous to imperium (Mommsen 1886: 28). 
An obvious objection would be that the pontifex maximus had no imperium: this ‘power of 
command’ (in military and civil spheres) was delegated by the people (Varro, de Lingua 
Latina 5.87) and one of the key characteristics of the chief pontiff’s office was that, although 
elected, it was by the lesser proportion of tribes. Attempts have been made to argue that the 
election of the pontifex maximus was originally by the maior pars since, at the introduction of 
the lex Ogulnia in 300, there were only thirty-three tribes. One of the proponents of this 
theory, Pais (1915: 337) based his argument on the premise that only this arrangement could 
have ensured a popular mandate for plebeian candidates. Furthermore, Livy uses the word 
‘creatus’ to describe the election of the first plebeian pontifex maximus, Tiberius 
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Coruncanius.36 Vallocchia points out that Livy uses ‘creare’ in other senses which do not 
imply the presence of an election; moreover, he argues that the comitia pontifici maximo 
creando could not have been held before 241B.C. (2008: 31), by which time the thirty-five 
tribes had been definitively established.37 There is also the point, made by Bauman, that if 
there were already elections in place in 300, it would seem odd that it took the plebeian 
nobiles four attempts to get one of ‘their own’ elected (1983: 73). 
But even if the principle that the people could not confer priesthoods holds good, there 
remains some ambiguity as to the nature of this office which was conferred by the minor pars 
populi. We should not read too much into Livy’s description of the struggle between the 
pontifex maximus Licinius Crassus and the flamen quirinalis Fabius Pictor 38 as a conflict of 
imperia: Livy is not necessarily suggesting that we understand this imperium in the same 
manner as the elected magistrates. Much more interesting, however, is the way in which the 
office of high pontiff shared one significant aspect of the trappings of imperium: lictors. 
Lictors attended elected magistrates throughout their period in office, most famously bearing 
the fasces, the rods which symbolised the power of punishment and, outside the pomerium, 
an axe to represent the right of the magistrate – or his lictor - to execute citizens (after due 
process, of course). Only the dictator and the pontifex maximus were exempt from this 
restriction: their ‘capital powers’ applied equally within the sacred boundary, although the 
high pontiff’s power to put someone to death involved only the fasces. It is perhaps for this 
reason that the lictors who attended the pontiff did not carry an axe with their rods. These 
lictors, technically lictores curiati, were in attendance during sacrifices and public religious 
ceremonies such as those involving adoption (Magdelain, 2009: 83) and the ‘possibly 
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 Livy, Periochae 18. 
37
 And possibly not before the election of Publius Licinius Crassus in 212: Vallocchia bases his 
observation on the first extant mention of elections in Livy 25.5.2-4. For the tribes, see Cicero, de 
Lege Agraria 2.17.17-18.  
38
 Livy 37.51:1-4. 
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monthly convocations of the community by the college of pontiffs for the announcement of 
religious days and similar matters’ (Loewenstein, 1973: 15).39 Indeed, by Cicero’s day, the 
thirty curiate lictors had come to represent the curia themselves in the comitia curiata 
(Cicero, de Lege Agraria 2.31), with the result that most citizens were no longer certain to 
which curia they belonged (Humm, 2012: 59). Their association with sacra publica (Van 
Haeperen, 2002: 287) extended to the members of the pontifical college, accompanying 
pontiffs and flamines as apparitores and Vestals as an escort through the street.40 In the early 
Principate, this escort was extended still further to include the vicomagistri on their duties (to 
the cult of the Lares and Genius Augusti - Pollini, 2012: 313) and subsequently to the women 
of the imperial household. I would suggest that this was because the curiate lictors were not 
only attached to the pontifical college as a whole, but particularly to the person of the 
pontifex maximus himself. The Vestals were accompanied by the lictors not simply as 
priestesses (they were accompanied at all times, even when not about their sacred duties) but 
as quasi-members of the ‘domus pontificia’ under the protection of the chief pontiff 41; this 
was, I believe, the rationale which permitted Augustus to bestow similar protection on the 
women of the domus augusta and the officials of the vici in their religious observances. 
 
Flower describes the ‘spectacle value’ of the Roman magistrate going about his business, 
attended by his retinue of lictors who represented his executive power (2004: 324); it could 
also be argued that the chief pontiff’s progress through the forum and the streets of the city 
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 It was this association with the priestly activities of the college, and specifically with the pontifex 
maximus, which ensured that lictores curiati were high status lictors; the high number of lictores 
curiati who record their position is an indication of this (Purcell, 1983: 149). 
40
 Culham is incorrect in stating that only the flamen Dialis was accompanied by a lictor (Culham, 
2004: 143); Horster notes that lictors were also part of the representation of the pontifices and the 
Vestal Virgins, although they had only one or two lictors’ (Horster, 2007: 334). 
41
 Cassius Dio (47.19) is a unique source reporting that the lictoral attendant for the Vestal was a grant 
of the triumvirs (as opposed to a more ancient privilege); even if this were the case, it may be argued 
that Caesar qua pontifex was behind this deployment of curiate lictors. 
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would have taken on a similar processional character. This show of potestas would not look 
so very different from the imperium of the magistrate - at least not to the crowds in the street. 
The accoutrements of office were at the disposal of the pontifex maximus for the whole of his 
life, unlike the comparatively brief term of elected office and any subsequent appointment to 
provincial government. As a result, the holder of this office enjoyed a position of stable 
prominence in the Republic which was unrivalled among his peers and competitors. In terms 
of being a visible part of the life of the city, the chief pontiff would be a recognisable figure – 
not just among the principes civitatis, but to the man in the street going about his business. 
Among the several advantages which the priesthood conferred, this prominent and recurrent 
role in the theatre of public life and religious ceremonial (Bell, 2013: 178) was perhaps the 
key. 
 
b) The Annales Maximi 
Another aspect of the pontifex maximus’ public activity was the maintenance of a record of 
notable occurrences and the actions of prominent individuals which would eventually 
constitute the official digest of each year’s events. This function of the pontifical college – 
and more particularly its head – may have originated in the fifth century and become more 
systematic over the course of the fourth, mirroring a parallel ‘rudimentary Roman literature’ 
and implying a more widespread literacy in general (Frier, 1979: 167).  In those opening lines 
of book VI of his Ab urbe condita quoted earlier, Livy made reference to ‘pontifical 
commentaries’ as a prized source of historical information (although Cicero refers to them as 
‘a scanty source’: de Legibus I:6). In addition to these, the chief priest was responsible for 
collating the pontifical rules, a coverall term for those ‘precedents, explanations and formulae 
developed within (and known only to) the pontifical college’ (Gordon, 1990: 188). Both 
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kinds of writing bestowed considerable prestige and influence on the head of the priestly 
college. As custodians of Rome’s public memory, the pontifices maximi were endowed with 
something of the character of proto-historian and it was to their archives that subsequent 
generations of historians would turn in their search for Rome’s past and for a sense of the 
mos maiorum shaping the actions and decisions of its leaders.42 Although a variety of public 
records came to be entrusted to the pontifex maximus and his colleagues, the original and 
most significant pontifical record was referred to as the tabulae dealbatae, recalling the fact 
that they were originally white-washed boards: 
 
erat enim historia nihil aliud nisi annalium confectio, cuius rei memoriaeque publicae 
retinendae causa ab initio rerum Romanarum usque ad P. Mucium pontificem maximum res 
omnis singulorum annorum mandabat litteris pontifex maximus referebatque in album et 
proponebat tabulam domi, potestas ut esset populo cognoscendi, eique etiam nunc annales 
maximi nominantur. (Cicero, de Oratore, 2:52)43 
 
It would seem that, by Cicero’s lifetime, the tabula dealbata was no longer on public display 
and the precise relation between the tabulae and the annales maximi is not entirely clear. The 
kind of information recorded on the tabula is somewhat scornfully described by the elder 
Cato (and transcribed by Gellius) as quotiens annona cara, quotiens lunae aut solis lumine 
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 Frier (1979) is cautious about uncritically accepting the ancient authors’ accounts of the ‘pontifical 
chronicle’ and its real links with the annalistic tradition at Rome. This is, he argues, based on 
ignorance of the form and content of the original chronicle. See also Richardson (2011: 91-92). 
43
 For history was nothing other than the compilation of annals, on which account, so as to keep the 
public record, from the beginning of Roman affairs down to the time of the pontifex maximus Publius 
Mucius, each pontifex maximus would commit to writing all the events of each year and record them 
on a white-washed tablet and affix it to his house, so that the people might be able to know of these 
things, and to this day these are known as the annales maximi. 
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caligo aut quid obstiterit. (Noctes Atticae, 2:28.6). ‘How often the price of grain went up, 
how often darkness blocked out the light of the moon or sun.’ 
 
Servius accords them an altogether more dignified role, much more in line with Cicero’s 
description: 
 
ita autem annales conficiebantur: tabulam dealbatam quotannis pontifex maximus habuit, in qua 
praescriptis consulum nominibus et aliorum magistratuum digna memoratu notare consueuerat 
domi militiaeque terra marique gesta per singulos dies. cuius diligentiae annuos commentarios 
in octoginta libros ueteres retulerunt, eosque a pontificibus maximis a quibus fiebant annales 
maximos appellarunt. (Servius 1: 373)44 
 
Brennan (1990) is dismissive of Servius’ description of the tabula as: 
 
a late, monstrous invention (Servius' own?), based ultimately on a misunderstanding of the one 
reliable account we do have of the Annales Maximi, that of Cicero De Oratore II 52.45 
 
Although the time of Servius’ writing is considerably removed from that of his principal 
source, Brennan’s contention that the Annales were a late invention is unsustainable. It must 
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 The annals used to be made in this way: the pontifex maximus had a whitened tablet for each year, 
on which he first wrote the names of the consuls and other magistrates and recorded events worthy of 
memory both at home and abroad, on land and sea, day by day. Thanks to his diligence, the ancients 
compiled these yearly commentaries into eighty books and called them the annales maximi after the 
pontifices maximi by whom they were made. 
45
 Brennan, Bryn Mawr Classical Review http://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/1990/01.02.15.html 
68 
 
be admitted, however, that both the tabulae and the information they contained are difficult to 
conceptualise. Fraccaro (1957:61) alludes to the logistical impossibility of affixing a 
sufficiently large board to a comparatively small building like the regia.  As we have said, the 
process whereby the details recorded on the tabulae were collated into the eighty books 
commonly referred to as the Annales Maximi is unclear. Cicero attributes the redaction to 
Publius Mucius Scaevola, who became pontifex maximus in 131 B.C. Some attempts have 
been made to suggest that Mucius was actually reworking an earlier edition of these 
documents but the standard view (for most of the 20th century at least) is that he was the first 
to collate the still extant tablets into a more accessible annalistic form (Crake, 1940: 386; 
Linderski, 2007: 300)46 That said, if the exterior of the regia was an improbably restricted 
space for the display of a tabula, one wonders how its interior could have accommodated the 
preserved tablets so that Cato could have referred to them. An even more pertinent question 
(but no less intractable) is the relation of these annales to the other archives entrusted to the 
oversight of the pontifex maximus (the state archives, the fasti and the commentarii of the 
pontifical college).  Mellor argues that the essential data of each year was added to the bronze 
tablets on display at the regia, but this suggestion seems to come up against the same 
logistical difficulties as the idea of maintaining an archive of tabulae dealbatae (Mellor, 
1999: 13) A further layer of complexity is created by frequent confusion of terminology: 
‘haec tamen confunduntur licenter’ (cf. Servius 1.373).  Pighi equates the album pontificale 
with the fasti pontificum, to which are customarily added the acta, the decreta and the 
responsa. Confusingly, however, the annual digest would also have included the fasti 
feriarum (the calendar), the fasti consulum and the even more confusing titled appendix of 
the fasti feriarum consulum triumphales (Pighi, 1967: 53). Given the dearth of reliable 
epigraphic evidence, such reconstructions as Pighi’s remain speculative and at the mercy of 
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 Drews takes the extreme position that ‘the Annales maximi were indeed never published and by the 
second half of the first century B.C. no longer existed’ (1988:289). 
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those ancient sources which mention only fasti without further elaboration. Smith (2011) 
argues that this process of piecing together information is not merely a current problem: the 
pontiffs themselves would have had to contend with reconciling conflicting (and some false) 
information in compiling their records, as would the pontifex maximus in collating his digest. 
The answer to this problem must, as Smith concludes, ‘make sense in the context of the 
degrees of competition and cooperation between elites within the Republic.’ (Smith, 2011: 
27). By this we are meant to understand that these pontifical annalists might favour the 
interests of their own clans or associated families; if that is the case, then the chief pontiff 
would have even greater authority and influence. 
 
c) The Calendar 
Perhaps the single most significant aspect of the pontifex maximus’ activity was his oversight 
of the Calendar.  Mindful of the terminological grey areas which bedevil this field, we should 
note that we are in fact speaking of a number of different calendars (Adkins & Adkins, 1996: 
36). These calendars (or fasti) were, as noted above, a collection of days and facts concerning 
the public life of Rome – both religious and political. Scrutiny of the Roman calendar shows 
up evidence of Rome’s gradual transformation from a tiny agrarian community, with a strong 
emphasis on sacralizing the rhythms of nature and the activities of agriculture, to the urban 
capital of Caesar and Cicero. As well as giving the fixed feasts of the gods (the feriae 
stativae), the pontiff would also indicate the dates on which the few movable festivals (feriae 
conceptivae) were to be celebrated (Ogilvie, 1969: 70). The calendar itself consisted of a 
twelve month lunar year, 355 days long, with intercalary months of 22 or 23 days being 
inserted every two years (Lewis & Reinhold, 1990: 68). Naturally the insertion of days and 
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months (as well as the abeyance of the procedure during the Civil War)47 led to a calendar 
which was often ‘out of sync’ with the seasons, a situation which caused considerable 
misalignment in a system which was as much rooted in the soil as the forum. We will return 
to Caesar’s attempt to solve the problem of the calendar in due course. 
 
In addition to this sacred chronology, later calendars also gave the designated locations for 
public celebrations, along with other pertinent historical facts such as the names of the 
consuls and other magistrates in any given year. Although this is not the place for an 
extended analysis of the development of the calendar, it is always worth remembering that 
the Roman conception of time was intimately bound up with the numinous. Perhaps the most 
important manifestation of this lay in the designation of days as fasti or nefasti: 
 
The dies fasti are those which provide man’s secular activity with a mystical basis, fas, which 
assures him of the chance to be successful; the dies nefasti do not provide such a basis 
(Dumézil, 1996: 560).   
 
It follows that the ability to determine which days are propitious and, just as importantly, 
what kind of events have the power to render a previously favourable day nefas, is one that 
confers great influence. The potential for abuse was certainly present and the subjection of 
religion to political chicanery has been a source of considerable preoccupation to writers both 
ancient and modern. Even the insertion of intercalary days or months could be used as a way 
of extending a friend or colleague’s term of office, providing a further opportunity for public 
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 And indeed for substantial periods in the second century B.C.: the Ides of March of 190 fell on the 
18th November 191 (Derow, 1973: 346). 
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service or preserving immunity from prosecution for just a little longer. Caesar, perhaps the 
figure most associated with the revision of Roman time, was able to use his status as chief 
pontiff to compel the rex sacrorum and the other pontiffs to cooperate in the intercalations 
necessitated by his calendar reform (Rüpke, 2011: 115).  He was able to ensure that the 
‘extra’ days were used to extend religious festivals without necessarily providing more 
opportunities for comitial business or other political activity. Yet while the calendar offers 
perhaps the most obvious illustration that the Roman understanding of the saeculum was not 
secular, the law also recognised the pontifex maximus and his colleagues as exerting real 
influence both in the prehistory and the development of Rome’s legal institutions. 
 
d) The Law 
MAXIMUS PONTIFEX dicitur, quod maximus rerum quæ ad sacra et religiones pertinent, 
iudex sit vindexque contumaciae privatorum magistratuumque. [Festus, De verborum 
significatu]48 
What we have come to regard as Roman law developed through the jurisdiction of the 
pontifices (Thomas, 1976: 5) long before the distinction between private and public law could 
be made; the interpretation of the Twelve Tables remained the exclusive competence of the 
pontiffs for two centuries (Kunkel, 1966: 30). The pontifices were, not unreasonably, the 
experts on interpreting the ius divinum, but their competence extended well beyond that. This 
meant, according to Poma, that the preservation and interpretation of the mores maiorum, the 
fundamental social and religious practices of the ancestors, were entrusted to the pontifices 
(Poma, 2009: 35).  It was this fact which accounted for the strict control of the priesthoods by 
the main aristocratic families until the ‘leak’ of the legis actiones by Flavius and the 
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 The pontifex maximus is so-called because he is the chief judge of matters pertaining to sacrifices 
and religion and champion against the stubbornness of private individuals and magistrates. 
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implementation of the lex Ogulnia from 300 B.C. onwards.  Before the promulgation of 
public codices, the recording and interpretation of the laws was reserved as a ‘pontifical 
secret’ and the  real democratization of legal knowledge only really came with the election in 
254 B.C. of the first plebeian pontifex maximus, Tiberius Coruncanius, who took the 
unprecedented step of dispensing responsa in public (Rüpke, 2011:80).49 It could be argued, 
of course, that the pontiffs’ interest in law arose out of that (by now axiomatic) assertion that 
even private affairs had public and therefore religious consequences. As Stockton observes: 
 
The office [of pontifex maximus] was important not only for its prestige but also because as 
chairman of the college of pontiffs and head of the state religion the pontifex maximus enjoyed 
considerable influence in the decision of questions of religious law, and at Rome such questions 
were frequently political questions (Stockton, 1971: 97-98).   
 
Examples of this oversight included patrician marriage (confarreatio), adoptions 
(adrogationes), burials (ius sepulchri) and wills (testamenta). This large body of archaic – yet 
undoubtedly important – law came to be the province of both pontifical and civil law 
(Johnson, 2007: 39); the process by which this blurring came about was a matter of gradual 
evolution, but with a definite impetus during the period of this study. In Book II of de 
Legibus (written c. 52 or 51 B.C., by which time Cicero had finally attained the augurate) he 
freely recognises a particular responsibility for pontiffs in the meticulous preservation of ius 
sacrum but also the development of the law; and is especially deferential towards the 
influence of his old teachers, the Scaevolae. 
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 Rawson notes that, by Caesar’s time, non-pontiffs were routinely writing commentaries on religious 




Hoc ego loco multisque aliis quaero a uobis Scaeuolae, pontifices maximi et homines meo 
quidem iudicio acutissimi, quid sit quod ad ius pontificium ciuile adpetatis; ciuilis enim iuris 
scientia pontificium quodam modo tollitis. Nam sacra cum pecunia pontificum auctoritate, 
nulla lege coniuncta sunt. Itaquc si uos tantummodo pontifices essetis, pontificalis maneret 
auctoritas; sed quod idem iuris ciuilis estis peritissimi, hac scientia illam eludistis. (De Legibus 
2: 52)50 
 
This reverence is, however, tempered with a measure of Ciceronian reproach, since their 
fusion of the categories of civil and pontifical law inevitably led to a subtle but inexorable 
undermining of the ius pontificum: the fact that many principles were no longer grounded 
wholly in pontifical law led to an increase in disputes as the meaning and implementation of 
certain aspects (such as funerary law). According to Santangelo (2013b: 24), this counter-
intuitive objection rested not solely on the loss of pontifical jurisprudence to definitively 
resolve such disputes, but also a diminished auctoritas for the pontiffs themselves. By 
expanding the reach of pontifical law, there were actually fewer areas of unadulterated 
oversight reserved to the expertise of the college. By Cicero’s day, their province of exclusive 
competence had receded to the proper application of ius divinum and the more arcane 
elements of family law. Despite the contraction of pontifical powers, it should be noted that 
the chief pontiff’s prerogatives remained intact. 
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 On this question – and on many others – I ask you, Scaevolas, chief pontiffs and, in my estimation, 
very learned men, why you add civil law to the pontifical law?; with knowledge of the civil law you, 
in a sense, do away with the pontifical law. Indeed these rites are associated with property only by 
virtue of your pontifical authority, not by any law. And so if you were only pontiffs, the pontifical 
authority would remain, but since you are also experts in civil law, you use this knowledge to get 
around the other. 
74 
 
As mentioned above, the pontifex maximus had a role to play in the oldest and, for the 
purposes of patrician families, most perfect form of marriage – confarreatio. Taking its name 
from the spelt cake which was consumed during the ceremony before the altar of Jupiter 
Farreus, marriage contracted by confarreatio was an absolute requirement for anyone who 
aspired to be flamen Dialis or rex sacrorum (Gaius, Institutiones 1.112; Thomas, 1976: 446). 
Although ‘quaint’, confarreatio was able to perpetuate itself as a badge of superiority since 
only those who were born of confarreate marriages were themselves eligible for this form of 
ceremony. The presence of Rome’s chief priest and Jupiter’s flamen indicated the religious 
import of such domestic arrangements. Rome’s future passed by way of its best families and 
the pontifex maximus can be seen as operating as the embodiment of the State as well as the 
guarantor of the pax deorum. 
 
The other significant field of protected pontifical oversight was the ‘remarkably obscure 
process’ of adrogatio (Smith, 2006a: 213) or adoption, especially those involving a shift of 
status from patrician to plebeian. Even though it often remained a juridical fiction (as in the 
case of Cicero’s great enemy Clodius), the process of transferring an adult male from one 
gens to another involved some complex legal and religious manoeuvres. Since the adoptee 
was effectively abandoning his ancestral cult through the detestatio sacrorum, the pontifex 
maximus was involved in solemnising the transfer. Mindful of the public consequences of an 
ostensibly private arrangement, adoptions were transacted in the presence of the comitia 
calata which could only be convoked by the pontifex maximus on two days each year, 24 
March and 24 May (Thomas, 1976: 438). According to the reconstruction we have received 
from Gaius, the adrogatio was effected by a threefold questioning: firstly, the pontifex 
maximus asked the pater adrogans if he wished to adopt the adrogandus as his legitimate 
son. Next the adrogandus was asked if he intended to fully submit himself to his new father’s 
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authority. Finally, with both parties having declared their willingness, the comitia was asked 
to give its assent on behalf of the people. After the declaration of detestatio by the 
adrogandus, the whole process was sealed by a solemn oath, perhaps composed by Quintus 
Mucius Scaevola (cf. Gellius, Noctes Atticae 5:19). The pontifex maximus had the additional 
power of circumventing the detestatio sacrorum if the cult of the adoptee’s former family 
was threatened with extinction by the move. 
 
Conclusion: The pontifex maximus in 141 B.C. 
In 141 when Scipio Nasica Serapio stood to give the funeral oration for his dead father, 
Nasica Corculum, he would have been able to record every step of the cursus honorum. Since 
Nasica Serapio will be the first of the pontifices maximi to feature in a substantive way in this 
thesis, it might be helpful to treat the career of his father – and predecessor – as a sort of 
terminus ante quem. Although Corculum led ‘an agitated political life that did not lack 
controversies’ (Candau, 2011: 130), it serves as a perfect example of a highly distinguished 
career which entered a more sedate final decade with the election to the chief pontificate.51 
 
The Cornelii Scipiones were a family thoroughly assured of its aristocratic credentials and its 
traditions of military leadership and office holding; 52 like the other patrician clans, strategic 
alliances through marriage ensured that the major offices, including the principal priesthoods, 
were seldom beyond the reach of a Cornelius Scipio.53 It is possible that Nasica Corculum 
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 Cicero identifies Corculum as an exemplum of happy but fruitful old age (de Senectute 50). 
52
 The elogia Scipionum bear witness to the achievements of those who reached the pinnacle of their 
careers, as well as those whose promising careers were cut short (see especially CIL VI. 1284-1296; 
also Millar, 1989: 139; Flower, 1996: 179-180). 
53
 Briscoe (1974) mentions ‘evidence’ that Corculum had become estranged from other members of 
the Cornelii Scipiones for a substantial period before his death. The evidence in question is far from 
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had been a pontifex since as early as 176 B.C., replacing P. Cornelius Scipio Hispallus; such 
instances of lateral ‘succession’ were a common feature. A comparatively early priesthood 
would have been a useful stepping stone in the acquisition of subsequent higher political 
offices, especially the consulships of 162 and 155 and the censorship of 159 B.C. He became 
princeps senatus in 147. 
 
His public career is bound up with the war against Carthage and his persistent opposition to 
the deletory rhetoric of Cato the Elder. Having argued for the salutary effects of fear of the 
other great Mediterranean power to keep Rome both moral and vigilant, he proceeded to 
decry the tide of luxury and laxity which swept over the city after its rival’s defeat.54 Nothing 
is known of Nasica Corculum’s tenure as chief pontiff. Augustine committed a wholly 
understandable error in confusing father and son when he described the reception of the cult 
items of Cybele in 205 or 204 B.C. 55 (Magna Mater’s influence was credited with the defeat 
of Carthage in the second Punic war).56 Corculum’s father was Rome’s optimus vir (Cicero, 
de Finibus 5.22.64) not her pontifex maximus – indeed not any kind of priest at all.57 Perhaps 
Augustine’s conflation arose out of his expectation that a pontiff would exercise a role with 
such powerful religious associations. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
conclusive, however, and may only refer to Corculum’s activity in the third Macedonian war (Livy, 
44.35.14; 44.36.9; 44.38.1; Plutarch, Aemilius Paullus 15; Briscoe, 1974: 134). How far his 
opposition to the war with Carthage would have alienated him from the rest of the gens is impossible 
to guage; after all, his son, Nasica Serapio, was among those officers overseeing the Carthaginian 
surrender. 
54
 Polybius 31.25.2-8. 
55
 Augustine, de Civitate Dei 1.30: Si Nasica ille Scipio uester quondam pontifex uiueret, quem sub 
terrore belli Punici in suscipiendis Phrygiis sacris, cum uir optimus quaereretur, uniuersus senatus 
elegit, cuius os fortasse non auderetis aspicere, ipse uos ab hac inpudentia cohiberet. 
If that former pontiff of yours Scipio Nasica were still alive, whom the senate unanimously chose as 
its best man to receive the sacred objects from Phryigia during the dreadful time of the Punic war, you 
would not be able to look him in the face, lest he deter you from your impudence. 
56
 Burton (1996), argues that the summoning of the Magna Mater to Rome was not the outcome of an 
optimistic mood, rather the desire to enlist every avenue of assistance at a time of on-going crisis. 
57




The other aspects of Corculum’s life may well say something about the nature of the position 
of chief pontiff at this time. He understood the value of self-publicity: his self-laudatory 
account of his involvement in the battle of Pydna in 167 B.C. seems to have passed over into 
Plutarch’s account of the event (Aemilius Paullus, 15-18), not least because it was written in 
Greek (Gratwick, 1982: 148). Corculum was clearly aware of the power of history and the 
control of an individual’s imprint upon it. We may hypothesise that he took no less an interest 
in this aspect of his activity as pontifex maximus, even though it would have been the 
illustrious deeds of others – his son included – which were recorded in the Annales Maximi. 
The latter phase of Corculum’s career would have been taken up with his religious and public 
duties. His presence being required at various functions, it is unlikely that he travelled very 
far from the city. The other area of expertise in which he was distinguished, the law, would 
also have sat well with his status as the chief interpreter of a substantial body of public and 
private law. 
 
One other vignette will suffice: Appian records that Nasica Corculum, as consul in 155, 
intervened to halt the construction and order the subsequent demolition of what was probably 
Rome’s first permanent theatre.58  Campbell (2003) notes that, besides Appian’s comment 
about his suspicion of a creeping Hellenism and its debilitating moral effects, other sources 
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   Τῷ δ’ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ Σκιpiίων ὕpiατος καθεῖλε  
τὸ θέατρον, οὗ Λεύκιος Κάσσιος ἦρκτο (καὶ ἤδη  
piου τέλος ἐλάµβανεν), ὡς καὶ τόδε στάσεων ἄρξον  
ἑτέρων ἢ οὐ χρήσιµον ὅλως Ἑλληνικαῖς ἡδυpiαθεί-  
αις Ῥωµαίους ἐθίζεσθαι. [Appian, Civil Wars I.4:28] 
 
About this time the consul Scipio Nasica demolished the theatre begun by Lucius Cassius, and now 
nearly finished, because he considered this also a likely source of new seditions, or because he 
thought it far from desirable that the Romans should become accustomed to Greek pleasures. 
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state that the consul Nasica was renowned for his severitas.59  His distaste for populism 
seems to have coupled with a sincere – if somewhat paternalistic - belief in the state’s 
responsibility to toughen the easily compromised moral fibre of the people. 
 
So the pontifex maximus at this juncture of transition was, as I have argued, the only role 
which brought its holder the charism of stable public prominence in the Roman Republic. As 
well as a clear position among the influential priests of the state, he had a refined species of 
auctoritas which could easily, to the untrained eye, be confused with the imperium of the 
chief magistrates. With his retinue of apparitores in attendance, the high pontiff would have 
been a visible reference point for the plebs as much as the élite. While he had direct 
involvement in legal matters which were of particular importance to the nobiles, his direction 
of festivals, oversight of crossroad shrines and collation of the official record of events would 
have been of no less interest to the ordinary citizen: for at least a hundred years they had also 
had a say in his election. In other words, the office of pontifex maximus offered a 
commanding view of Rome and, in more benign times, it was as integral to the maintenance 
of the mos maiorum as any high office – if not more so. In the events which were soon to 
follow, this commanding position would be exploited as a position of command: a tribune’s 
provocation would result in an equally provocative counter-measure which would redefine 
Rome’s religious and political institutions. 
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Publius Cornelius Scipio Nasica Serapio:  
absens pontifex maximus 
 
Hoc initium in urbe Roma ciuilis sanguinis gladiorumque impunitatis fuit. Inde ius ui obrutum 
potentiorque habitus prior, discordiaeque ciuium antea condicionibus sanari solitae ferro 
diiudicatae bellaque non causis inita, sed prout eorum merces fuit. (Velleius)60 
The impact of this violence, especially when understood in terms of religious transgression and 
pollution, can scarcely be overestimated. Meanwhile, Nasica’s claim that the republican 
government was in mortal danger became a self-fulfilling prophecy. (Flower, 2010: 83) 
 
Having surveyed the principal conceptual issues in the introduction, in this chapter I will 
consider the confluence of politics, religion and violence in what is rightly considered one of 
the most significant disputes in the late Republic: the murder of Tiberius Gracchus by the 
pontifex maximus, Scipio Nasica Serapio. I intend to demonstrate that the actions of Nasica 
definitively altered perceptions of the office at all levels of Roman society. The dense 
narrative of this crisis, constructed from a variety of accounts, throws up a number of 
complex religious issues which cluster around the involvement of the high pontiff in an 
                                                          
60
 Velleius, 2.3.3. This was the beginning in Rome of civil bloodshed, and the sword went unchecked. 
From this time on right was crushed by might, the most powerful now took precedence in the state, 
the disputes among citizens which were once healed by amicable agreements were now settled by 
arms, and wars were now begun not for good cause but for whatever profit was to be had. 
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unprecedented chain of events. Indeed, as Flower suggests, the effects of this irruption of 
politically motivated killing are hard to exaggerate.  
 
Life and Career of Scipio Nasica ‘Serapio’ 
Publius Cornelius Scipio Nasica ‘Serapio’ was born in 176.61 As one would expect of a scion 
of the Cornelii Scipiones, he ascended the ladder of a public career by steady stages and at 
the earliest eligible age – with the notable exception of a misstep in his effort to reach the 
aedileship.62  
 
He became quaestor at the age of 27 in 149. Appian recounts Nasica’s involvement in the 
surrender of the Carthaginian arms in 149: 63  this was an important moment for several 
reasons. Firstly, it placed Nasica in a very prominent position during a ceremony loaded with 
political, military and religious significance.  Alongside the surrender of arms, there was also 
an implied religious submission – as represented by the Carthaginian priests – to the consuls. 
Such a gesture could be interpreted as recognition of the superior strength of the Roman 
pantheon compared with those of the vanquished Punic gods (as part of the devotio hostis of 
the city itself). Furthermore, these same gods had, in the course of a ritual evocatio, been 
‘called out’ by the Roman general and offered a better cult.64 Although the ritual itself will be 
discussed in greater detail later in this chapter, it is worth noting Nasica’s involvement in the 
additional ritual of surrender and the influence such exposure may have had on his attitude to 
public ‘liturgy’. In addition, this ceremony would earn him the prestige of a still closer 
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 This is the chronology as reconstructed by Carcopino, (1967: 67). Mommsen places Nasica’s birth 
in 175. 
62
 We will discuss this setback in connection with Nasica’s haughty temperament and ‘sharp tongue’.         
63
 Appian, Punic Wars 12:80. 
64
 Macrobius, Saturnalia 3.9.6-9. 
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association with his cousin, the victorious Scipio Aemilianus. It should also be noted that 
another cousin, Tiberius Gracchus, was on Aemilianus’ staff at this time. 
 
In 141 he became praetor at the age of 35. Yet the prestige of this year’s praetorship was 
eclipsed – or perhaps we should say enhanced – by his probable acquisition of the Chief 
Priesthood in succession to his father, Scipio Nasica Corculum, who died that same year. 
Münzer (1999: 231) notes the unusual circumstances of the younger Nasica’s elevation to the 
pontifical college. The prohibition of two members of the same gens belonging to the same 
college would normally have ensured that the son could only have been co-opted after his 
father’s death and then rapidly promoted to the role of president. It is Münzer’s contention 
that such a precipitate rise to prominence demonstrates not only the cachet of the Scipiones 
Nasicae but also the fact that prior experience as a pontiff was not a prerequisite for the 
pontifex maximus. A measured rejection of Münzer’s theory lies at the heart of John North’s 
discussion of family and priesthood in the late Republic (1990). North argues that the 
simultaneous presence of Nasica Corculum and Nasica Serapio in the college is ‘the only 
likely exception’ to the established practice (North, 1990: 533).  He bases his thesis on Livy’s 
account of the election of the pontifex maximus in 213: 
 
comitia inde pontifici maximo creando sunt habita; ea comitia nouus pontifex M. Cornelius 
Cethegus habuit. tres ingenti certamine petierunt, Q. Fuluius Flaccus consul, qui et ante bis 
consul et censor fuerat, et T. Manlius Torquatus, et ipse duobus consulatibus et censura 
insignis, et P. Licinius Crassus, qui aedilitatem curulem petiturus erat. hic senes honoratosque 
iuuenis in eo certamine uicit. ante hunc intra centum annos et uiginti nemo praeter P. 
Cornelium Calussam pontifex maximus creatus fuerat qui sella curuli non sedisset. 65 
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 Livy 24: 2-4 The next thing was the election of the chief pontiff. The new pontiff, M. Cornelius 




The ‘numerical’ vacancy in the college is filled by co-optation (in the above instance 
Cethegus) and it is the new pontiff’s responsibility to oversee the election of the pontifex 
maximus. If this were the normal rubric for such events, North suggests that it would be 
impossible for one individual to accede to both positions and so considers it more reasonable 
to presume that Nasica ‘father and son’ were together as pontiffs. I find it hard to assent 
completely to North’s argument that it would be impossible for one man to be co-opted and 
subsequently elected as head: it would be unusual but, given some of the procedural 
intricacies, not beyond the realm of possibility. 
 
The only voice which questions our certainty that he became pontifex maximus at this time is 
that of Velleius Paterculus and his curious comment that Nasica ‘absens pontifex maximus 
factus est’ (Velleius, 2.3.1).  This is a unique assertion and one which, with Münzer, we 
should set aside; Münzer is dismissive of what he considers a habit of ‘clumsy incorporation’ 
on the part of Velleius, whereby biographical information becomes transposed and marginal 
annotations appear wrenched from their proper context (Münzer, 1999: 240). Nevertheless, 
the possible origin of Velleius’ problematic phrase will be further discussed in the wake of 
the event for which Nasica is chiefly remembered – the death of Tiberius Gracchus. 
 
Although our attention is particularly directed towards the later stages of Nasica’s public life, 
his consulate (in 138) merits some examination. His youth – being only 38 during his year in 
office – was exceptional but not unique. By far the most striking feature of 138 was the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Fulvius Flaccus, the consul, who had previously been twice consul as well as censor; T. Manlius 
Torquatus, who could also point to two consulships and the censorship; and P. Licinius Crassus, who 
was about to stand for the curule aedileship. This young man defeated his old and distinguished 
competitors; before him there had been no one for a hundred and twenty years, with the sole 




imprisonment of the consuls, Nasica and his colleague Brutus, by the plebeian tribune 
Curiatus. Cicero leaves us in no doubt as to his estimation of the tribune’s character, 
describing the man who threw the consuls in prison as ‘homo omnium infimus et 
sordidissimus’ and the action itself unprecedented (de Legibus, III: 20). 
 
Although Livy’s epitomator’s account of the same incident is also relatively brief, it contains 
some illuminating details: 
 
P. Cornelio Nasica, cui cognomen Serapion fuit ab inridente Curiatio trib. pleb. impositum, et 
Dec. Iunio Bruto coss. dilectum habentibus in conspectu tironum res saluberrimi exempli facta 
est: nam C. Matienius accusatus est apud tribunos pl., quod exercitum ex Hispania deseruisset, 
damnatusque sub furca diu uirgis caesus est et sestertio nummo ueniit. Tribuni pleb. quia non 
inpetrarent ut sibi denos quos uellent milites eximere liceret, consules in carcerem duci 
iusserunt.66  
 
Curiatus is introduced as the originator of Nasica’s mocking cognomen Serapio, marking his 
resemblance to a well-known sacrificial assistant by that name: while the tragicomic effect of 
this ‘nick-name’ can only be fully appreciated in the light of subsequent events, it is worth 
noting the hint at personal animosity underlying public debate. This particular episode seems 
to be a matter of military procedure and discipline arising out of the conscription of soldiers 
(dilectus). Livy reports a similar scenario in Periochae 48 in which the consuls Lucius 
Licinius Lucullus and Aulus Postumius Albinus were imprisoned by order of the tribune of 
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 Livy, Periochae, 55 
When the consuls Publius Cornelius Nasica, to whom the Tribune of the plebs Curiatus mockingly 
affixed the cognomen ‘Serapio’, and Decimus Junius Brutus were conducting the draft, something 
happened in full sight of the recruits which turned out to be a most helpful precedent. For Gaius 
Matienus was charged before the tribunes of the plebs that he had deserted from the army in Spain, 
and he was convicted, bound to a furca and flogged for a long time with rods and was sold for a 
sestertius. Since the tribunes of the plebs failed to obtain permission to acquire exemptions for the ten 
soldiers apiece they each wanted, they ordered the consuls to be thrown into jail. 
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the plebs for allowing no exemptions to the draft. If we are to trust Livy’s chronology, then 
incarceration of the consuls was not, as Cicero maintained, an unprecedented sanction (since 
the incident with Lucullus and Albinus would have occurred during 151). That instance 
notwithstanding, imprisonment of the highest State officials (one of whom was also pontifex 
maximus) must be read as an extreme exercise of tribunician power. Earl goes so far as to 
describe it ‘as revolutionary an act as any of Ti. Gracchus’ (Earl, 1963:46).  
 
Valerius Maximus offers a further example of strife between the consuls and Curiatus in 
which Nasica stamps his authority on a restive crowd. Due, in part, to the slave unrest in 
Sicily, the rising price of grain had led to an uneasy domestic situation: 
 
annonae caritate increscente C. Curiatius tr. pl. productos in contionem consules conpellebat ut 
de frumento emendo adque id negotium explicandum mittendis legatis in curia referrent. cuius 
instituti minime utilis interpellandi gratia Nasica contrariam actionem ordiri coepit. obstrepente 
deinde plebe 'tacete, quaeso, Quirites', inquit: 'plus ego enim quam uos quid rei publicae 
expediat intellego'. qua uoce audita omnes pleno uenerationis silentio maiorem auctoritatis 
eiusquam suorum alimentorum respectum egerunt. (Valerius Maximus 3.7.3)67 
 
Here Nasica’s intervention seems to have worked because of a sufficiently diffuse sense – 
even among the plebs who stood to gain most from the measure - that the benefit of the res 
publica was the overriding concern of every true Roman (Hölkeskamp 2013: 25).  The 
weight of his auctoritas is also cited by Valerius as enough to suppress the unrest of the 
crowd. This auctoritas, reflecting Nasica’s status as consul as well as the cachet attached to 
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 With the price of grain increasing, the tribune C. Curiatus had the consuls brought before a public 
meeting so that they should move the senate to buy corn and send envoys to arrange the sale. Nasica 
began to voice his opposition to this wholly proper measure. Then, with the people crying out in 
protest, Nasica said, ‘Be silent, citizens, if you please. I understand better than you what is for the 
good of the republic.’ When they heard this, all of them fell into an awed silence, paying more heed to 
his authority than their own need of food. 
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the name of a Scipio Nasica, may account for Curiatus’ tactical use of mockery: he attacks 
Nasica directly on that ground from which much of his influence is derived – his name.  
 
Valerius offers a further exemplum, this time with clear political consequences: 
 
P. autem Scipio Nasica togatae potentiae clarissimum lumen, qui consul Iugurthae bellum 
indixit, qui matrem Idaeam e Phrygiis sedibus ad nostras aras focosque migrantem sanctissimis 
manibus excepit, qui multas et pestiferas seditiones auctoritatis suae robore oppressit, quo 
principe senatus per aliquot annos gloriatus est, cum aedilitatem curulem adulescens peteret 
manumque cuiusdam rustico opere duratam more candidatorum tenacius adprehendisset, ioci 
gratia interrogauit eum num manibus solitus esset ambulare. quod dictum a circumstantibus 
exceptum ad populum manauit causamque repulsae Scipioni attulit: omnes namque rusticae 
tribus paupertatem sibi ab eo exprobratam iudicantes iram suam aduersus contumeliosam eius 
urbanitatem destrinxerunt.68  
 
Although Valerius has a tendency to conflate his Nasicae,69 this would seem to be a clear 
reference to Serapio’s arrogant disdain – at least in so far as people ‘rustico opere’ were 
concerned. This instance of an ill-judged pleasantry is thought to have cost Nasica the 
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 Valerius Maximus, 7. 9.2 
P. Scipio Nasica was a brilliant luminary of civilian power. As consul he declared war on Jugurtha; he 
received in his purest hands the Idean Mother as she migrated from her Phrygian seat to our altars and 
hearths; by the strength of his authority he suppressed many harmful uprisings; for some years the 
senate gloried in him as their leader. Standing for the curule aedilship as a young man, after the 
manner of candidates he gripped somebody’s hand, which had been hardened by farm labour, rather 
tightly, and asked him as a joke whether he was by way of walking on his hands. Bystanders caught 
the remark and it spread to the public and caused Scipio’s defeat. For all the rustic tribes thought he 
had taunted them with poverty and vented their anger against his insulting wit. 
69
 Valerius is somewhat confused in his description: the Cornelii Scipiones were not central to the 
beginnings of the Jugurthine war and the cult image of Magna Mater was received by Serapio’s 
grandfather in 205/4. Valerius is not alone in this confusion. Cicero records how Metellus Scipio 
incorrectly identified more than one statue of his great-grandfather, Scipio Nasica (cf. ad Atticum 
6:1); in reality they were statues of Scipio Aemilianus (Morstein-Marx, 2004: 80). 
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aedileship. Any ambiguity as to the identity of the Nasica seems to be resolved by Cicero’s 
statement in pro Plancio: 
 
auus uero tuus et P. Nasicae tibi aediliciam praedicaret repulsam, quo ciue neminem ego statuo 
in hac re publica fortiorem (Cicero, pro Plancio 51). 70 
 
Cicero is offering examples of prominent men who had been unsuccessful in their campaign 
for the aedileship but who had gone on to win the consulship. Elsewhere, especially in his 
philosophical works, Cicero attests to the pungency of Nasica’s speech: 
 
illum Scipionem, quo duce priuato Ti. Gracchus occisus esset, cum omnibus in rebus uementem 
tum acrem aiebat in dicendo fuisse (Cicero, Brutus 108).71 
 
Audivi ex maioribus natu, hoc idem fuisse in P. Scipione Nasica, contraque patrem eius, illum 
qui Ti. Gracchi conatus perditos vindicavit, nullam comitatem habuisse sermonis, ob eamque 
rem ipsam magnum et clarum fuisse (Cicero, de Officiis 1: 109)72 
 
Dyck (1996: 278) considers Nasica’s inflexibility to be the fruit of his Stoic leanings (cf. 
Tusc. 4.51) and, presumably, a further reason for Cicero’s reverential allusions to him. Dyck 
also references the Valerian ‘grain anecdote’ in support of his depiction of Nasica as a man 
who could not be easily deflected from a principled stance. 
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 Your grandfather could tell you also of the rejection of Publius Nasica, when he stood for the 
aedileship, though I am sure there has never been a greater citizen in this republic. 
71
 … that Scipio by whom as an unofficial commander T. Gracchus was killed, was not only a man of 
passion in all other respects, but sharp in his way of speaking. 
72
 I have heard from my elders that this was true of P. Scipio Nasica, whereas the opposite was true of 
his father - the one who punished the desperate efforts of Ti. Gracchus - had no friendliness in his 
speech and for that reason became great and famous.  
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All this certainly seems consistent with the image of a man who is acutely aware of his 
auctoritas.73 Although there is no indication as to precisely when this confrontation over the 
grain supply occurred – before or after Nasica’s imprisonment - the fact that it was 
choreographed by the tribune is surely significant. The mention of Curiatus and his 
involvement – either as defender of the people or as provocateur – may account for the tone 
of contempt in the consul’s response. Whilst Curiatus, perhaps through his association with 
Nasica, is one of the more conspicuous tribunes of this period, their recurring interference in 
the workings of the army and Rome’s external affairs with client peoples established a pattern 
which Tiberius and his brother were to follow (Taylor, 1962: 27). 
 
No doubt the later accounts bear the distinct imprint of later events, but these anecdotes about 
Nasica’s early career do at least attest to a firmness of purpose, a solidly patrician view of the 
world and an exposure to tough tribunician politics. 
 
The crisis of 133: mounting tensions 
 
As far as the extant records are concerned, Nasica retreats into obscurity after his consulship 
and only emerges once again in connection with Tiberius’ land reforms.  
 
We know nothing of Nasica’s own circumstances and the presumption that he, like many of 
the other nobiles, had benefitted from the creeping appropriation of public land, remains a 
supposition.74 It is significant that his opposition (at least in so far as the sources record) 
began not during the attempt to get the law passed but only after the commission had been 
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 Scullard describes Nasica’s response and attitude as ‘high-handed’ (1960: 70). 
74
 Only Plutarch suggests this (Tiberius Gracchus 13:3): possession of public land and the threat of 
being dispossessed is the sole motivation for all opposition to the lex Sempronia in Plutarch.  
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established. Although his distaste for the plebs is well documented, the commissioners were 
of robust aristocratic standing – including the princeps senatus, Appius Claudius: our search 
for a motive must lead beyond ‘class strife’ (Canali: 2004: 35). The roots of Nasica’s 
objection may lie, at least in part, in his rough treatment at the hands of a tribune while at the 
pinnacle of his career. Just as Curiatus had done nothing illegal, Tiberius’ actions could not 
be challenged on the grounds of their dubious constitutionality. There was nothing to say that 
a tribune could not be deposed for acting contrary to the will – or good – of the people. After 
all, no tribune had ever vetoed an agrarian bill (as Octavius had done).  
 
Much of the ensuing debate and recrimination turns on this very question of precedent: unlike 
Curiatus’ actions, it was the unprecedented nature of Tiberius’ bold strategy which would 
occasion alarm among the boni. Lintott, while recognising the extreme course taken by 
Tiberius, acknowledges that it was proportionate to the provocation of his fellow tribune’s 
obstructionist tactic (1999b: 207). Seeing Octavius removed – perhaps physically, according 
to Plutarch - was also a sign that the traditional counter-ploy of using a ‘friendly’ tribune to 
block a colleague had failed.  
 
Nasica let his hostility to the lex Sempronia agraria and its triumviral commission be 
known.75 It was his involvement which led to Tiberius being denied the publicly funded tent 
which would act as his ‘office’ during the land redistribution. Again, it was his influence 
which induced the senate to vote the commissioners the derisory daily allowance of nine 
asses. In these interventions, Nasica was acting as the ‘head’ of the family (Earl, 1963: 92), 
but he would have powerful sympathisers beyond what Earl, from the perspective of 1960s 
scholarship, calls the ‘Scipionic faction’. 
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That said, these high profile objections must have been a factor in determining Tiberius’ next 
– and decisive – step: to stand for re-election to the tribunate. This decision, variously 
interpreted as a mark of radical opportunism or Tiberius’ increasing desperation, is 
universally acknowledged as the trigger to the volatile chain of events which followed. It was 
not merely the notion of subsequent terms as tribune which proved alarming (and, surely, the 
possibility of a further term after that); the scope of Tiberius’ manifesto, shifting from a rural 
to an urban power-base, may have suggested  
 
an attitude more aggressive than defensive, one which sought to exploit the powers of the 
tribunate and assembly even further (Lintott, 1992: 69). 
 
Discussions around the legality of Tiberius’ candidacy certainly took on a more aggressive 
tone. On the first day of voting two tribes had cast their lots in favour of Tiberius before the 
vote was discontinued after a legal challenge was mounted. He made a carefully staged 
appearance in the Forum that evening, dressed in mourning garb and urging the crowd to care 
for his family should ‘something’ happen. Plutarch tells us that this display was enough to 
cause an improvised bodyguard to be set up around his house that night (Tiberius Gracchus 
16) and that some elements of the crowd were primed for trouble.  It has been suggested that 
Tiberius’ success in mobilising support among the city’s uici may have been a decisive factor 
in Nasica’s actions (Flower, 2013: 98): were these ‘grass-roots’ pockets of support a buffer 
against violence or a means of fomenting and coordinating violent action by the urban plebs? 
According to Flower’s analysis, fear of the mob at Tiberius’ disposal was enough to set 




The pontifex maximus: dux privatus 
 
The death of Tiberius took place against the backdrop of an assembly. This was not, as 
Appian (and later Earl, 1963) argues an election to renew Tiberius’ tribunate, so much as a 
vote on the legality of his tribunician re-election. Furthermore, Tiberius’ supporters were 
gathered in the area Capitolina not as an occupying force holding some strategic position but 
in the place where tribunes customarily conducted their business (Kondratieff, 2009: 339). If 
anything, the location of the senate meeting was the more unusual. 
 
 
Figure 1 The Capitoline Hill (image from Wikipedia Commons) 76 
 
As the map shows, the Capitol was a fairly confined area and the key locations are all 
towards the southern eastern end of the hill – the area Capitolina, the Temple of Jupiter and 
the Temple of Fides (where the senate was meeting that day). The relationship between the 
Temple and the Senate merits some brief comment. Other than cursory mentions in Valerius 
Maximus and Appian, both referring to this episode, we have no other indications of the 
Temple being used as a meeting place for the Senate. As venues go, however, it certainly 





offered plenty of symbolic resonances, being the depository of international agreements and 
the diplomata of honourably discharged soldiers. Clark (2007) argues that the Temple, 
possibly the first instance of a civic shrine both to the Fides of the Republic and an individual 
family (the Atilii), ‘may well have constituted a space allowing and provoking discussion of 
… Fides’ (Clark, 2007: 62). The notion of ‘sacred space’ shaping the kind of conversations 
that are carried out inside it is one which certainly merits further reflection in this context. 
For the Senate to meet in a space so redolent of the Republic’s political and military bona 
fides, we can more readily understand how much easier it was to represent Tiberius and his 
supporters as extra fidem. Perhaps its proximity to the Tarpeian rock, from which traitors 
were consigned to their deaths, underscored the duty of Fides toward the State and the 
consequences of betraying it. This topographical juxtaposition was also reflected in the 
rhetorical contrast of a sober ‘faith’ and a demagogue’s ‘treason’ which would feature in later 
reconstructions of the event.  
 
Who determined the Temple of Fides as the Senate’s meeting place? The Senate was 
convoked by the ‘presiding magistrate’ (usually the consul) and had to meet in a templum, a 
space which had been officially designated by the augurs (and so not always a ‘temple’ in the 
formal sense). Bonnefond-Coudry (1989: 113) attributes the choice of venue to the consul 
Publius Mucius Scaevola. She sees no reason to think the Senate was playing ideological 
games in choosing Fides, arguing that the most common Capitoline setting, the Temple of 
Jupiter itself, was already occupied by Tiberius’ partisans and so the nearest available 
templum had to suffice.77  That said, Bonnefond-Coudry does find herself musing about the 
shrine’s other uses as offering ‘une raison supplémentaire de choisir ce temple’ (1989: 115). 
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 Bonnefond-Coudry claims to follow Plutarch and Appian’s reading of the event in suggesting that 
the Gracchans were occupying the Temple; neither account actually says this and there seems to be no 
evidence to suggest that the ‘anti-Senatorial’ faction had gathered anywhere other than the ‘forecourt’ 
of the area Capitolina. 
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There are objections which may be made to her thesis: claiming that the choice of Fides was 
the unpremeditated result of fast moving events overlooks the fact that the fateful session 
took place on the second day of Tiberius’ bid for re-election. This opens up the possibility 
that Scaevola’s choice was not made on the spur of the moment but had been predetermined 
at the insistence of Nasica. Although the consul would scarcely have given way to a private 
citizen on such a matter, the pontifex maximus could have made a compelling argument to the 
college of pontiffs – including Scaevola - that the Temple of Public Faith was the most 
appropriate and auspicious place for the senate to gather and face down the challenge of 
Tiberius. Might Scaevola, having already shown that he was broadly sympathetic to Tiberius’ 
reforms, have made this concession to establish his own bona fides with the rest of the 
college and the senate as a whole? 
 
While the senate were meeting in the Temple of the Fides, an altercation outside the Temple 
of Jupiter had set the chain of violent events in motion. Appian mentions the crowd laying 
hold of the fasces of the lictors and using them to drive off ‘the rich’. Why would the lictors 
have been there at all, unless they had been sent at the behest of one of the magistrates? To 
seize and break the fasces would have been little short of a revolutionary act in itself – 
symbolically deposing or rejececting the authority of that magistrate (Hölkeskamp, 2011: 
169-170). Or, is it possible that these were lictores curiati whom the pontifex maximus had 
decided to deploy for particular duties that morning? What if Appian’s account is confused as 
to the seizing of the lictors’ rods and that it was actually the senators who armed themselves 
with the fasces? Such a scenario is no less remarkable than the idea of Gracchus’ supporters 
meekly handing over their makeshift weapons, only to be beaten with the same weapons 
moments later. Of course, the most controversial subtext to the latter reconstruction would be 
that the pontifex maximus himself had made preparations to arm his own ‘partisans’ - perhaps 
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not with the intention of killing anyone, but in full expectation of a violent confrontation. The 
use of wooden implements, rather than ‘iron’ swords or daggers (Plutarch, Tiberius 
Gracchus, 19) is also considered of significance (Rawson, 1974: 194): the fact that this 
absence of metal is specifically noted by Plutarch (who displays a refined religious 
sensibility) and that iron was forbidden in sacrifices, sits well with those analyses which are 
drawn to the ‘sacral’ allusions of these events and actors. 
 
Of course the most prominent sacral allusion was Nasica’s decision to veil his head and lead 
the senators outside to deal with Tiberius. This use of the cinctus gabinus has generated an 
interesting discussion over the last decade. Even before this, Badian (1972) and Rawson 
(1974) both recognised the ritual significance of the arrangement of Nasica’s toga but draw 
back from any interpretation of his actions which would cast him in a sacrificial role. Rawson 
in particular finds it difficult to imagine Tiberius’ death as pre-meditated, let alone 
symbolically choreographed by his cousin. The fact remains, however, that Nasica’s vesture 
continues to pose a problem for us. Beyond conferring what Rawson describes as ‘some 
vague solemnity’, what sense are we to make of his decision to cover his head and, according 
to Plutarch, have the purple stripe of his toga praetexta in full view of the senators who were 
following and the mob swirling around him? It is Linderski (2002) who points out that the 
very fact he was wearing the toga praetexta at all is itself unusual: if Mommsen (I:3) is 
correct, we would expect Nasica to be wearing a toga pura since the pontiffs did not wear the 
praetexta in the Senate or at any time apart from the public exercise of their office.78 To 
suggest that he emerged from the Temple of Fides drawing attention to his priestly office 
(and indeed his consular rank) would mean that, at some indeterminate point, he cast off the 
toga pura in favour of the praetexta.  Appian makes no reference to the religious 
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 Livy 33.42.1 notes with regard to the tresviri epulones that the privilege of the praetexta ‘item ut 
pontificibus lege datum est’ (Mitchell, 2005: 165). 
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connotations of Nasica’s arrangement of his toga,79 although he does invert the customary 
significance of the gesture: the velatio capitis was an act of concealment rather than an 
expression of pietas. 
 
Approaching the symbolic weight of Nasica’s appearance from a different angle, Clark 
(2007a) draws attention to a less scrutinised detail in Plutarch’s account: 
 
With these words he drew the edge of his toga over his head and strode out towards the Capitol. 
All the senators who followed him wrapped their togas over their arms and thrust aside anyone 
who stood in their path, with no one opposing them, because of their rank, but rather feeling 
and trampling upon one another (Plutarch, Tiberius Gracchus 19). 
 
Valerius supplies the additional detail that the pontifex maximus had his left hand covered, 
while Velleius makes it his left arm. Clark finds Nasica’s veiled hand more intriguing than 
his veiled head: is this an instance of an inverse ‘liturgy’ of Fides? (Clark, 2007a: 128). 
Instead of approaching the Temple of Fides in a carriage with right hands covered (as Livy 
describes the rites of Fides)80, Nasica leads the senators on foot, away from the Temple, with 
their left hands (or arms) covered.  
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 This may have been to induce more of them to accompany him by the distinctiveness of his dress, 
or to fashion for the onlookers some symbol of war like a helmet, or to hide from the gods his shame 
at what he proposed to do. (Appian, BC I:16) 
80
 Et (soli) Fidei sollemne instituit. Ad id sacrarium flamines bigis curru arcuato vehi iussit manuque 
ad digitos usque inuoluta rem divinam facere, significantes fidem tutandam sedemque eius etiam in 
dexteris sacratam esse. (Livy 1:21.4) 
He also instituted a yearly sacrifice to Fides and ordered that the Flamens should ride to her temple in 
a covered chariot, and should perform the service with their hands covered as far as the fingers, to 
signify that Faith must be sheltered and that her seat is holy even when it is in men's right hands. 
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If we are to accept both Plutarch and Appian’s accounts we must also recognise that they do 
lend themselves to those constructions of the event which suggest a deliberate action with a 
conscious appeal to its religious undertones. Indeed, although all the sources vary on many 
details, they are remarkably unified in recording something which looked very much like a 
ritual action under the direction of the high pontiff. 
 
We also have an intriguing fragment attributed to Tiberius’ brother Gaius which is preserved 
by the grammarian Charisius. In support of a lex Papiria to allow tribunician re-election, 
Gaius seemingly alludes to the kind of politician exemplified by his brother and contrasts this 
with the sort who would kill a man in the same way that one might slaughter a pig: 
 
<<Communiter>> C. Gracchus ut lex Papiria accipiatur: <<qui sapientem cum faciet, qui et 
uobis et rei publicae et sibi communiter prospiciat, non qui pro suilla humanum trucidet.>> 81 
 
The lacunae in this fragment lend themselves to nuanced readings of the author’s intention. 
Badian reads Gaius as recalling the merits of his brother as a wise servant of the common 
good, ‘not one to sacrifice a man as he would a pig’ (2004:2 65); this interpretation leaves the 
making of connections with Nasica to the audience. Morgan (1974: 214) draws perhaps the 
clearest connections between the sacrificial language and Nasica’s agnomen ‘Serapio’ which, 
as have seen, he is said to have acquired through his resemblance to a well-known victimarius 
(assistant at sacrifices).82  Our reading of Gaius Gracchus’ comment may well serve two 
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 Charisius, Artis Grammaticae 5: 
‘Jointly’ - as is used by G. Gracchus in speaking for the passage of the Papirian Law: the wise man is 
he who would jointly provide for you, the Republic and himself, not he who slaughters a human being 
like a pig.’ 
82
 A further barb, perhaps just as sharp for an aristocrat such as Nasica, would have been the lowly 
connotations of this name. ‘Serapio’ and other derivatives of ‘Serapis / Sarapis’ have been associated 
with the servile classes (Clarysse & Paganini, 2009: 80). 
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purposes: it may both sustain the idea that Nasica was invoking his chief priestly status and 
yet subvert his attempt to do so by evoking the lowlier status of his namesake. 
 
Cicero, who revered Scipio as a precursor and missed no opportunity to act as encomiast for 
the Nasican cause,83 is keen to emphasise that, although pontifex maximus, he was acting as a 
private citizen – i.e. not as a magistrate with any kind of imperium.84 Roughly contemporary 
with Cicero, the Rhetorica ad Herennium is unambigiously hostile to Nasica, describing him 
as ‘sudans, oculis ardentibus, erecto capillo, contorta toga’.85  This is, Várhelyi notes, typical 
of Latin invective and emphasises that Nasica has lost that most prized characteristic of 
Roman manhood: self-possession and control (Várhelyi, 2011: 127). Badian (2004: 269) is of 
the view that, beneath the rhetorical tropes, may lie an account which has been lifted from a 
contemporary speech charging Nasica with the murder or perhaps a letter of Gaius Gracchus 
levelling the same accusation (although it seems less likely that a letter would be read in a 
school of eloquence). Intriguingly, the ad Herennium account makes no mention of Nasica’s 
priestly office, although the arrangement of his toga does merit a brief nod: is the contorta 
toga anything more than the outward expression of a twisted mind? If anyone emerges as the 
epitome of religious probity in the ad Herennium’s account it is, perhaps predictably, 
Tiberius. He begins the contio with the prescribed invocation of the gods. It is almost as if 
Tiberius’ prayer becomes the provocation and the signal to attack. 
 
The remaining Livian account, from the Periochae (58), eschews any religious commentary, 
although it does denote Nasica as the ‘auctor’ of Tiberius’ killing. Velleius Paterculus offers 
more by way of detail: 
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 As e.g. Murray (1966) points out, however, Cicero was also capable of praising the Gracchi (and 
their land reforms) when it suited him. 
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 E.g. in Catilinam, 1.3; de Officiis, 1:76; de Re Publica 2.46. 
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… priuatusque et togatus, cum esset consobrinus Ti. Gracchi, patriam cognationi praeferens et 
quidquid publice salutare non esset, priuatim alienum existimans (ob eas uirtutes primus 
omnium absens pontifex maximus factus est), circumdata laeuo brachio togae lacinia ex 
superiore parte Capitolii summis gradibus insistens hortatus est, qui salvam uellent rem 
publicam, se sequerentur.86 
 
As we have seen, Velleius is unique in suggesting that Nasica was the first to be elected 
pontifex maximus in his absence – a claim for which we have no other authority – and yet he 
draws no further conclusions about the nature of his actions that day.87 His main concern 
seems to be the sounding of a solemn note about the evils of civil war: a theme which would 
chime with the still-fresh Augustan theme of civil strife being quelled by the princeps-
pontifex.  
 
Priest and victim 
 
Santangelo argues that Tiberius’ death at the hands of the pontifex maximus created real 
problems for the Gracchan partisans and apologists (2005: 211): it also served to underscore 
the charges of impiety and disregard for legitimate omens (but as one might expect from a 
protégé of the sceptic Blossius). As part of their posthumous defence of the tribune, Várhelyi 
suggests that these sympathisers sought to emphasise Nasica’s almost Bacchanalian frenzy: 
                                                          
86
 A private citizen and clad in the toga, although the cousin of Tiberius Gracchus, he set his country 
before family connections, regarding as contrary to his private interests everything that was not for the 
common good (a quality which earned for him the distinction of being the first man to be elected 
pontifex maximus in his absence). Wrapping the fold of his toga about his left forearm and standing on 
the topmost steps of the Capitol, he summoned all those who wished for the safety of the state to 
follow him. 
87
 As Wardle (1998) points out, Valerius’ account has some lacunae, especially in Book I: we rely for 
supplementary detail on two epitomators, Julius Paulus and Januarius Nepotianus. Nepotianus is 
interesting in suggesting that it is Nasica himself who kills Tiberius (Wardle, 1998: 158). 
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this had little to do with the measured seriousness of Roman ritual, rather it bore comparison 
to ‘the excessive, mad outbursts of unacceptable religion’ (2011:127).  That said, we cannot 
simply accept that the involvement of the chief priest inevitably led to religious 
interpretations of the mêlée. Part of the confusion arising out of Nasica’s intervention centres 
around the blurring of roles and rituals we encounter in the complex Roman system. 
Although the toga praetexta and the velatio capitis88 are characteristic of the chief pontiff in 
attendance at a sacrifice, he would not be the man wielding the knife.89  
 
Jorg Rüpke (1992) alerts us to an interesting link between the pontifex maximus, the city and 
the phenomenon of sanctioned killing. As we have already noted, the execution of citizens 
was forbidden within the sacred boundary of the pomerium: even those dispatched from the 
Tarpeian rock were technically thrown away from the city, as civilian detritus. The only 
exception to this ban on killing within the urban boundary was reserved for the punishment of 
Vestals guilty of incestum. In this instance the pontifex maximus, who was regarded as the 
Vestal paterfamilias, was required with his own hand to beat the Virgin’s seducer to death 
with rods (Rüpke, 1992: 65). Although an exceptional penalty, the knowledge that one even 
had such emergency powers, must have influenced the way people regarded the chief pontiff 
– indeed it may even have affected how he saw his own actions. Rüpke observes a tendency 
from the period of the Gracchi towards ‘a sacralization of judicial and politically motivated 
murder’ (1992: 71). He does not attempt to make any explicit connections between the 
religious personnel of the City and this ‘sacralizing tendency’ but I think it throws up some 
fascinating questions about the way in which Nasica and subsequent pontifices maximi 
legitimised violent actions by framing them in vaguely ritualised forms.  
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 The covering of the head was also part of ius fetiale, whereby priests carried out the ritual 
preparations for war against an aggressor (Glinister, 2009: 195). 
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 In discussing the killing of Tiberius, Barton overstates matters in asserting that ‘the priest and 




There is another element of the pontiff’s ‘repertoire’ which might be implied in Nasica’s 
choice of words and posture during those crucial minutes. The relatively obscure (but 
symbolically rich) practice of deuotio has many points of congruence with the scene on the 
Capitoline that day. When confronted with a situation of seemingly irretrievable bleakness, a 
Roman general or consul-in-the-field could consecrate himself as an offering to the gods 
(McDonnell, 2006: 200). The best known examples of deuotio were the Decii Mures, father 
and son, whose bravery and self-sacrifice in the Samnite wars are recorded by Livy. In this 
most detailed account of the ritual and its preparatory rubrics, Livy records that the pontifex 
maximus recited a formula of dedicatio for Decius in which a variety of gods (both ‘celestial’ 
and ‘infernal’) were invoked. Then – and this, I think, is the most significant aspect – with his 
head veiled in the cinctus gabinus, the general plunged into the heart of the enemy forces.90 Is 
it possible, then, to discern the outlines of a quasi deuotio in Nasica’s actions? Although it 
entails much of the same blurring of margins as the other theories we have so far 
encountered, I feel there is something worth exploring in this. He had, after all, been consul 
and, as both pontiff and a veteran of the Carthaginian campaign, he would have been familiar 
with the ‘lore’ of deuotio.91 Appian’s account certainly lends itself to such a reading: the 
veiled pontiff might just as easily be seen as a military figure (wearing ‘some symbol of war 
like a helmet’). It is also, as Binot (2001: 194) points out, this military symbolism which 
Vergil alludes to in Book VII of the Aeneid.92 In his celebrated survey of the killing of 
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 Livy, 8.9. 
91
 Macrobius (Sat. 3.9.9ff) relates an ‘offensive’ use of deuotio whereby the entire city of Carthage 
was ‘devoted’ to the gods of the underworld and its citizens designated substitutes for the Roman 
army. Cf. Versnel, 1996. 
92
 Aeneid, 7: 611-614: 
 
has, ubi certa sedet patribus sententia pugnae,  
ipse Quirinali trabea cinctuque Gabino 
insignis reserat stridentia limina consul, 
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Tiberius, Linderski brusquely dismisses the allusion to deuotio since Nasica ‘was not an 
imperator, and hence he was not entitled to perform this ceremony’ (Linderski, 2002: 355). I 
feel that a narrow focus on the classic deuotio ducis and its military application leads to an 
impoverished understanding of the metaphorical weight of this gesture. Andrew Dyck (2004) 
offers what is, in my view, a compelling argument that Cicero made use of the language and 
imagery of deuotio as part of his post reditum rhetoric. The exempla of the Decii and their 
exploits are referenced by Cicero in the de Domo 64. Elsewhere, Cicero rises to the challenge 
of making his decision to go into exile sound heroic by painting his exile as a kind of ‘living 
death’. He succeeds (to an extent) in dodging the religious objection that a dux deuotus who 
survived was technically impius by framing his decision to return and serve the Republic as 
the fulfilment of his vow. 93  His appeal to this kind of rhetoric should, of course, be 
understood against the backdrop of his role in the suppression of Catiline in which he was 
every bit the dux togatus (or loricatus). If one ‘saviour of the state’ could wrap himself in the 
cloak of just sacrifice unfettered by a scrupulous adherence to the details, could Nasica not be 
seen to do the same? Moreover, the rhetoric of devotio was far more common than the 
practice itself (McDonnell, 2006: 200): the ‘battle’ could be symbolic as well as real 
(Heyman, 2007: 180) and later poetic renderings of the practice would even allow for 
‘deuotio in reverse’. In his telling of the end-game at Pharsalus, Lucan (7.659-664) has 
Pompey deciding to quit the field of battle as a way of saving his soldiers (Bartsch, 1997: 79). 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
ipse uocat pugnas; sequitur tum cetera pubes, 
aereaque adsensu conspirant cornua rauco.  
 
When the final decision of the city fathers is for battle,  
the Consul himself, dressed in the Quirinal toga, folded 
in the Gabine manner, unbars these groaning doors, himself, 
and himself invokes the battle: then the rest of the men  
do so too, and bronze horns breathe their hoarse assent. 
 
93
 According to Livy 8.10.12, a life-size effigy of the general would be buried in fulfilment of the vow 
(Beard et al, 1998a: 35). 
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There is nothing to suggest that Nasica could not have made use of this flexible trope to 
imbue his actions with religious legitimacy. 
 
As mentioned above, Linderski leaps over deuotio in order to reach his preferred ritual 
exegesis of sacratio: declaring or ‘cursing’ someone as homo sacer. This practice probably 
dates from the very oldest phase of Roman law before any meaningful distinction could be 
made between sacred and secular codes and certainly before the veil was lifted on pontifical 
jurisprudence (Watson, 1992: 33). From this period onwards we encounter a series of 
prohibitions demanding capital punishment, from the archaic moving of boundary markers 
and beating of parents through to mistreatment of Tribunes and usurpation of monarchy. 
These rules, termed the leges sacratae, involved not just execution but other ancillary 
punishments such as the sale of the homo sacer’s property at the Temple of Ceres, Liber and 
Libera (cf. Livy III, 5:5). As the name sacer suggests, branding a man in this way rendered 
him the property of a god (often but not always Jupiter) and the only way to properly ensure 
this transfer was by killing. In its practical application sacratio introduced a curious element 
of liberalization into the killing of one man by another. If you kill a man and can 
subsequently prove that he was indeed homo sacer, then that killing was a valid execution 
rather than murder. Bennett (1930) makes a case for the concept of sacer esto simply being a 
religious embellishment of straightforward capital punishment carried out by various means. 
When secular law began to predominate (and indeed when capital punishment became 
comparatively rare), a corresponding shift towards secular execution became the norm. It is, I 
think stretching things too far to suggest that the sacred outcast simply mutated over time into 
the secular equivalent of aqua et igni interdictus. However rare its application may have 
been, sacratio was understood as the proper response to adfectatio regni throughout the 
Republic (Fiori, 1996: 532) and that sacralizing of politically motivated killing mentioned by 
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Rüpke may well have exerted some subliminal influence on Nasica. This is precisely how 
Linderski chooses to interpret his actions: 
 
The old religious and public regulations of the Republic, the leges sacratae, prescribed that the 
heads of those who attempted to establish tyranny (adfectatio regni), and of those who injured 
the tribunes of the plebs be forfeited to Jupiter, the guarantor of the constitution. And who was 
better qualified to pronounce the curse than the pontifex maximus, iudex atque arbiter rerum 
divinarum humanarumque? (Linderski, 2002: 365) 
 
Wiseman thinks it odd that Cicero makes no mention at all of the sacratio of Tiberius (2009: 
186) but there is, nevertheless, an intuitive appeal in Linderski’s interpretation: it offers a 
justification for Nasica’s unusual posture / vesture and corresponds to the two charges, 
whether credible or spurious, being laid against Tiberius. Linderski himself also dismisses the 
possibility of Nasica ‘sacrificing’ Tiberius since, following Festus, the homo sacer could not 
be sacrificed: 
 
At homo sacer is est quem populus iudicavit ob maleficium neque fas est eum immolari sed qui 
occidit parricidi non damnatur (Festus, 424 L)94 
 
Roberto Fiori (1996:18) points out that the text of Festus is not without its share of difficulty 
(many scholars have asked why not ‘immolare’? Why is it ‘sed’ and not ‘et’?). Macrobius 
went so far as to suggest that what Festus was describing was the exception rather than the 
rule (although Fiori is not convinced by this). Unlike Linderski, Fiori is not interested in a 
dissection of Nasica’s gesture and vesture. For him, what lends weight to the sacer esto 
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 But the homo sacer is one who has been judged by the people on account of a crime (nor) is it 
permitted for him to be sacrificed but whoever kills him will not be guilty of murder. 
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theory was the immediate aftermath of Tiberius’ death and, in particular, the attitude of the 
consul, P. Mucius Scaevola. It was Scaevola who had firmly rejected Nasica’s plea to 
intervene, stating that he would initiate no violent action and would not execute a fellow 
citizen without benefit of due process. This in turn forced (or gave Nasica the pretext) to 
declaim what sounds very much like the formula for summoning the emergency levy: 'qui 
rem publicam saluam esse uolunt me sequantur'.  Lintott describes Nasica’s words as a 
‘usurpation’ of the consul’s role (1999: 91) but Fiori would seem to suggest that Scaevola 
was only too happy to allow the pontifex maximus this room for manoeuvre. As consul, he 
could not risk the illegality of such an action, but if Nasica were to declare Tiberius homo 
sacer then Scaevola had no power to intervene. The fact that the action brought against 
Nasica by M. Fulvius Flaccus came to nothing suggests that the consul (and foremost 
jurisconsult of his day) was prepared to seek a religious and political compromise – and one 
which kept him safely removed from the spectacle of a full trial of the pontifex maximus.95 
Confusion remains over the ‘quip’ recorded by Cicero in de Oratore as Nasica’s response to 
Scaevola’s nomination as a iudex : 
 
Placet etiam mihi illud Scipionis illius, qui Ti. Gracchum perculit: cum ei M. Flaccus multis 
probris obiectis P. Mucium iudicem tulisset; "eiero," inquit "iniquus est"; cum esset 
admurmuratum, "ah," inquit "P. C., non ego mihi illum iniquum eiero, uerum omnibus." (de 
Oratore, 2. 285) 96 
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 Scaevola was nominated as a judge in Flaccus’ quaestio (cf. Astin, 1967: 229); Plutarch, Tiberius 
Gracchus 21.4. 
96
 I also like that remark of Scipio – the one who overthrew Ti. Gracchus : when M. Flaccus, after 
throwing many insults at him, proposed P. Mucius as a judge, Scipio said ‘I reject him; he is 
prejudiced’. When there were murmurings about this he added, ‘Senators, I do not reject him as 
prejudiced towards me, but towards everybody.’ 
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How are we to understand Nasica’s response? Badian (2004: 269) rightly identifies an 
inconsistency with other statements of Cicero regarding Scaevola’s attitude and actions (pro 
Plancio, 88 and de Domo 91): did this exchange take place at the first meeting of the Senate 
after Tiberius had been killed? Nasica’s objections to Scaevola as iudex met with rebuttals 
from many in the senate, suggesting that the consul had already endorsed Nasica’s actions. 
Cicero can, of course, be ambiguous in his deployment of anecdote; and there was already 
enough ambiguity around the fatal events. Tiberius had fallen in a melée of jostling and 
rhetoric: perhaps untangling precisely who said and did what (and in what capacity) 
presented too taxing and divisive a prospect for the Senate.97 Not that the senate could afford 
to ignore the matter. There was a keen sense that the violation of tribunician sacrosanctitas 
(whether that of Tiberius, Octavius or indeed both) had inflicted a religious wound on the 
Republic.  
 
Flower (2006:70) is convinced that Nasica’s status as pontifex maximus left a distinct imprint 
on the violence which marked a ‘decisive rift in the life of the Roman community’. The flurry 
of show trials of Tiberius’ surviving sympathisers resulted in a few more deaths and some 
more ended careers. Although, as we have seen, he was acquitted under the process brought 
by Flaccus, Nasica was perhaps the most prominent individual to experience a premature end 
to his career as a result of Tiberius’ death.98 Plutarch paints a grim picture of a public figure 
in terminal decline: 
 
People made no secret of their loathing for him when they saw him in the streets: they shouted 
enraged insults at him, vilifying him as an accursed tyrant who had polluted the most holy and 
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 It is the view of Briscoe (1974) that ‘Scaevola, seeing that the majority of the senate were behind 
Nasica, may well have made some ambivalent remarks which Cicero chose to construe as indicating 
approval of the murder.’ (1974: 129) 
98
 Although it could be argued that, whatever the precise circumstances of his death, the career of 
Scipio Aemilianus was also ended by his response to the crisis. 
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solemn of the city’s sanctuaries with the murder of a man whose body was sacred and 
inviolable. (21) 
 
The increasing clamour for his formal prosecution grew so great that the Senate created the 
pretext for his discreet exit from the city. Valerius Maximus is our chief source for his 
appointment to the embassy to Pergamum, sent to oversee the settlement of Rome’s latest 
inheritance. Although this is a more honourable discharge than Plutarch’s account of a 
dejected outcast’s meanderings, the words ‘sub titulo legationis’ (V.3.2.) cannot entirely 
disguise the fact that this withdrawal from Rome was, as I have chosen to describe it above, 
something of ‘a punitive embassy’. Flower (2006:100) is probably right in configuring 
Nasica’s mission as a species of exile, drawing parallels with Cicero’s fate under broadly 
similar charges. But it is Plutarch who alerts us to the most remarkable feature of this course 
of action. Although it was Nasica’s misfortune to die before he, like Cicero, could be 
‘recalled’, the very fact that he was sent away at all is of extraordinary import. We need not 
linger over Plutarch’s description of him slinking away; where he is absolutely correct, 
however, is his mention of Nasica ‘being duty-bound to remain, since as pontifex maximus he 
had vital religious rites to carry out’ (21). This is the crucial element in Nasica’s story and for 
which, more so than his direct or indirect involvement in Tiberius’ death, makes him a figure 
of pivotal significance in Rome’s religious and political history. While it was the flamen 
Dialis, the priest of Jupiter, who experienced the most severe restrictions on his freedom of 
movement, it was unheard of for the city’s chief priest to be absent for an extended period 
sine die. In the course of the Ab Urbe Condita Livy offers other examples of pontifices 
maximi 99who were constrained from leaving the city even when it was politically expedient 
for them to do so. No passing political or military advantage could justify breaking the sacred 
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 Livy, 28.38.12; 28.44.11-12. 
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bonds between the high pontiff and the city: no amount of suitably qualified colleagues could 
replace the head of the college in the discharge of his most sacred duties. 
 
As far as the extant records will allow us to determine, Nasica is the first pontifex maximus to 
die outside of the city. That curious (and unique) phrase of Velleius that he was the first to be 
elected chief pontiff in absentia must surely be a garbled reference to the fact that set Nasica 
apart from all his predecessors: that he was the first absens pontifex maximus.100 He would 
not be the last of course. Indeed his immediate successor, Scaevola’s brother P. Licinius 
Crassus Dives Mucianus, famously used his pontifical authority to constrain the flamen 
Martialis (and fellow consul) L. Valerius Flaccus from taking the prized command against 
Aristonicus in Pergamum. The fact that he could take his place at the head of the legions on 
the Pergamene campaign owes much, if not everything, to the fact that there was a precedent 




Extraordinary threats to the safety of the Republic demanded an extraordinary response. 
Treves (1996: 1564-1565), following Cicero, distinguishes two kinds of tumultus: the Italicus 
and the Gallicus. Whenever the menace was directed at the city itself, even the conventions 
of military procedure could be set aside in an emergency call-to-arms, the tumultarius 
dilectus (Golden, 2013: 47). Although Nasica is sometimes anachronistically depicted as 
invoking the senatus consultum ultimum, the first proper deployment of the ‘ultimate decree’ 
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 Badian (1996:399) takes Velleius at face value and conjectures that he may only have been elected 
PM as late as 132. If he did not succeed his father, P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica Corculum, in 141 this 
poses a significant challenge to both Broughton and Szemler’s ordering of the pontifical lists.  
101
 It was also, as Astin (1967:234) argues, an occasion which demonstrated the eclipse of Scipio 
Aemilianus. The comitia tributa was asked to resolve the dispute between the consuls, with entrusting 
the command to Scipio as an obvious way out of the impasse; only two tribes voted for him. 
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did not occur until 121 when it was directed against Tiberius’ younger sibling and his 
supporters. What is most striking here is the way in which Nasica again maximises the 
opportunity presented by Scaevola’s inaction to take a decisive step which, although 
unprecedented, nevertheless bore a strong resemblance to measures in keeping with mos. 
 
Firstly, he could accentuate the gravity of the situation since the presiding consul had 
neglected to act. There is no want of drama in the three-way exchange between pontifex 
maximus, consul and senate: if Rome’s chief magistrate could not bestir himself, who would 
be the guarantor of its laws and its defender in the face of Tiberius’ depredations? Still, we 
can only wonder how Nasica felt as the moment of action finally arrived. He was, after all, 
proposing to deprive fellow-citizens (and a tribune) of their most basic rights, not only 
branding them as outlaws but reducing them to the status of foreign aggressors. 
 
The contentious iteration of Tiberius’ tribunate was probably enough to taint him with the 
charge of adfectatio regni, a step which legitimized the suppression of his civil rights and 
which consigned him to a status which was as much sub-human as sub-citizen. Precedent 
could be found for the disposal of would-be tyrants. As Smith (2006b: 50) notes, there is a 
strong connection between frumentary-agrarian intervention on the part of popular leaders 
and senatorial alarums of incipient tyranny. We should be conscious, however, of the 
retrospective shadow the Gracchi may have cast over the accounts of earlier adfectatores 
regni. Nasica would have known, however, that the credible taint of wishing to establish a 
regnum in Rome would lend both urgency and legitimacy to any ensuing action. He would 
also have been conscious of the religious sanctions attached to attempted tyrants both in 
terms of their own fate and the disposal of their property. In other words, Nasica was fully 




The extraordinary scope of the course undertaken by Nasica clearly challenges the perception 
of an ad hoc solution. We cannot, of course, be sure from whom he would have sought his 
legal advice but there remains a question mark over the consul’s role in these decisive hours. 
It is hard to imagine that any consul would stomach such a public rebuke and meekly accept 
such an open challenge to his authority. The fact that Scaevola gave every impression of 
‘rolling over’ to Nasica - offering no substantial resistance at the time and a form of tacit 
acceptance thereafter – makes his position problematic. Cicero, who is understandably fond 
of the Nasican motif, even suggests that the consul’s response was laudatory: 
 
Sed publicam causam contra uim armatam sine publico praesidio suscipere nolui, non quo mihi 
P. Scipionis, fortissimi uiri, uis in Ti. <Graccho>, privati hominis, displiceret, sed Scipionis 
factum statim P. Mucius consul, qui in gerenda re (publica) putabatur fuisse segnior, gesta 
multis senatus consultis non modo defendit, sed etiam ornauit.102 
 
The next year’s consuls presided over a number of quaestiones extraordinariae by way of a 
‘contained purge’ of Gracchan sympathisers. These trials are best known for Blossius’ 
response to the loaded question about setting fire to the Capitol if Tiberius had asked for it. 
Incendiarism on the Capitol was, as Nippel (1995: 62) observes, a fear which stalked the 
Roman imagination, especially in the early and middle Republic. As we have already seen, 
the Capitol provided a particularly suggestive palcoscenico for Nasica and his followers: not 
only would Tiberius be struck down in sight of the statues of the kings but it seems likely that 
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 Cicero, De domo, 91. 
But I was unwilling to take up the public cause against armed violence, without the protection of the 
people. Not that I disapproved of the forcefulness of P. Scipio, that bravest of men, against Tiberius 
Gracchus when he was only a private individual; but P. Mucius the consul, who was thought 
somewhat remiss in safeguarding the republic, immediately defended, and, what is more, extolled the 
action of Scipio in many resolutions passed by the senate. 
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a statue honouring the ‘tyrannicide’ was set up in these same precincts. Lintott (1992: 72) 
speculates that the remains of a statue of Aristogeiton, found at the base of the Capitol, ‘may 
be part of a monument set up later to commemorate the alleged imitation of the Athenian 
example.’ We know that, by Cicero’s time, there was at least one misidentified statue of 
Scipio Nasica Serapio; how this relates to the conversation in De re publica (VI.8) in which 
Laelius’ character bemoans the fact that no-one has erected a statue of Nasica is not clear. It 
may be that the incorrect inscriptions were added to statues already standing, whereas the 
Aristogeiton statue was a coded tribute to the controversial pontifex which needed no explicit 
dedication. 103   
 
As we have seen, either Nasica was spontaneously inspired to punctuate his outbursts against 
Tiberius with the impressive cadences of the tumultus and the symbolic vesture of the 
pontifex-consul or he had deliberately choreographed it. No matter the intention, the effect of 
the chief priest bearing down on the crowds has been variously described as one of ‘awe’ 
(Nippel, 1995: 58) or a ‘deferential giving way’ (Brunt, 1971: 81). Consciously or not, Lintott 
(1999: 183) suggests that the pontifex was indeed ‘making a bridge’ between the traditional 
execution of tyrants and the ultimate decree which would form the Republic’s last line of 
defence in times of civil emergency.  
 
It seems likely that Nasica continued to be a figure of prominence in the immediate aftermath 
of the killings. Flower (2006: 70) thinks that it was Nasica himself who turned down the 
family’s request for Tiberius’ corpse, denying him the last rites – despite their promise of a 
discreet funeral. He was certainly unapologetic about his involvement and yet, on some level, 
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 Flower suggests that it was Sulla who erected copies of both the Athenian Harmodius and 
Aristogeiton statues in celebration of his defeat of the Marians (2006: 109). 
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he must surely have sensed the magnitude of what had taken place. As the ‘fall-out’ gradually 
began to descend on Rome, perhaps he felt the need to cover his head once again.  
 
It is worth considering in a little more detail the specifically religious response to Tiberius’ 
death at the hands of Nasica. 
 
Sacrum and expiation 
 
Unfavourable omens led the Senate to consult the Sibylline books so as to determine how 
best to undo the harm that had been done. The focus of the expiatory rites centred on Ceres, 
the goddess of the crops and the fields. There has been a suggestion that, since Tiberius’ 
programme was one of agrarian reform, it was Ceres who had taken offence: whether offence 
was taken at the manner of his death or, as his opponents suggested, at his making the fields 
of Italy the turf of a pitched ideological battle, is a matter of interpretation. The fact that the 
expiation was carried out at the most ancient cult centre of Ceres, at Henna in Sicily, is a 
further intriguing detail. Was this a reflection of the gravity of the offence or merely part of a 
wider effort at damage limitation, removing the sanative rituals from the still-tense arena of 
Roman politics? The beauty of this scenario for our purposes is that we do not have to 
choose: it simply serves as a further demonstration of the religious aftershocks of the event 
itself. 
 
Although Nasica was the prime-mover of the opposition to Tiberius, there is no absolute 
consensus as to the hand which dealt the fatal blow. The dubious distinction of actually 
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felling Tiberius usually belongs in the later literature to a fellow tribune, Publius Satureius.104 
This should give us pause. The traditional reading of the subsequent religious ceremonies 
accepts the conventional wisdom that Ceres, tutelary goddess of the plebs, had to be placated 
as a result of Tiberius’ actions. He had deposed a tribune from office and, just possibly, 
allowed him to be subjected to rough handling, thereby violating his sacrosanctitas. Such a 
transgression was an impediment to the normal life of the state: a crucial threshold of order 
and right relations had been breached. Spaeth (1996: 73) argues that Ceres had special care of 
the ‘liminal realities’ of public life, as well as a particular connection with the laws on 
sacrosanctitas and adfectatio regni.105  It would be misleading, however, to interpret the 
involvement of Ceres simply as a vindication of those who sought to blacken the name and 
the cause of Gracchus. The reality is, I think, more complex and ambiguous than that. There 
is, for example, an ambiguity in Cicero’s account of the decision to carry out expiatory rites 
at the most ancient shrine of Ceres: 
 
Itaque apud patres nostros atroci ac difficili rei publicae tempore, cum Tiberio Graccho occiso 
magnorum periculorum metus ex ostentis portenderetur, P. Mucio L. Calpurnio consulibus 
aditum est ad libros Sibyllinos; ex quibus inuentum est Cererem antiquissimam placari 
oportere.106 
 
Cicero, who does not normally shy away from making his criticism of Tiberius explicit 
(Woolf, 2006:89), here seems to allow the precise cause of that ‘most dreadful and trying 
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And so among our fathers during that most dreadful and trying time for the Republic, when, with 
Tiberius Gracchus killed, fear of great dangers was indicated by prodigies, in the consulship of P. 
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was necessary to placate the most ancient Ceres.  
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time for the Republic’ remain somewhat obscure. It is just possible that he too was not 
immune to the disquieting thought that it was Tiberius’ own inviolability which had been 
brutally compromised – and by a fellow tribune. 
 
And so it may be that, although the ensuing recriminations and surviving accounts of the 
legal process seem not to mention it, Tiberius had acted in accordance with the law. 
Badian (1996: 196) is of the view that Tiberius’ proposed dismissal of his colleague as 
tribune was not accompanied by a formal exauguration since ‘Octavius had himself 
violated the terms of the lex sacra and thereby stripped himself of its protection.’  
Therefore, it was not Octavius’ sacrosanctity which had been so egregiously trampled 
upon, but that of Nasica’s enemy – or so the Gracchan partisans could argue. Still, it was 
Tiberius who had instigated a form of violence, albeit non-lethal, in the physical removal 
of Octavius (Flower, 2010: 83). No matter how this disturbance was dissected and 
examined, the fact remains that one tribune acting violently towards another constituted a 
serious infraction of that sacred balance so beloved of Ceres. That some piaculum was 
required is beyond doubt. As we have already noted, the choice of the ‘mother shrine’ of 
Ceres at Henna was less ideologically loaded than the Roman plebs’ sanctuary on the 
Aventine. There may be another reason behind the choice.  
 
Scaevola was left to steer a path through the crisis without the direct support of his 
consular colleague, Calpurnius Piso Frugi, who was otherwise detained in Sicily. Piso had 
taken the command against the slave revolt led by Eunus which, as Spartacus’ insurrection 
would also prove some sixty years later, had been more than a match for Roman arms. The 
city of Henna and its sanctuary fell to the slave army and, after several unsuccessful 
attempts by other generals, Piso had just begun to meet with success when he had to return 
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to Rome. Eunus’ grip had been weakened, however, and the revolt was finally put down in 
132. Le Bonniec (1958: 368) is struck by the timing of the priestly delegation to Henna in 
that same year. He argues – correctly in my view – that the senate wished to erase any 
contamination of the cult of Ceres by the rebels and send out a message of solidarity to the 
people of this prized island at the conclusion of their own time of crisis. We might even 
suggest that there was an element of religious and political re-colonisation implicit in this 
undertaking. The death of Tiberius was certainly ‘on the agenda’ but it may not have been 
the whole of it and perhaps not even the real priority. The real expiation would take a 
different form and involve a different victim. 
 
Spiriting Nasica from Rome 
 
The ancient sources are ambiguous about the timescale of Nasica’s fall from grace: this 
has led to some widely divergent reconstructions of events. We get the sense that the 
optimates, Nasica included, regarded offence as the best form of defence and attempted to 
quickly assert their ascendancy. Those quaestiones extraordinariae which took place 
under the consuls of 132 are sometimes presented as being at the behest (or at least with 
the significant involvement) of Scipio Nasica. There is, in fact, little need to associate the 
events in which Nasica is shown playing a key role against Blossius, Diophanes and 
Villius (Plutarch, Tiberius Gracchus 20) with those later formal trials. Plutarch, for 
example, is exercised by the fact that these Gracchan sympathisers were disposed of 
without benefit of trial. Having Nasica as a prime mover in the quaestiones makes it 
difficult to reconcile the urgency of events in Rome with the more leisurely pace 
demanded by the protracted legal process which seems to have followed. Cicero gives 




Ti. quidem Gracchum rem publicam uexantem a Q. Tuberone aequalibusque amicis derelictum 
videbamus. At C. Blossius Cumanus, hospes familiae vestrae, Scaeuola, cum ad me, quod 
aderam Laenati et Rupilio consulibus in consilio, deprecatum uenisset, hanc ut sibi ignoscerem, 
causam adferebat, quod tanti Ti. Gracchum fecisset ut, quidquid ille uellet, sibi faciendum 
putaret. Tum ego: 'Etiamne, si te in Capitolium faces ferre uellet?' 'Numquam' inquit 'uoluisset 
id quidem; sed si uoluisset, paruissem.' Uidetis, quam nefaria vox! Et hercule ita fecit uel plus 
etiam quam dixit; non enim paruit ille Ti. Gracchi temeritati sed praefuit, nec se comitem illius 
furoris, sed ducem praebuit. Itaque hac amentia quaestione noua perterritus in Asiam profugit, 
ad hostes se contulit, poenas rei publicae graves iustasque persoluit. Nulla est igitur excusatio 
peccati, si amici causa peccaueris; nam cum conciliatrix amicitiae uirtutis opinio fuerit, difficile 
est amicitiam manere, si a uirtute defeceris.107 
 
Valerius Maximus also adopts Cicero’s version of events, making no mention of Nasica at 
this juncture. Such accounts are more in keeping with the notion that it was the pontifex 
maximus who was under fire and being threatened from various quarters. The plebs who had 
clamoured for an inquest got their way and part of the solution was to ensure that Nasica was 
shielded from the consequences by removing him from the city (sacred ties notwithstanding 
                                                          
107
 Cicero, de Amicitia, 37 
When Tiberius Gracchus attempted his revolutionary measures he was deserted, as we saw, by 
Quintus Tubero and the friends of his own standing. On the other hand, a friend of your own family, 
Scaevola, Gaius Blossius of Cumae, took a different course. I was acting as assessor to the consuls 
Laenas and Rupilius to try the conspirators, and Blossius pleaded for my pardon on the ground that 
his regard for Tiberius Gracchus had been so high that he looked upon his wishes as law. "Even if he 
had wished you to set fire to the Capitol?" said I. "That is a thing," he replied, "that he never would 
have wished." "Ah, but if he had wished it?" said I. "I would have obeyed." The wickedness of such a 
speech needs no comment. And in point of fact he was as good and better than his word; for he did 
not wait for orders in the audacious proceedings of Tiberius Gracchus, but was the head and front of 
them, and was a leader rather than an abettor of his madness. The result of his infatuation was that he 
fled to Asia, terrified by the special commission appointed to try him, joined the enemies of his 
country, and paid a penalty to the republic as heavy as it was deserved. I conclude, then, that the plea 
of having acted in the interests of a friend is not a valid excuse for a wrong action. For, seeing that a 
belief in a man's virtue is the original cause of friendship, friendship can hardly remain if virtue be 
abandoned (translated by W. A. Falconer). 
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Lowrie, 2007: 49). Nagle (1971) argues that this was a fairly rapid process. She supports the 
‘traditional’ position of Tiberius’ death sometime in June (according to the solar calendar) or 
in July (by the Roman reckoning). The consultum regarding Pergamum and its five-man 
commission would have been passed between mid-August and September and so ‘Nasica was 
out of Rome by the end of September’ (Nagle: 1971: 127).  
 
No doubt the senators’ commission to Nasica was a way of avoiding the worrisome prospect 
of a pontifex maximus on trial, but also perhaps tacit recognition that there was enough 
evidence to find him guilty. No member of the senate is more emblematic of this uncertainty 
than Scaevola:  
 
If one single man, and he holding the highest political office in the republic and an educated 
expert in the law, was unable to provide blanket approval or blanket disapproval of this 
conduct, how was the entire population, or even the ruling class of Rome supposed to decide? 




I have argued that Nasica’s actions set in motion a chain of events which fundamentally 
altered the office of pontifex maximus and the way it was perceived. Authorities both ancient 
and modern differ in the extent to which they accord any religious significance to these 
events. Knowing what we now know about the symbiosis of religion and public life in Rome, 
it is no longer sufficient to treat Nasica’s intervention as a purely political deed. It was (and 
not merely tangentially) a religious intervention by virtue of his office which lent him 
gravitas and auctoritas, if not imperium. Those who have argued against a pre-meditated act 
of lethal violence against a kinsman do so against virtually every source which records the 
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event or its consequences. Even if, to paraphrase Rawson, Nasica extemporised some vaguely 
solemn pastiche of pontifical sobriety as a cover for pent-up political passions, he must have 
had some idea that things could end badly and yet proceeded regardless of this. It was not as 
though he did not have ‘form’ as a vociferous opponent of his cousin. By appealing to 
religious principle he could, literally, attempt to cover himself against the immediate 
accusations of sacrilege which would later dog his every step. Just which religious principle 
or formula is a question beyond resolution. Although the idea of a human sacrifice is both 
unpalatable and rendered problematic by the implied confusion of roles (was he priest or 
privatus?), the same could be said of all attempts at unpicking the knot of words and deeds. 
Linderski’s dismissal of an improvised sort of devotio on the grounds that Nasica did not 
have imperium is no more logically robust than the claim that he was declaring Tiberius 
homo sacer. He was a private citizen because he had no imperium and yet a privatus had no 
power to declare any thing or one sacer; it is much more probable that was drawing attention 
to the fact that he was pontifex maximus, the iudex atque arbiter rerum divinarum 
humanarumque. And surely, if anyone had the power to recast an obscure rite in the heat of 
an unprecedented crisis it was this same iudex atque arbiter?  
 
There is just as much legitimacy in proposing a course of action which drew upon elements 
of devotio as well as sacratio; the rigid categories of ‘normal’ religious ceremony must yield 
to the exceptional circumstances we are addressing in 133. To a real degree, these 
circumstances were just as much the result of religious conflict as they were political (and not 
merely as religious interpretations worked out after the fact): the very issue of sacrosanctitas 
at the heart of this crisis is as germane as the details of agrarian policy or popular assemblies. 
This is why Nasica was not only uniquely placed to become the auctor of this sacro-political 
solution, but in a sense, obliged to be. As Connolly (2004) observes, ‘ritual emerges as a 
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fiction created – and written – by the aristocracy as a prop for and instantiation of their 
power’ (2004: 165). Nasica was more than capable of creating a new ritual, a dramaturgical 
fusion of those categories of sacred action I have discussed precisely because the power of 
the senate was being so openly subverted. Is the prospect of a pontiff-executioner really so 
untenable when his opponent can be cast in the role of tyrant, abuser of the tribunate – even 
one who tampers with Rome’s key boundary markers?  
 
Politically and religiously speaking, Tiberius’ death marks a watershed. Although a decade of 
normal ‘competition and compromise’ among the nobiles followed (Lutz & Lutz, 2006: 500), 
something profound had changed in the discourse of public life in Rome. Nasica’s 
achievement of stable prominence meant that he was also a conspicuous and controversial 
figure after the death of Tiberius. He was known to have incited the senatorial group and 
indeed had clearly been seen doing so: as a consequence, the pontifex maximus was now 
perceived in a new light. 
 
As a result of the popular and (delayed) senatorial reaction to Nasica’s deed, there came 
about the sundering of the vital link between pontifex and urbs. By his action, Nasica absens 
pontifex, became not merely the predecessor but the enabler of subsequent absent pontiffs, 
most notably Julius Caesar. Moreover, his actions provoked anguished debate on the 
lawfulness of what his dilectus had accomplished. Under the guise of archaic religious forms, 
Nasica brought ‘the sword’ into the public square and it was not be sheathed until such time 









Quintus Mucius Scaevola Pontifex 
 
Tiberius had unleashed an exemplum whose force was uncontainable; it was to be repeated in 
the late Republic until Augustus put an end to civil discord. Custom was not only more 
powerful than the law to begin with, but in the face of the law’s insufficiency, exceptional 
behaviour became the mos maiorum and was subject to repetition (Lowrie, 2007: 54). 
 
The interventions of Tiberius Gracchus and Scipio Nasica demonstrated just how flexible (or 
vulnerable) the concept of mos had become. Both had improvised courses of action which, as 
Lowrie correctly argues, demonstrated the inability of the law to cope with the increasing 
incidence of ‘exceptional behaviour’.  In this regard, the pontifex maximus would come to be 
in a strong position: strong in the sense that he was able to behave exceptionally and still 
invoke the categories of mos to justify it. But where was the law in all this? What 
developments were taking place within the law and what was the involvement of the pontifex 
maximus in this process? In answering these questions, our attention in this chapter will focus 
on Quintus Mucius Scaevola whose intellectual activity had consequences – not only for 
legal and religious discourse – but for Scaevola himself. Indeed, Scaevola’s own character (as 
well as his pursuits) had a bearing on the development of the office of chief pontiff and, I 
would argue, help to account for his vulnerability when the next wave of civil discord swept 




Although the sources relating to Scaevola are comparatively abundant, there is a sense in 
which he is no less elusive than his quasi-mythical ancestor.108 Much, though not all, of what 
we know of his life and thought reaches us through the filter of Ciceronian hagiography - 
replete with superlatives.  Scaevola comes to exemplify all that is best about Roman virtue 
and integrity; he embodies ‘good faith’, both at an individual and at a societal level (Harries, 
2006: 25). This can, however, result in his becoming ‘a stock character, stereotypical and 
without dimension, whose virtue is a literary topos of Cicero’ (Tuori, 2004: 247). Although 
Cicero exalts a number of exempla, some particular features of Scaevola’s life do cause him 
to stand out from the ranks of illustrious principes ciuitatis. The aim of this chapter is to 
explore what we can know of him and what distinct imprint he left on the events of his time 
and the office of the pontifex maximus before he too was caught up in the murderous politics 
of the 80s B.C. 
 
Before undertaking this analysis, however, we must briefly survey the careers of the men who 
preceded him in the office. It was through their pontificates that the legacy of Nasica was 




Scaevola enjoyed a unique perspective of close kinship with the men who followed Nasica as 
head of the college. As we have seen, Nasica’s absence from Rome set the precedent which 
his successor, Publius Licinius Crassus Mucianus, would exploit to the full. More open in his 
Gracchan sympathies than his brother, the consul of 133, Mucianus may well have benefited 
from the public backlash against Tiberius’ senatorial enemies: he was appointed to the land 
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commission in place of Tiberius. Whether or not the pontifical election was seriously 
contested by those candidates aligned with the opponents of the Gracchi, he successfully laid 
claim to the office at a time and in such a way that he was able to use it to further his own 
ambitions. The best known instance of this was the conflict with fellow consul Flaccus over 
the command against Aristonicus. Inspired, as we have seen, by similar past interventions, 
Mucianus adroitly nominated his colleague to the archaically prestigious post of flamen 
Martialis (Cicero, Philippic 11.18). Although not quite so career-crippling as the flaminate of 
Jupiter, the priest of Mars was constrained by his key role in some of Rome’s most important 
religious rites. To have no flamen present at these ancient ceremonies was unthinkable, even 
if the priest were to embark on a military enterprise – and Mucianus understood and exploited 
this fully.  His manoeuvre in appointing Flaccus would ensure that his colleague was 
effectively neutralised as a general while Mucianus, liberated by the precedent of Nasica’s 
recent embassy, could absent himself from Rome indefinitely on military campaign. The 
power struggle which ensued was illustrative of the territory into which the political-religious 
nexus had shifted. The pontifex maximus levied a fine against the flamen-designate and he, in 
turn, appealed to the populus. It was the people’s view that the fine should be waived – 
provided that Flaccus gave way to the chief pontiff’s decree. Thus the distinction between 
pontifical jurisdiction, whereby the captio of the pontifex maximus should be honoured, and 
the legitimate disputation of the financial penalty, was maintained (Thomas, 2005: 124). 
Mucianus’ victory was of brief duration: he was killed by Aristonicus in 130 and was 
succeeded as chief pontiff by his brother, P. Mucius Scaevola, the consul at the time of the 
first Gracchan crisis. 
 
The ambiguity of Publius Scaevola’s allegiances continues to perplex: although he no doubt 
feared the potentially disastrous consequences of hasty intervention, his apparent 
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endorsement of Scipio Nasica’s actions and conciliatory overtures towards the optimates may 
only have served to isolate him, even if it did ensure his political survival (Gaughan, 2010: 
112). Perhaps, as Gruen suggests, estrangement from his old sympathisers and a 
rapprochement with the Scipiones forced him to rely upon the friendship of the Metelli and 
the Aurelii Cottae (Gruen, 1965: 330). Elsewhere,109  Cicero lists Scaevola among those 
consuls who have lent support to popularis causes or subsequently been adopted by these 
seditiosi cives (Duplá, 2011: 283): and so the ambiguity remains. Scaevola tends to disappear 
from the front-line of political life thereafter. He briefly re-emerges from obscurity to make 
two interventions, both of them grounded in his office as pontifex maximus. In 123 he ruled 
against the Vestal Licinia, decreeing that her dedication of a shrine to Bona Dea was invalid 
owing to lack of popular authorisation.110 Two years later we have his final publicly recorded 
act: after the death of the younger Gracchus he attempted to secure the return of his niece 
Licinia’s dowry. This was more than simply avuncular concern: the harsh treatment meted 
out to the wives of the fallen transgressed both sacred norms and the mos maiorum.111 His 
purported role in the discontinuation of the tabulae dealbatae (Frier, 1979: 83) and 
compilation of the annales maximi (Manca & Vio, 2010: 69) has been discussed in Chapter 
One. 
 
Two other pontifices maximi, Metellus Delmaticus and Domitius Ahenobarbus, interrupted 
the tenure of the chief priesthood by the Mucii Scaevolae. Lucius Caecilius Metellus 
Delmaticus, pontifex maximus from c. 114 (Rüpke, 2008: 580) is a relatively obscure figure. 
He had been consul in 119 and triumphator in 117: as far as we can tell, he spent his term as 
chief pontiff in the city and, like his predecessor, is only really remembered for his 
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involvement in the trial of the Vestals Marcia, Aemilia and Licinia. According to Asconius 
(pro Milone, 32), Metellus and the whole pontifical college were accused ‘male iudicasse de 
incesto virginum Vestalium’. The retrial in 113, at the behest of a nervous populace, found all 
three guilty (originally only Aemilia had been convicted). This represents something of a sad 
end for Licinia, who had already been guilty of improper consecration of the Bona Dea 
shrine. Wildfang (2006: 93) argues that Licinia had been trying to assert her order’s 
independence from ‘the dictates of the people’. If so, it was an assertion too far: the pontifex 
maximus, not long in office, had had his judgement overturned and been compelled to preside 
at the ritual execution of his ‘daughters’ and their paramours. One can only imagine the effect 
of such direct involvement in an event characterised by what Plutarch describes as δεινῆς 
κατηφείας ‘a dreadful sorrow’ (Plutarch, Numa, 10:6). There had not been a similar spectacle 
for a hundred years, also coincidentally at a time of defeat for Roman armies.112 Beyond this, 
we know nothing of Metellus’ pontificate. Perhaps this is, in itself, an eloquent silence. After 
the dramatic posturing of Scipio Nasica and Crassus Mucianus – to say nothing of the manner 
of their deaths on foreign soil – it may have been considered prudent to recalibrate the 
pontificate along more traditional (and less dangerous) lines. 
 
We know more of Q. Scaevola’s immediate predecessor Domitius Ahenobarbus, at least his 
career before becoming pontifex maximus. Together with Crassus, he was appointed as a 
commissioner to oversee the establishment of the new colony of Narbo Martius in 
Transalpine Gaul in 118. As we shall see, this early collaboration with Crassus would not be 
characteristic of later relations between the two men. Domitius is perhaps best known for his 
tenacity in seeking entry to the pontifical college after the death of his father. As a 
prodigiously active tribune of the plebs in 104, he prosecuted the princeps Senatus M. 
                                                          
112
 The previous instance was in 216, after the defeat at Cannae; in 113 the Cimbri and Teutones had 
defeated the Roman army sent by the senate to the aid of the Taurisci (Rawson, 1974: 199). 
123 
 
Aemilius Scaurus who had apparently blocked his cooptation into one of the priestly 
colleges.113 While Asconius refers to the college of augurs114, Suetonius (and most modern 
scholarship) maintains that he was frustrated in his attempt to become a pontifex.115  A 
difficulty arises from the fact that Scaurus was himself an augur116 and what mechanisms, 
official or informal, existed for inter-collegial interference are hard to determine. Given that 
Domitius joined the pontifices so soon after this, the scholarly consensus has tended to flow 
in this direction. It might be possible, however, that Domitius’ initial overture to a priestly 
college was to the augures and that this was to be the first of two unsuccessful bids in fairly 
quick succession.117  
 
Although it was Scaurus’ veto which prompted Domitius’ suit, the charge that was officially 
brought against him was of negligence in observing a religious ceremony. Carlsen (2006), 
following Asconius, identifies these rites as pertaining to the penates publici at Lavinium. 
Gruen (1964: 108) notes that this ‘obscure’ charge not only fails to resolve the pontifical / 
augural question but might just as easily refer to some religious infraction dating from 
Scaurus’ consulship or even earlier. It is Szemler’s contention that the cult of the penates was 
entrusted to the pontiffs (1972: 124), whereas Lucan seems to suggest that senators were 
regularly charged with sacred vigils in compliance with a decree of Numa.118 No matter what 
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the substance of the charge may have been, the people acquitted Scaurus and Domitius set his 
sights upon another target, M. Junius Silanus. Although this action does not appear to be 
directly connected with his pontifical aspirations, we may be sure that Domitius’ pursuit of 
Silanus was part of his campaign to raise his profile. Once again, his prosecution of Silanus 
failed.  
 
After his unsuccessful attempt to litigate his way in, he decided, as tribune, to legislate a path 
by proposing a substantial change to the method of recruiting new members of the 
amplissima collegia. Domitius reworked a failed bill that had been proposed more than a 
generation earlier by the tribune C. Licinius Crassus in 145 (Cicero, de Amicitia 25). Crassus’ 
law, which certainly enshrined some recognition of the sovereignty of the people in 
determining the make-up of the priestly colleges, may have been part of a wider interest in 
codifying solutions to religious questions (Rüpke, 2012: 118).  Cicero’s description implies 
that the basic intent of the lex Licinia was preserved by Domitius: the main thrust of his new 
law was giving the minor pars populi the right to elect all priests in the same manner as the 
pontifex maximus. One element of novelty, highlighted by Scheid (1985: 68), was the 
clustering of these four distinct colleges on the same procedural basis. Each member of the 
pontifices, augures, decemviri and tresviri epulones was obliged to nominate one candidate, 
with a cap of two nominators for each candidate. Clearly intended to strike a balance between 
priestly freedoms and legitimate popular involvement, Domitius’ bill was, as Beard et al. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
rus uacuum, quod non habitet nisi nocte coacta                   
inuitus questusque Numam iussisse senator. 
 
Then all of the Latin name will be but legend; 
ruined roofs covered in dust will  
scarce be able to point to the site of Gabii and Veii  
and Cora, the lares of Alba and the penates of  
Laurentum — an abandoned countryside, where no one dwells  
except the senator forced to spend  
the night there by Numa's law which they resent. 
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(1998a: 136) maintain, a more sophisticated instrument than the legal crowbar it is sometimes 
made out to be. North (1990) argues that the prohibition of more than one member of a gens 
being present in a college at any one time also originates in Domitius’ proposed law - 
although he does not make a convincing argument as to why it should have been so (North, 
1990: 527 ff).  More recently, Drummond has explored the precise meaning of gentiles (and 
the notion of ‘control’ of a priestly college) to offer a more satisfying account of the 
mechanisms which may have been involved in the prohibition (Drummond, 2008). North 
himself has revisited (but not substantially altered) his earlier position: he regards Domitius’ 
law as more of a compromise than is sometimes portrayed, ensuring that the pontifices still 
retained some influence through nomination of candidates, even if they could no longer 
directly coopt them (North, 2011: 40). 
 
After his failed lawsuits, and perhaps reaping the rewards of a busy year as the tribune, he 
was successful and the lex Domitia of 103 became one of the landmarks of pontifical history. 
It is worth noting that while Domitius was investing considerable time and effort in his 
attempt to enter the college (and then, within a few months, lead it), Quintus Scaevola was 
already in the college and had been for over ten years. It would not have been unreasonable to 
suppose that he might be the natural successor to Metellus Delmaticus. Attempts to recreate 
the circumstances within the college at the time of Domitius’ accession will always be 
conjectural. It can be assumed that he had at least one inimicus among their number 
(otherwise cooptation would have been fairly automatic).119 Even if we allow for Scaurus 
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exerting external pressure to block the cooptation, we are still left with the question of who 
the obstructive member was within. Where there other channels of influence feeding into the 
discussions from outside the college? Bauman reads into the remark attributed to Crassus in 
Suetonius –   
 
in hunc dixit Licinius Crassus orator non esse mirandum, quod aeneam barbam haberet, 
cui os ferreum, cor plumbeum esset 120   
 
– that some unspecified hostility between Crassus and Domitius increases the likelihood that 
it was indeed Scaevola who blackballed the enemy of his ‘friend’ (Bauman, 1983: 381). 
Scaevola’s sympathies are hard to pin down at this time; his ‘repeated collegiality’ (Rüpke, 
2012: 121) with Crassus and increasing identification with optimate causes is perhaps an 
indication that Scaevola would have been prepared to block Domitius. What Bauman has 
termed the ‘irruption’ of Domitius into the college is, of course, only half the problem.121 For 
an incomer to be elected pontifex maximus after such a short interval throws up a procedural 
question. If we follow Livy’s statement about the newest pontiff conducting the election of 
the chief pontiff,122 this naturally creates a scenario similar to that of Scipio Nasica Serapio. 
Could Domitius’ rapid ascent be attributed to his ability to influence the tribes, or was there 
some other mechanism to ensure a fair and seemly transition? Cicero writes to Marcus Brutus 
about a consul convening the priestly comitia in 43,123 but we cannot be certain if a similar 
procedure could have been invoked in 103.  
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The fairly detailed knowledge we have, both of Domitius’ entry to the pontifical college and 
election as pontifex maximus, makes the lack of information about his career thereafter all the 
more incongruous. He was consul in 96 and censor in 92 (along with Crassus), but beyond a 
few meagre facts we have little or no detail about his career: it is perhaps telling that 
Suetonius finds more to say about the lex Domitia than anything else (Suetonius, Nero 1).124 
This may well indicate that the unobtrusive pontificate of Metellus Delmaticus had come to 
represent something of a template for his successor. No doubt such a pattern of tranquility 
would have suited the man who would, in turn, succeed Domitius as high pontiff in 89: the 
eruption of all-out civil war would deprive Scaevola of that. Even in the year in which 
Scaevola became pontifex maximus, the urban praetor Sempronius Asellio had been cut down 
by a mob while performing a sacrifice in a temple at the heart of the forum (Barlow, 1980: 
213).125 That such violence could be perpetrated against the urban praetor himself – and in a 
sacred space – is a sign of how much things had changed since the murder of the Gracchi. 
That the instigators went unpunished (Steel, 2013: 102), is even more telling. 
 
 
Quintus Mucius Scaevola: Cursus honorum 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
I thought everything would have moved altogether faster if Pansa were alive. He would have had his 
colleague elected straight away and then the priestly elections would have preceded the praetorian 
ones. Now I foresee a long delay for the auspices: for as long as there is one patrician magistrate, the 
auspices cannot revert to the patricians. There is a great deal of confusion. 
[Cicero is writing in the context of a vacancy in the pontifical college which he hopes will fall to his 
son: clearly this letter to Marcus Brutus is meant to elicit his support since Brutus is a pontifex.] 
124
 Suetonius confuses Domitius with his homonymous father, who defeated the Allobroges and 
Averni c. 121 B.C.; this deprives us of the only other colourful anecdote attributed to Domitius 
Ahenobarbus, that he rode an elephant in triumph. 
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Quintus Mucius Scaevola (born c. 140 B.C.) became chief pontiff in 89 and his promotion 
marked the culmination of his public career. Finding a reliable chronology for Quintus’ life is 
problematic. Following the indications in Broughton, we may tentatively reconstruct the 
major events of his career as: quaestor in 110/109, tribunus plebis in 106, curule aedile by 
100, praetor by 98, consul in 95, governor of Asia during or after either his praetorship or his 
consulship, pontifex from 115/4 and pontifex maximus from 89 until his murder in 82 
(Broughton, 1952: 593).126 
 
His term as a tribune seems to have passed quietly (Russell, 2013: 105); Cicero can think of 
nothing to report.127 To all intents and purposes, Scaevola really emerges fully into the record 
as consul in 95, alongside his colleague and (then) friend L. Licinius Crassus. Their 
association has been cemented through two pieces of legal activity128. Most famous – and 
consequential – was the lex Licinia Mucia of 95. The lex established a quaestio to address the 
issue of Latins and Italians who had illegally registered as Roman citizens. Their action is 
often characterised as a straightforward expulsion of non-citizens from the city (Kahn, 1986: 
20), but the moderate consensus is that it merely overturned these erroneous registrations. 
Indeed Cicero explicitly rules out the expulsion interpretation in de Officiis 3.47 on the 
grounds it would be ‘inhumanum’. That said, Cicero (and certainly Asconius) was of the 
opinion that the law did contribute to the outbreak of the Social War (Tweedie, 2012: 123).129 
Those simmering resentments against the high-handed and frequently ungrateful treatment of 
the Italians were given juridical form in the lex Licinia Mucia. It may be that what was most 
injurious was not the law itself but the motivation of some of its proponents and the manner 
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of its application. Cicero alludes to the influence of Scaurus,130 whose attitude towards the 
Italians typified Roman arrogance. Elsewhere the quaestio itself is described as acerrima.131 
In pro Balbo Cicero briefly relates the trial of Matrinius who was granted citizenship by 
Marius and is the only individual known to have been prosecuted under the lex. Gruen 
construes the prosecution as an attack on Scaevola, Crassus and Marius whom, he argues, 
were confederates at this time (1966a: 48). Although ending in acquittal, it would seem more 
plausible to see the trial as a simple rebuke to Marius who had issued several grants of 
citizenship under a lex Appuleia de coloniis deducendis. This view would be more consistent 
with the tenor of the relationship between Marius and Scaevola we can observe (in its 
downward spiral) from this point onwards. 
 
Marcus Aemilius Scaurus, who certainly impressed Cicero132 and may have indeed inspired 
the lex Licinia Mucia, was to have another significant influence on Scaevola’s career. 
Scaurus spent part of the nineties on an embassy to Asia (probably during 96) with a view to 
curbing Mithridates.133 It was during this legatio Asiatica that he observed much that was 
going awry in the province together with indications of Marius’ lingering influence – the two 
were synonymous as far as Scaurus was concerned. It was probably for this reason that he 
pressed for Scaevola’s appointment as governor. There is also the fact that the Mucii 
Scaevolae, through two earlier governorships, had acquired three decades’ worth of expertise 
and local knowledge. 
 
 
Scaevola in Asia 
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In becoming governor of Asia Scaevola was following in the footsteps of his (second) cousin, 
Quintus Scaevola the Augur, who presided over the province in 120-119.134 The younger 
Scaevola’s administration was distinguished as much by its brevity as its probity: solos 
novem menses Asiae praefuit, writes Cicero to Atticus.135 This timeline would also appear to 
be borne out by his returning to Rome in time to spoil Crassus’ plans for a triumph at the 
conclusion of his governorship of Cisalpine Gaul (Cicero, in Pisonem 62). 136 
 
An early indication of a new style of leadership was his decision to meet the expenses of his 
administration out of his own resources. He also expected his staff to emulate this new spirit 
of restraint and, one presumes, those involved in profiteering were made aware of the 
governor’s parsimony. This could hardly have been welcomed. Thanks to the provision made 
by Gaius Gracchus in 123 for gathering its provincial revenue, Asia had one of the most 
competitive (and therefore savage) tax markets in the Roman world. But the ubiquitous 
practice of bleeding a province, rapacious governors in tow with unscrupulous publicani, was 
not to be a feature of Scaevola’s watch. Indeed the publicani were to find themselves the 
targets of an aggressive ‘clean hands’ policy instigated by the governor. Diodorus writes 
enthusiastically of the opportunities for popular redress against the tax-farmers and records 
that every complaint was upheld and compensation ordered.137 
 
Scaevola’s philosophy of just governance was given its most enduring and far-reaching 
expression in his provincial edict (Balsdon, 1937: 8). The edict resonated with the more noble 
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aspirations of the Senate and it was quickly established as binding for all subsequent 
governors of that province.138 Beyond Asia, Brennan (2000: 464) notes that the edict was 
soon adopted (perhaps almost in its entirety) for Sicily and, most famously, proved to be a 
mine of both style and substance for Cicero in his own Cilician edict some forty years later 
(Marshall, 1964: 189; Richardson, 1994: 590). What set Scaevola’s edict apart from other 
such provincial decrees was the fact that it was drawn up as a response to the real 
circumstances of the province. The actual condition of the provincials had a direct influence 
on the priorities and policies identified in Scaevola’s edict. In contrast, most edicts seem to 
have been put together before the governor had even set foot in his province and tended, 
therefore, to focus on generalities. Brennan finds that Scaevola’s attention to the fine detail of 
people’s lives, while admirable, runs the risk of absurd micro-management. Among the 
initiatives meeting with Diodorus’ approval was Scaevola’s self-appointment as tutor to 
children and women without a guardian, prompting Brennan to ask what they were meant to 
do after he had left the province (2000: 480). 
 
According to Harries (2006: 20), what Cicero found most useful in the original Scaevolan 
edict was the principle that locals should be allowed to deal with their own private disputes 
according to their own laws. His implementation of this policy is demonstrated in the 
agreement he successfully brokered between Ephesus and Sardis. A jurist to his fingertips, 
Scaevola crafted this civil compact between the cities so that should a citizen of either polis 
be accused of harming a citizen of the other, the legal process would be carried out in the 
defendant’s jurisdiction. Riders to this agreement committed both cities to peaceful 
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negotiation of unresolved disputes through the arbitration of neutral third parties (Magie, 
1975: 174). For such a basic policy of respect and fairness to be hailed as groundbreaking is a 
measure of what a relatively rare phenomenon good provincial government was. Cicero’s 
application of similar principles was regarded as emancipatory and assured him similar 
demonstrations of good will to those which greeted Scaevola.139 Underpinning this liberality 
seems to have been a genuine conviction on Scaevola’s part that laws are intrinsic to a 
people’s identity and dignity. Such a conviction also invites a more nuanced reading of the 
lex Licinia Mucia: the usurpation of citizenship is not just an infringement of Roman laws but 
a denial of those laws and customs which sustain the identity and dignity of other civitates. 
The lex becomes not the blunt assertion of Roman isolationism but rather an affirmation of 
civil pluralism. 
 
Another aspect of Scaevola’s edict which made its way into Cicero’s own was that clause 
which invalidated those contracts which were not ex fide bona. Bauman underscores the 
significance of this: 
 
The introduction of the exceptio doli into the provincial edict… is the most dynamic 
illustration that we possess of the ideology of Q. Scaevola in action on the political 
front (Bauman, 1983: 383).  
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What it most clearly illustrates is Scaevola’s esteem for bona fides as the key characteristic of 
social and political behaviour. While his contemporary Bibulus had included a much more 
explicit version of the clause in his Syrian edict, Cicero preferred the emollient phraseology 
of Scaevola’s version. Anything which assuaged the unease and hostility of the equites was 
desirable in Cicero’s eyes. The publicani were, of course, equites themselves and although 
Cicero gravitated towards the boni (the ‘right thinking’ nobility) throughout his career,140 he 
could not renounce his own equestrian origins. Moreover, he was only too aware of the extent 
to which the entire Roman project relied on these ‘contractors’. Even when castigating 
Verres, the ‘anti-Scaevola’, he pulled his punches with the publicani. Much later, in the pro 
Plancio, he goes so far as to endorse them as ornamentum ciuitatis et firmamentum 
reipublicae.141 Yet Scaevola’s intervention, however exemplary, would not be an enduring 
legacy: ten years after his prosecution of Verres, Cicero was reluctantly siding with the 
publicani of Asia who had pleaded for a reduction in their original bid for the tax contract. In 
their enthusiasm – or greed – they had overstretched themselves: Cicero’s advocacy failed, 
however, to prevent a rift between the senate and the equites.142 
 
No matter how the publicani regarded Scaevola at that time (and we can presume they did not 
share Diodorus’ enthusiasm), the rest of the populace venerated him as a hero. The Ephesians 
instituted - or at least appended to an existing festival - quadrennial games in his honour, 
known as the Mucieia. Still extant is a letter of thanks in which Scaevola records his gratitude 
but also displays appropriate humility (OGIS 437). We do not know his reaction to the setting 
up of a statue at Olympia but the conferral of semi-divine status was not without precedent in 
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the Greek cities (Price, 1996: 1338). It had, in fact, been regarded as politically expedient to 
allow the provinces to celebrate viri illustres in ways that could not have been countenanced 
at home. Even those who became enemies of Rome appreciated the necessity of respecting 
Roman virtue – especially if it served to cast their current opponents in a less favourable 
light. Brennan (2000) notes that one of the barbs directed by Cicero against Verres was that, 
while Mithridates had not dared tamper with the Mucieia, Verres had supplanted the 
established Marcellan games with his own ‘Verria’ (Cicero in Verrem, 2.2.19; Brennan, 
2000: 550; also Santangelo, 2007: 34). Elsewhere in the province, Mithridates had also 
thought it wiser to leave inscriptions to Scaevola intact. 
 
The striking – and one presumes sincere – lionization of Scaevola stands in sharp contrast 
with the treatment received by his legatus, Rutilius Rufus. After his decision to withdraw 
from the province after only nine months, the interregnum between Scaevola’s return to 
Rome and the arrival of his unnamed successor was entrusted to Rutilius. This left him 
exposed to the hostile attention of those less enamoured with the government of the province. 
 
Cicero reminds us (and more immediately, Lentulus Spinther) of the risks of alienating the 
publicani and of their hostility to Scaevola during his time in Asia.143 And yet it was not 
Scaevola who suffered their wrath: it was Rutilius who would be the lightning rod for the 
policy of fiscal restraint, being prosecuted for extortion during his time in the province. There 
are several possible reasons for this: in the first instance, we must disregard Badian’s 
assertion that the counter-attack was aimed at the legatus since ‘the pontifex maximus might 
have overawed any jury’ (Badian, 1972b: 91).144 Badian is, however, on surer ground with 
his contention that Rutilius’ vulnerability was increased by the fact that he stayed on for three 
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months after the governor’s departure. He became a sitting target for the publicani and it is 
easy to see how his emergence as a separate figurehead made it all the easier to strike at him 
without impugning the virtuous Scaevola.145 As the supply lines of tax revenue flowed back 
to Rome, so too did the mounting sense of grievance and plans for a reckoning. The business 
interests of a significant proportion of the equites had been affected and Rome’s middle class 
were in an unforgiving mood; Rutilius’ conviction for extortion, despite a measured speech in 
his defence by Scaevola146, shocked many. Ancient sources tend to portray it as an injustice 
and there are many modern writers who seem to concur with their analysis.147  
 
There are, of course, difficulties which remain. Bauman (1983: 389) notes that it deals a 
heavy blow to our perception of Rutilius to imagine one of the architects of the ‘model edict’ 
showing such practical disregard for its most praiseworthy ideals. We are also left wondering 
what Scaevola himself was doing while his deputy was supposed to have been lining his own 
pockets. Or are we to presume that Rutilius waited until Scaevola had left the province before 
engaging in the behaviour he had previously sought to extirpate? Just how much should we 
read into Scaevola’s ‘exemption’ from prosecution?  
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One factor which merits consideration is the fact that Scaevola was a pontifex: were he to be 
found guilty he would have been expelled from the College. Such a penalty would have been 
of sufficient gravity to merit extreme caution on the part of praetors and prosecutors. 
According to Cicero, the condemnation of C. Sulpicius Galba was the first time this had 
happened to a priest.148 After his term in Asia Scaevola Augur was prosecuted de repetundis 
and Bauman speculates what role, if any, his priesthood may have played in his acquittal 
(1983: 398). Even if Scaevola Pontifex did benefit from his priestly status, he would not have 
been the first magistrate to enjoy the protection of his office and he would not be the last. It is 
curious, however, to note that the ‘ideological immunity’ of the priesthood – especially the 
chief priesthood – seems to have worn a little thin by the age of Caesar. Perhaps Caesar’s 
moves to prosecute his fellow pontifex, Quintus Lutatius Catulus in 62 (for misappropriation 
of funds in the Capitoline restoration project), had a part to play in this.149 
 
Thus far the discussion of Scaevola’s legal interventions has been connected with the wider 
events which had driven them. Given that he enjoyed the greatest renown for his contribution 
to the law - and indeed sometimes been credited with the invention of ‘legal science’ as a 
distinct discipline – we should consider his career as a lawyer at greater length. 
 
 
Scaevola the lawyer 
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The modern word ‘lawyer’ proves too constrictive a term for the spheres of activity in which 
Quintus Mucius was engaged: the giving of responsa, the instruction of younger men in the 
laws and legal institutions of the State, public advocacy, jurisprudence. It is in this last 
category that he really excelled – although he was more than accomplished in the others. He 
is the earliest jurist to feature in the Digest and his opinions are cited on 46 occasions (Tuori, 
2004: 251). In the absence of extant legal works, we rely on the abstractions and epitomes of 
(mostly) late writers. Beyond this, there are anecdotal references which may shed a little light 
on his reputation among contemporaries and record something of his ‘real’ activity. 
 
Naturally we rely heavily upon Cicero’s estimation of his former teacher. His association 
with the Scaevolae brought him social as well as well as intellectual opportunities (Narducci, 
2009: 34). He had initially studied under Scaevola augur but, after the old man’s death, he 
passed to the tutelage of the younger Scaevola.150  In the pro Caecina, both augur and 
pontifex are praised for their wisdom in matters of law; such allusions in a speech attest to 
their influence on Cicero as well as their auctoritas (van der Blom, 2010: 181).151 Harries 
notes that, while Scaevola pontifex would have an enduring influence on Cicero (especially in 
the latter phase of his life and career), his greatest debt to the pontifex lay in Scaevola’s 
articulation of ‘the ideal of Law itself’ (Harries, 2006: 18) and, flowing from this, the very 
idea of what is lawful. This notion of lawfulness would be cast into sharp relief by the 
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increasingly lawless turn of events in the late 80s and the early 40s. Cicero attempted to 
navigate the perilous straits of the civil war with the aid of the intellectual and moral compass 
of Scaevola’s legal philosophy. He may, ultimately, have forced the needle somewhat by 
attempting to project his own course of action onto Scaevola by claiming to follow his lead in 
similarly trying circumstances. Beyond the expected encomia, we do not obtain a clear 
picture from Cicero of his real merits as a teacher. One anecdote suggests he was a rigorous 
taskmaster. Pomponius, writing in the second century, records his brusque treatment of 
Servius Sulpicius. When the younger man repeatedly failed to understand some legal advice 
given by Scaevola, he was upbraided in the most forthright terms (Digest I.2.2.43). The stern 
rebuke was supposedly the spur which prompted Servius’ serious application to the law and it 
is Servius - not Scaevola – who actually occupies first place in Cicero’s reckoning of legal 
genius (Syme, 1981: 421). In an extended reflection in the Brutus, Cicero contrasts the two: 
while Scaevola’s grasp of the law was second to none, it is Servius who elevated it to the 
status of ars.152  Cicero, who had been planning a treatise to systematize the civil law, 
deferred to Servius who had already embarked on a similar project (Fantham, 2004: 112). 
Servius also felt competent to critique some of Scaevola’s oeuvre in his Reprehensa 
Scaevolae capita, a response to Scaevola’s most sustained piece of jurisprudential writing, 
the Libri XVIII de iure ciuili (von Albrecht, 1997: 636).  
 
Before commenting on his contribution to ‘legal science’ (however that is construed), his 
activity before the courts merits some discussion. Scaevola combined erudition with 
eloquence, as Cicero repeatedly attests. What insight we have into his style suggests that he 
was true to his Stoic formation, which inculcated a disdain for excess in speech as in other 
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things.153 This terseness would have been especially apparent when contrasted with the style 
of other luminaries. The section of the Brutus referred to above does precisely that: 
comparing the skill and accomplishments of Scaevola with his contemporary, Crassus. We 
have already noted the relationship between these two men. After - even during - their joint 
consulship in 95, relations between the two appear somewhat strained. It is possible to detect 
signs of rivalry in public exchanges between the two men and, in these debates, Crassus is 
credited with a more strategic approach. He eschewed the practice of consultation, since 
Mucius would clearly be his superior in the field, 154 and played to his strength which was, 
crudely put, his ability to win a case. The locus classicus of this contrast was the famous 
causa Curiana of c. 92 which pitted jurisprudens against orator – indeed the most celebrated 
and gifted ‘lawyers’ of the day: eloquentium iuris peritissimus Crassus, iuris peritorum 
eloquentissimus Scaevola.155 Our knowledge of the case relies mostly on Cicero’s repeated 
references, although it is possible that Crassus published a written version of his speech on 
which Cicero based his account (Steel, 2006:15). It is even conceivable that a young Cicero 
was actually present in court and jotted down notes from the viva vox of the participants.156 
Crassus was briefed by Scaevola the augur, to some an indication of the Mucii Scaevolae’s 
powers of detachment and impartiality (Bauman, 1983: 348). The augur was, of course, 
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Crassus’ father-in-law. As far as the ultimate outcome was concerned, the eloquence of 
Crassus bested the literalism of Scaevola (Dugan, 2013: 220). 
 
Although the timeline is hard to determine with absolute certainty, it is likely that the other 
celebrated trial in which Scaevola participated took place after losing the causa Curiana. We 
have already mentioned his speech in defence of Rutilius: his words were few, carefully 
chosen and kept to the point at issue (Cicero, Brutus 115; de Oratore I: 229). The Curian 
defeat clearly did not prompt a change of style: an embrace of artifice for the sake of it would 
not sit well with the principles in which he had himself been schooled. While Cicero can 
make this attitude sound less than an enhancement - ista oscitans et dormitans sapientia 
Scaeuolarum (de Oratore 2: 145) – it accords fully with the best traditions of his family. In 
fact the sleepy wisdom of the Scaevolae is not averse to innovation, albeit ‘within the 
confines of an overall conservatism’ (Bauman, 1983: 350).  
 
Pontiffs had, as we have seen, a particular association with the origins, development and 
systemizing of Roman law. The very notions underpinning the Roman legal system, from the 
law of persons to the definitions of res and ownership, were derived from religious 
distinctions (Watson, 1968: 2). For much of the Republic’s history, the closest thing to a caste 
of lawyers were the pontifices themselves: legal development was entrusted to them in the 
first instance, before passing to ‘lay’ jurists (Thomas, 1976: 4). As Patricians, they could be 
trusted to maintain the proper order in every sense (Watson, 1992: 63). It was, according to 
Livy, the ‘promethean’ action of Gnaeus Flavius in 304 which snatched the ius ciuile from 
the secretive stewardship of the pontiffs and brought it out into the public domain (Livy, 
9.46). If not directly caused by this, the lex Ogulnia of 300, which opened to the pontifical 
college to plebeians, certainly cemented the effects of this revolutionary step. One of 
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Scaevola’s predecessors, Tiberius Coruncanius (pontifex maximus 254-c.243), the first 
plebeian pontifex maximus, took the definitive step of publicly issuing responsa on matters 
pertaining to both civil and sacred law. Thereafter the relationship between these bodies of 
law became complicated by those elements of civil law and public life which involved some 
degree of  pontifical oversight: will-making, confarreatio, certain forms of adoption etc. Even 
the disputed temple dedication of Gnaeus Flavius, mentioned by Livy, 157  illustrates the 
complex relationship between the sources of authority and expertise. Recent scholarship has 
attempted to clarify this relationship and offer new definitions of pontifical law (Johnson, 
2007: 46-48; Linderski, 1985: 216).  
 
Cicero records some of the most famous – and contentious - dicta associated with the 
Scaevolae, touching upon the relationship between pontifical and civil law and illustrating an 
attitude which finds little sympathy with Cicero. Firstly, there is Quintus’ observation 'saepe 
ex patre audivi, pontificem bonum neminem esse, nisi qui ius civile cognosset' (Cicero, de 
Legibus, 2: 47).158 Johnson observes that Atticus’ comments about the sacra perpetua (the 
ancestral religious rites to be observed in perpetuity) and the ius Manium (the forms 
pertaining to the propitiation of the departed) frame the discussion which follows: these are 
the questions which pertain to pontifical and civil law (Johnson, 2008: 33; Dyck, 2004: 379). 
The suggestion is not that pontiffs need to know the civil law because they have a direct (or 
indirect) influence upon it; merely that they are conversant with the quantulum which is 
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bound up with religion. Knowing the lines of demarcation and the areas of overlap would be 
essential to the correct interpretation and application of ius pontificium. We have to be 
conscious of the different capacities in which the same person could speak; Cicero records 
the distinction made by the pontifex M. Terentius Varro Lucullus in the matter of his 
house.159 Lucullus clearly satisfies the Scaevolan criterion for the pontifex bonus. 
 
Elsewhere in de Legibus, Cicero revisits his complaint against the Scaevolae and expands 
it.160  He reveals that these homines acutissimi used their knowledge of the civil law to 
circumvent the demands of the pontifical law. By a shrewd interpretation of the legal 
requirements of a bequest, Scaevola shows the extraneus how to avoid the sacra incumbent 
on the estate. The text breaks off at this point, but we know enough from the preceding 
conversation to grasp Cicero’s strength of feeling (Cicero, de Legibus, 2: 48). That such 
brilliant minds – and pontifices maximi – should somehow conspire against their own 
auctoritas and use their art for the creation of (frankly) irreligious loopholes is the cause of 
Cicero’s indignation (Santangelo, 2013b: 25). We cannot really ascertain whether or not the 
effect on the transmission of sacra was his main preoccupation. Bauman thinks it was and 
agrees with Scaevola; he goes too far, however, in stating that Scaevola wanted ‘to free the 
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law of succession from the dead hand of the sacra’ (Bauman, 1983: 350). The withering of 
Roman religion, especially with regard to her rites and rituals, is something of a leitmotiv in 
deciphering this part of de Legibus but it makes our reading of Cicero’s intent all the more 
difficult. For Cicero such ideas of the archaic and pure forms of religious, legal and social 
order are intrinsic to Rome’s nature – and survival. He will always tend towards the 
‘integralist’ position. Perhaps it was the pollution of pontifical law by the unwarranted import 
of strategies from the ius civile which was the real cause of offence. But that does not exhaust 
the interpretations of this question. It has been argued that Scaevola was actually acting in the 
best interests of Rome’s ancient religious practices by ensuring their transmission to those 
most likely to honour them (Dyck, 2004: 386). Even putting matters of intention aside, it may 
be observed that ‘the reasoning behind the dodge was very pontifical’ (Watson, 1992: 80-81). 
 
Scaevola’s interventions in explicitly religious legal questions are less numerous, but 
nonetheless significant. A key principle elucidated by Scaevola touches upon the expiation of 
religious offences (Richardson, 2011: 102); Varro refers to an instance whereby a praetor 
ignores the taboo on dies nefasti to issue judgement or make a decision.161 If he was unaware 
of the status of the day, then his decision stood but required a propitiatory sacrifice; if, 
however, he was fully conscious of the prohibition, but proceeded anyway, then he was 
impius and his transgression could not be expiated. Scaevola’s approach, according to Scheid 
(2006: 21), is consistent with his approach to questions of civil law: when consulted, he 
frames a regula by way of response. 
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Scaevola is described in the Brutus as one committed to conserving the civil law.162 To this 
end, perhaps his singular contribution was in the production of a written work. In the 
Enchiridion Pomponius identifies Scaevola as a pioneer in this regard: Post hos Quintus 
Mucius Publii filius pontifex maximus ius civile primus constituit generatim in libros decem 
et octo redigendo.163 Just how pioneering Scaevola actually was is impossible to determine, 
but the debt owed to him by subsequent legal historians is scarcely in doubt. Our knowledge 
of those aspects of private law omitted from the Twelve Tables is due largely to his 
commentary in the Ius Ciuile (Watson, 1992: 15). So too, the modifications introduced by the 
Praetor’s Edict were also incorporated in an organised manner. It was not, of course, the first 
attempt to produce a text on the corpus of civil law: Sextus Aelius had composed his 
Tripertita at the turn of the second century (Tuori, 2004: 255). The element of novelty 
consists in the term generatim. Scaevola was the first, according to Pomponius, to organise 
the laws according to category. As a result he was able to offer both normative definitions 
and equivalent terminology for use in similar but not identical situations (Frier, 1985: 161-
162). The work is far from exhaustive: marriage and divorce, dowry, cura and slavery do not 
feature in the XVIII libri. While justly celebrated, the Ius Ciuile may suffer from the lack of a 
clear rationale: its omissions may be attributable to its intended purpose as a handbook for 
court practitioners rather than a systematic exposition (Watson, 1974: 156). Although Cicero 
makes some (one?) oblique reference to it, he does not seem to accord particular significance 
to the opus.164 
 
Perhaps the true measure of Scaevola’s stature and influence as a jurisconsult can be gleaned 
from one of Cicero’s less magniloquent references to his old teacher. In the course of a light-
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hearted missive to Trebatius, he dispenses advice on surviving the harsh British winter and 
counsels the use of blankets. This opinion, he adds, is consistent with the Mucian position.165 





Scaevola pontifex maximus  
 
We have already touched upon the relationship between Marius and Scaevola, noting the 
former’s potential role in the fall of Rutilius. Although Scaevola’s tenure in Asia was fairly 
brief, much of the emergent dynamic between these figures centres on that province. It may 
be true that Scaevola owed his appointment as governor to that old antipathy between 
Scaurus and Marius, but there is no reason to suppose that Marius regarded Scaevola 
personally as an enemy – at least not at that juncture. As was so often the case, the flipped 
coin of alliance or alienation by dint of one’s connections was a determining factor in many a 
career. In many respects this holds true for Scaevola: he fell victim to the bitter rivalry 
between Marius and Sulla which was to claim so many others. The death of Domitius 
Ahenobarbus in 89 meant that he moved – at last - into a position of real prominence just as 
the storm was about to break. There would be no discreet margins to which the pontifex 
maximus could withdraw in these dangerous times. 
 
The tug-of-war between Marius and Sulla over the Mithridatic command resulted in that 
defining moment in 88 when Sulla, the consul that year, snatched Rome from the hands of its 
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Marian defenders. Marius himself and eleven others were declared hostes publici, although 
only the tribune P. Sulpicius suffered the sanction of being killed on sight. Although the 
decree outlawing Marius and his confederates was issued by the senate, it was most definitely 
at Sulla’s behest. Valerius Maximus suggests that the sole voice raised in opposition to 
Sulla’s will was Quintus Scaevola the Augur, who refused to betray the saviour of both Rome 
and Italy.166 His refusal to give an opinion suggests a firm rejection of Sulla’s spiteful relatio, 
no doubt conscious of the unwelcome parallels with the fate of the Gracchi. Valerius’ phrase 
solus Scaevola underscores the friendship which had endured for many years between the 
Augur and Marius, leaving him as sole defender. 167  But it also implies that the other 
Scaevola, the pontifex maximus, had fallen in line with the other senators in their 
acquiescence. Yet it is perilous to read too much into Valerius’ choice of words: he may be 
emphasising the Augur’s heroic isolation so as to cast his words into even sharper relief. It 
may be that the chief priest found some pretext to be absent at the session and that Sulla 
could not bring himself to subject such a figure to rough handling. That said, so prodigious 
was Sulla’s capacity for revenge that it is hard to imagine anyone of standing being excused a 
part in such a stage-managed exercise in political humiliation. 
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If our Scaevola did indeed give his assent to the declaration that Marius was an enemy of the 
people, it would explain the curious turn of events that were to follow. Although Sulla was 
master of Rome, his preferred candidates for the consulship (one of them his nephew) were 
unsuccessful. The pressing nature of the Mithridatic campaign was such that he had to leave 
Rome in the hands of the new consuls, having extracted a promise from L. Cornelius Cinna to 
leave his improvements to the state untouched168 . The consul’s blithe disregard for this 
undertaking was to fuel further strife in Rome.169 He quickly moved to implement Sulpicius’ 
intended measure of enrolling new citizens among all the tribes. Opposition to this step, 
fomented by his colleague Octavius, quickly became violent and Cinna was forced to flee the 
city. 170  A supine senate was coerced into deposing Cinna 171  and the flamen Dialis L. 
Cornelius Merula was hastily (and given the strictures of his office, somewhat ridiculously) 
made suffectus, possibly without any kind of popular vote (Morstein-Marx, 2011: 266). Katz 
argues that the acceptance of the consulship by ‘this conscientious and unobjectionable 
priest’ more or less legitimised the senate’s disposal of Cinna (Katz, 1979: 165). It may 
certainly account for his ultimate fate, as he was swallowed up in the unprecedented spate of 
iudicia populi instigated by Cinna’s pliant tribunes.172 An interesting sidebar to the deposition 
of Cinna is that the decemviri found legitimating authority in the Sibylline books – no doubt 
at the behest of Octavius.173 Although the custodians of the Sibylline verses were largely 
autonomous of the pontifex maximus, only the senate could authorise their consultation: what 
part did Scaevola play in this process – as senator, consular, jurist and chief priest? 
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Benefiting from his ‘living martyr’ status for the novi cives (Appian, BC 1.63-64; Katz, 1976: 
328), the ousted consul succeeded in securing the loyalty of a Sullan legion at Nola. From 
there he levied throughout Italy, ultimately laying siege to Rome itself. The stranglehold was 
tightened further thanks to Marius who had just returned from his refuge in Africa to drum up 
support for his next throw at power and revenge. An offer of relief from the Samnites was 
scuppered by the senate’s refusal to grant them citizenship, an offer which Cinna and Marius 
were only too happy to make – along with other inducements to the slave population of the 
city.174 No doubt realising their previous missteps and collective peril, the senate at last 
showed some independent initiative in dealing directly with the besiegers. For once Octavius 
was eclipsed by Merula, who not only ‘cooperated’ (Konrad, 2006: 180) but seems to have 
taken the initiative in resigning the consulship and attempting to mediate (Seager, 1992: 178). 
Several parleys later, most of which seem to have concerned in which capacity – combatant 
or consul – Cinna was being addressed by the senate, terms of surrender were agreed. The 
newly-restored consul entered the city with very mixed results: Octavius was butchered on 
his curule chair, Merula committed suicide before the iudicium populi could convict him 
(Mackay, 2004:126)175 and Marius was formally recalled from his species of exile. Although 
Octavius and Merula, as consuls, were the most prominent victims of this purge (Octavius 
was the first ‘sitting’ consul to meet such fate), several other leading men of the senate lost 
their lives.176  Seager (1992: 178) notes that, apart from two exceptions, we cannot hold 
Marius directly responsible for the choice of these unfortunates and no clear link with Sulla 
can be made.177 Sulla himself suffered the remote reprisals of being branded a hostis, having 
his property confiscated and his houses burned, his acts overturned and, according to 
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Keaveney (1984: 118), being stripped of a priesthood.178 They were keen to establish these 
actions as being in the public interest: bringing about the restitution of order and freedom, not 
settling scores (Nippel, 1995: 66). 
 
Cinna and Marius were elected consuls for 86 – Marius’ seventh consulship – and almost 
certainly unopposed. This crowning achievement of Marius’ career, apparently by divine 
ordinance, lasted only seventeen days.179 According to Plutarch his final days were spent 
deliriously waging the Mithridatic campaign on his bed, deprived at the last of this much-
coveted prize.  
 
What was Scaevola doing at this time? Apart from his pontifical duties, Scaevola seems to 
have devoted much of his time to legal study and writing. The concept of bona fides, which 
formed the conceptual pivot of his provincial decree, became a key preoccupation in his 
jurisprudential output during this period.180  As to politics, we do not know if Scaevola 
himself was considered for the suffect consulship but we may assume that Merula could not 
have been appointed without his blessing. As the flamen’s superior, the pontifex maximus 
must have had some involvement in the process, although whether or not an explicit 
dispensation was required remains speculation. It is also possible that Scaevola had some part 
in the events leading up to Merula’s death, specifically his resignation of the flaminate. It 
may be that Merula, caught between his cultic ties to the city and his desire to escape an 
ignominious execution, confided to the pontifex maximus his intention to open his veins. 
Aware of the consequences of such a deed, the chief pontiff was within his rights to force the 
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abdication of the flamen: prior instances of forced abdication were based on neglect of 
duty, 181  but Merula’s intent to neglect his duties (in the most extreme way) may have 
prompted such a preventative measure. We may assume that such intervention was as much 
the result of compassion for the man’s plight as strict concern for the ius sacrum on the part 
of the chief pontiff.  
 
Those who record these events are keen to emphasise the religious dimension of Merula’s 
final moments. He lays aside his flamen’s apex (Appian BC 1.74.342) and, according to 
Valerius, escapes the mockery awaiting him by ending his life in the shrine of Jupiter 
itself.182 Velleius juxtaposes the prayers he had frequently offered for the wellbeing of the 
state with the curses he rains down on Cinna and the pack following him.183 Várhelyi wishes 
to underscore the link between the ritual of devotio and the execratio uttered by Merula 
(Velleius 2.22.2); he is, according to her analysis, sacrificing himself and ‘leaving the ritual 
logic unharmed’ so that his enemies would be rendered homines sacri (Várhelyi, 2011: 132). 
Várhelyi is clearly influenced by the sacratio reading of Tiberius Gracchus’ murder, and 
seeks to apply it to Merula’s self-sacrifice. The elision of devotio and sacratio seems less 
plausible in this context and Várhelyi’s designation of Merula as ‘priest and victim’ perhaps 
owes more to seeing these events through a theological rather than a ritual lens. Still, it is 
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interesting to note that some well established ritual categories can lend themselves to blurred 
interpretations – precisely as I have suggested in the actions of Nasica almost half a century 
previously.  
 
Even if Merula had taken the precaution of setting aside his priesthood, the impact of the ex-
flamen’s suicide in Jupiter’s sanctuary would have been considerable and not easily erased. 
Even if a lustration were carried out, the religious and political consequences would 
reverberate for some time. And it is likely that Scaevola had some role to play in this. As we 
know, the pontifex maximus had a degree of influence in the selection of the flamen Dialis – 
although we cannot be entirely sure of the fine detail of the process. It is probable that the 
flamines were not affected by the provisions of the lex Domitia and relied instead on the 
traditional system of captio (Bodel, 2004: 306).184 While he could reject two of the ‘terna’ of 
names proposed by his colleagues, the pontifex maximus could not impose other candidates of 
his own choosing and had to accept one of the list of nominees. Even if he were pressurised 
by the other members of pontifical college to accede to the captio of a candidate, he could 
still decline to convoke the comitia calata to oversee the formal inauguratio. This meant that 
the flaminate would be filled from a technical standpoint but that the flamen-designate 
remained just that: Jupiter’s priest in name only. 
 
It may be that Scaevola pursued such a course in 86 (or thereabouts) when it came to the 
vacancy caused by Merula’s death. It is doubtful that the pontifical college got the 
opportunity to mull over a list; it is far more likely that Rome’s powerbrokers made the 
identity of their preferred candidate abundantly clear – a youth of the gens Iulia who 
happened to be son-in-law to Cinna and Marius’ nephew. Although the young Caesar will be 
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of considerable importance in shaping future events, his personal significance here is 
somewhat tangential. What is more intriguing is the dynamic between Scaevola, Cinna and 
Marius over the office itself. Marius is said to have died shortly after Caesar’s nomination, 
although it is just as probable that it was Cinna himself who oversaw the process of selecting 
Merula’s successor. It is curious, therefore, that the pontifex maximus seems to have held out 
for the duration of the dominatio Cinnae in refusing to inaugurate the new flamen. Linderski 
attributes this to the fact that Scaevola had been wounded at Marius’ funeral (2007: 637), but 
this would not have been sufficient to delay the inauguratio indefinitely; the pontifex 
maximus’ inaction looks more like a stubborn refusal than a result of frailty. This obduracy 
may have been procedural (a single candidate may have been proposed), religious (protesting 
such mistreatment of the flamen Dialis or questioning Caesar’s confarreate status) or political 
(Scaevola wished to signal, albeit in muted form, his disapproval of the wider situation). We 
will discuss Caesar’s relationship with the flaminate in the next chapter, but for our purposes 
it is sufficient to note that no other flamen Dialis was appointed until Augustus was in a 
position to fill the office. 
 
Scaevola the Target 
 
As we have mentioned, Marius’ funeral was ‘enlivened by an attempt on the life of Q. 
Mucius Scaevola, the pontifex maximus, made by Marius’ quaestor, C. Flavius Fimbria’ 
(Seager, 1992: 179). No doubt it would be expected for the chief pontiff to attend the funeral 
rites for a man of Marius’ standing, no matter how disagreeable he found aspects – or even 
the entirety – of his politics. This makes Fimbria’s actions all the more shocking: although 
funerals could be boisterous occasions (Nippel, 1995, p. 39), what kind of man would try to 




What little we know of Fimbria suggests such actions as being wholly consistent with his 
career and disposition, both of which could be characterised as bloody and reckless. His 
father, also C. Flavius Fimbria, had served as Marius’ consular colleague in 104. We know 
nothing of the son until the fraught events of 87. Granius Licinianus, never a terribly reliable 
source,185 states that it was Fimbria who bargained with the Samnites on Cinna’s behalf and 
successfully brought them over to his side.186 After the capitulation of the city, he played a 
part in the bloodletting which followed, although we cannot be sure which of the victims 
were his ‘handiwork’. Undoubtedly one of Cinna’s henchmen by this stage, Fimbria would 
have been useful to both partners in the new regime. As a result, it is hard to determine at 
whose behest the attack on Scaevola was carried out or if it was simply a piece of freelance 
madness on Fimbria’s part. Cicero, who offers us an account of this remarkable episode, is in 
no doubt that Fimbria was a dangerous man to be around.187 As Lintott (1971) observes, 
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 Cicero, pro Roscio, 33: Hominem longe audacissimum nuper habuimus in ciuitate C. Fimbriam et, 
quod inter omnis constat, nisi inter eos, qui ipsi quoque insaniunt, insanissimum. Is cum curasset, in 
funere C. Mari ut Q. Scaeuola uolneraretur, uir sanctissimus atque ornatissimus nostrae ciuitatis, de 
cuius laude neque hic locus est, ut multa dicantur, neque plura tamen dici possunt, quam populus 
Romanus memoria retinet, diem Scaeuolae dixit, postea quam comperit eum posse uiuere. Cum ab eo 
quaereretur, quid tandem accusaturus esset eum, quem pro dignitate ne laudare quidem quisquam satis 
commode posset, aiunt hominem, ut erat furiosus, respondisse: "Quod non totum telum corpore 
recepisset." Quo populus Romanus nihil uidit indignius nisi eiusdem uiri mortem, quae tantum potuit, 
ut omnis occisus perdiderit et adflixerit; quos quia servare per compositionem uolebat, ipse ab eis 
interemptus est. 
We lately had a most audacious man in this city, Gaius Fimbria, a man, as is well known among all 
except among those who are mad themselves, utterly insane. He, when at the funeral of Gaius Marius, 
had contrived that Quintus Scaevola, the most venerable and accomplished man in our city, should be 
wounded; (a man in whose praise there is neither room to say much here, nor indeed is it possible to 
say more than the Roman people preserves in its recollection) he, I say, brought an accusation against 
Scaevola when he found that he might possibly live. When the question was asked him, what he was 
going to accuse that man of, whom no one could praise in a manner sufficiently suitable to his worth, 
they say that the man, like a madman as he was, answered, for not having received the whole weapon 
in his body. A more lamentable thing was never seen by the Roman people, unless it were the death of 
that same man, which was so important that it crushed and broke the hearts of all his fellow-citizens; 
for endeavouring to save whom by an arrangement, he was destroyed by them.  
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Valerius basically repeats Cicero in his account although is less acerbic in his description of 
Fimbria (Lintott, 1971: 696).188 The actus reus seems to be in little doubt: he clearly intended 
that there should be two corpses at Marius’ funeral. Although the mens rea would also appear 
to be beyond question, what factors motivated his deadly intent are less clear. 
 
Bauman dissents from Gruen’s argument that Marius had been protecting Scaevola up to this 
point.189 The grounds for adfinitas between the two men are never very solid: the warmth of 
the relationship between Marius and Scaevola Augur would be a more realistic reason to 
extend his protection to his relative. Yet would Marius have done so if he knew that Scaevola 
Pontifex had tacitly joined with the senators who declared him a public enemy? Knowing that 
the pontifex maximus had facilitated both Merula’s installation as consul and had 
foreknowledge of his suicide, would he have been so benevolent towards him? If he was 
aware that it was the chief priest’s stalling tactics which prevented his nephew from being 
inaugurated as flamen Dialis, would he have seen any merit in keeping him alive?190 Then 
there was also the matter of the overturning of citizenship grants made by Marius. I doubt 
there was much to commend Scaevola to him, either politically or personally. The fact 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Cicero draws parallels between the prosecution of Roscius and the attempt on Scaevola’s life: this 
was, at least in part, to dissociate his defence from the popularis cause in the civil war (Dyck, 2003: 
244). 
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 Cf. Valerius Maximus, 9.11.2: 
Non tam atrox C. Fimbriae est factum et dictum, sed si per se aestimetur, utrumque audacissimum. id 
egerat, ut Scaeuola in funere C. Marii iugularetur. quem postquam ex uulnere recreatum conperit, 
accusare apud populum instituit. interrogatus deinde quid de eo secus dicturus esset, cui pro sanctitate 
morum satis digna laudatio reddi non posset, respondit obiecturum se illi quod parcius corpore telum 
recepisset. licentiam furoris aegrae rei publicae gemitu prosequendam! 
The deed and saying of C. Fimbria is not so atrocious, but considered in themselves, both are 
extremely daring. He had planned that Scaevola should be murdered at C. Marius’ funeral. 
Afterwards, when Fimbria learned he had recovered from his wound, he set about prosecuting him 
before the people. Then, asked what he was going to say against one whose blameless character could 
not be praised highly enough, he replied that he would charge him with scarcely receiving the weapon 
in his body. What extravagance of madness, to be followed by the groans of an ailing Republic! 
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 Bauman, 1983, p. 412. Cf. Gruen, 1968, p. 235. 
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 It should be noted that, mutatis mutandis, all these ‘motives’ apply to Cinna as well. 
155 
 
remains, however, that he was not just any citizen. Having the priest of Jupiter191 harried to 
death had already opened up a kind of wound in the Republic, a wound which Scaevola was 
deliberately or incidentally keeping open by his refusal to inaugurate Caesar. But to kill the 
pontifex maximus as well would have been an unprecedented step – and marked a new low in 
this cycle of decline. Marius probably had too much respect for the office to sacrifice the man 
who held it. 
 
It might be argued, therefore, that some residual pietas did act as a shield for Scaevola, even 
though his recent sympathies and actions demanded otherwise. Once he was gone, however, 
Scaevola was fully exposed to the ire of someone like Fimbria who seems to have shared 
little of these more elevated sensibilities. Moreover, as we have already noted, those actions 
of Scaevola which were disagreeable to Marius were scarcely more palatable for Cinna. All 
these factors combine to suggest a scenario in which the attack, even if it had not been 
sponsored by Fimbria’s master, would not have excessively grieved him either.  
 
Although one might think it impossible to surpass the provocative impact of attempted 
murder, his subsequent decision to prosecute Scaevola does precisely that. The stated charge 
levelled against the pontifex maximus was that he had been ‘insufficiently stabbed’ and was 
therefore culpable. Lintott notes that Cicero, who is careful with his forensic terminology, 
uses the term ‘diem dicere’ which suggests a public hearing brought by a magistrate (Lintott, 
1998a: 132). The real problem lies in determining which magistracy Fimbria held in 86: the 
tribunate and aedileship are, at least in Lintott’s analysis, ruled out because of their close 
links with the city and the fact that Fimbria left for Asia that same year. Some sort of 
quaestorship seems the likeliest solution, although Lintott goes out on a limb somewhat with 
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his suggestion that the basis for the prosecution may have been financial (Lintott, 1971: 697-
698). Surely the spectre of financial impropriety – the revenant shadow on his governorship 
of Asia – would have been more widely recorded and more likely to proceed? There is a 
sense in which trying to restructure Fimbria’s actions based on known procedures and 
practices is a futile exercise. To exclude the possibility of a tribunate, for example, solely on 
the grounds that leaving the city before the expiry of his term ‘would have been a complete 
betrayal of his office’ (Lintott, 1971: 697) is to argue that Fimbria is the sort of man who 
cared. We know that the prosecution itself came to nothing: once again we are left not 
knowing whether this was due to the intervention of a sympathetic tribune or simply because 
the accuser had (literally) decided to move on. Fimbria’s contribution to the Mithridatic 
campaign – as legate or praefectus equitum to the consul Lucius Valerius Flaccus – would be 
mutiny and his own death by suicide. Sulla had made use of Scaevola’s old friend Rutilius to 
negotiate with Fimbria, but Fimbria preferred death to surrender. 
 
No doubt Scaevola was relieved to hear that his persecutor was no more but the news that 
Sulla was victorious and, more importantly, coming home, would have overshadowed the 
other news drifting back from the East. That said, if word of Rutilius’ involvement as a 
Sullan agent also reached Rome at this time, would it not have prompted speculation about 
Scaevola’s own sympathies? As someone who had never abjured his friendship for Rutilius 
and indeed had made strenuous efforts to make his friend’s exile comfortable, would he not 
now be regarded as one of the Sullani in Rome? As the curtain began to fall on the dominatio 
Cinnae, the objectives and preoccupations of the leadership may have been focused 
elsewhere but it is the attitude of the ‘next generation’ which may be most significant in 




Scaevola the Theologian 
 
It is to this phase which Bauman (1983) attributes the pontifex maximus’ sole (surviving) 
contribution to the field of public theology, the so-called ‘theologia tripertita’. Before 
exploring Bauman’s argumentation, a restatement of the outlines of this theology is 
necessary. Broadly speaking, Scaevola is credited with the elaboration of a ‘civic theology’ 
which, as the term implies, regards the gods of Rome as being bound by the same duties to 
the city as its mortal citizens. The deditio noxae, the surrender to divine justice of those who 
had knowingly and wilfully rendered themselves impius, is a perfect example of this civic 
theology in practice (Scheid, 2006: 32). Just how much of this theology is Scaevola’s own 
contribution is harder to ascertain.  
 
Scaevola’s theological ideas come down to us by a somewhat circuitous route: we rely on 
Augustine’s account in Book IV of the de Civitate Dei, which in turn drew extensively on an 
earlier presentation by the religious encyclopaedist Varro: 
 
Relatum est in litteras doctissimum pontificem Scaeuolam disputasse tria genera tradita 
deorum: unum a poetis, alterum a philosophis, tertium a principibus ciuitatis. Primum genus 
nugatorium dicit esse, quod multa de diis fingantur indigna; secundum non congruere 
ciuitatibus, quod habeat aliqua superuacua, aliqua etiam quae obsit populis nosse. De 
superuacuis non magna causa est; solet enim et a iuris peritis dici: Superflua non nocent. Quae 
sunt autem illa, quae prolata in multitudinem nocent? "Haec, inquit, non esse deos Herculem, 
Aesculapium, Castorem, Pollucem; proditur enim ab doctis, quod homines fuerint et humana 
condicione defecerint." Quid aliud? "Quod eorum qui sint dii non habeant ciuitates uera 
simulacra, quod uerus deus nec sexum habeat nec aetatem nec definita corporis membra." Haec 
pontifex nosse populos non uult; nam falsa esse non putat. Expedire igitur existimat falli in 
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religione ciuitates. Quod dicere etiam in libris rerum diuinarum Varro ipse non dubitat. 
Praeclara religio, quo confugiat liberandus infirmus, et cum ueritatem qua liberetur inquirat, 
credatur ei expedire quod fallitur. Poeticum sane deorum genus cur Scaeuola respuat, eisdem 
litteris non tacetur: quia sic uidelicet deos deformant, ut nec bonis hominibus comparentur, cum 
alium faciant furari, alium adulterare, sic item aliquid aliter turpiter atque inepte dicere ac 
facere; tres inter se deas certasse de praemio pulchritudinis, uictas duas a Venere Troiam 
euertisse; Iouem ipsum conuerti in bouem aut cygnum, ut cum aliqua concumbat; deam homini 
nubere, Saturnum liberos deuorare: nihil denique posse confingi miraculorum atque uitiorum, 
quod non ibi reperiatur atque ab deorum natura longe absit. O Scaeuola pontifex maxime, ludos 
tolle, si potes; praecipe populis, ne tales honores diis inmortalibus deferant, ubi crimina deorum 
libeat mirari et quae fieri possunt placeat imitari. Si autem tibi responderit populus: Vos nobis 
importastis ista pontifices: deos ipsos roga, quibus instigantibus ista iussistis, ne talia sibi 
iubeant exhiberi. (Augustine, de Civitate Dei, IV, 27.) 192 
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 It is recorded that the most learned pontifex Scaevola distinguished three kinds of gods handed 
down to us — one by the poets, another by the philosophers, another by the leading citizens. He 
declares the first kind to be trifling, because many unworthy things have been made up by the poets 
concerning the gods; the second is not suited to states, because it contains some things that are 
superfluous, and some, too, which it would be harmful for the people to know. The superfluous things 
do not matter much, for it is a common saying of skilled lawyers that ‘superfluous things do no harm’. 
But what are those things which do harm when brought before the people? These, he says: that 
Hercules, Aesculapius, Castor and Pollux, are not gods; for it is declared by learned men that they 
were only men, and suffered the fate of mortals. What else? That states do not have true images of the 
gods; because a true god has neither sex, nor age, nor defined bodily parts. The pontifex does not wish 
the people to know these things; but he does not think they are false. But he thinks it expedient that 
states should be deceived in matters of religion; the same thing that Varro himself does not hesitate to 
say in his books on ‘Divine Matters’. What an excellent religion! Wherein the weak, in need of 
deliverance, may seek refuge; and when he seeks for the truth by which he may be set free, it is 
considered best for him to be deceived. And, truly, in these same writings, Scaevola is not silent as to 
his reason for rejecting the gods of the poets—namely that they so misrepresent the gods that they 
could not bear comparison even with good men, when they make one to commit theft, another 
adultery; or, again, to say or do something else crudely and foolishly; that three goddesses competed 
with each other for the prize of beauty, and the two who lost out to Venus destroyed Troy; that Jupiter 
turned himself into a bull or swan that he might have his way with someone; that a goddess married a 
man, and Saturn devoured his children; that, in sum, there is nothing that could be imagined, either 
wonderful or wicked, which may not be found there, and yet is far removed from the nature of the 
gods. O pontifex maximus Scaevola, do away with these games if you can; instruct the people not to 
offer such honours to the immortal gods, whereby they admire the misdeeds of the gods, and, if it so 
please them and it can be done, copy them. If the people answer, ‘But you, priests, have brought these 
things to us’, then ask the gods themselves at whose prompting you have ordered them, that they do 





The natural wariness of dealing with a third-hand account is heightened by our knowledge of 
Augustine’s purpose which was both polemic and apologetic: he sought to discredit the ‘old 
religion’ of Rome and dismiss those charges which had been levelled against the new.193 
Although he is clearly taking aim at the religious policy of Scaevola (as far as he understands 
it), his real targets were ‘the perfumed gentlemen of Rome’ who treated the god of the 
Christians with such disdain (O’Donnell, 2005: 183). It is impossible to ascertain whether 
much of Scaevola’s religious and philosophical output was extant beyond what was recorded 
by individuals such as Varro. There is also debate as to how much of this can be attributed to 
the real pontifex maximus as opposed to a philosophical cipher ‘co-opted’ into a Varronian 
dialogue (Beard, North and Price, 1998(a): 151-152). Scheid remains circumspect with his 
allusion to ‘a traditional definition popularised by Varro’ (Scheid, 2003: 175). The origins of 
some sections of the argument are certainly ancient; we may discern the recognisable outlines 
of this theology in the writings of Xenophanes of Colophon in the 6th century (Kahn, 2003: 
1682). Certainly a critique of poetic anthropomorphism is very much in the tradition of 
Xenophanes, who took Homer and Hesiod to task for their less-than-noble depiction of the 
gods (Brunt, 1989: 178). It is a feature of the late Republican intellectual landscape that such 
Greek influences came to be embedded in Roman discourse albeit with a discernibly Latin 
accent. After Scaevola’s day, both Latin and Greek scholars (such as Dio Chrysostom’s 1st 
century Olympian Oration; Becker, 1993: 67) continued to work on the theologia tripertita so 
that a scholar such as Augustine need not have relied solely on Varro’s formulation. It is not 
beyond the realms of possibility that Scaevola was the genuine originator of this dictum. His 
knowledge of Aelius’ juristic Tripertita, along with his own generatim treatment of the Ius 
Civile, lends weight to the theory that the learned pontifex maximus approached a religious 
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matter in his preferred idiom. There is the further tantalising possibility that, together with his 
juridical writings, Scaevola composed a work of theology in which this specific question 
would have been read in its proper context.194 
 
Attempts to determine the veracity of the Varronian-Augustinian account are helped (to an 
extent) by the generally Stoic flavour of its argument. Although, in the absence of more 
substantial evidence, Scaevola remains ‘Stoic by association’, it is fairly likely that he 
assimilated the philosophical views of his father and the cultural milieu of his circle. The 
theologia tripertita was essentially the product of a Stoic refinement of those questions raised 
by thinkers like Xenophanes several centuries earlier. Rawson (1985: 300) interprets 
Scaevola’s intervention as building on the Stoic divisio by importing a negative moral 
evaluation of both poetic and philosophical renderings of the gods. Perhaps the most 
problematic aspect of the Scaevolan theologia is the semantic space it allows for readings 
which run perilously close to deception of the infirmus. Augustine certainly mocks the 
pontifex maximus with charges of complicity in duping the credulous for the purposes of civic 
utility. But we should be aware that at least some of those phrases which hint at the 
‘expediency of ignorance’ seem to be part of Augustine’s own apologetic interpretation 
(although there are other late Republican voices which treat the religion of Numa in a similar 
manner, notably Lucretius). There is, of course, an aspect of this discourse which is more in 
keeping with the Stoic and, by extension, Scaevolan attitude – namely the lack of enthusiasm 
for shocking people out of their social and religious ‘comfort zones’ simply for the sake of 
it.195 Nevertheless, the Stoic would not be reluctant to criticise the excesses of religious 
practice when necessary. Fortin accuses Augustine of ‘grievously’ – perhaps deliberately – 
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celeberrimum’ – ‘Mucius Scaevola, the pontifex maximus and a very famous authority on divine and 
human law.’ 
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misconstruing Scaevola’s intention to suit his own rhetorical agenda (Fortin, 1980: 243).196 
After all, Scaevola did not consider the intuitions of natural theology to be ‘false’, merely 
incongruent with the requirements of political reality. After all, the state religion was ‘a 
political artefact exactly like the secular machinery of government, and it came into existence 
after the state’ (Liebeschuetz, 1979: 37). It may be inferred, therefore, that the religion 
transmitted to the people should, in Scaevola’s view, be ‘a creature of the state’ (Watson, 
1992: 13). 
 
In a significant and, in Rawson’s view, distinctively Roman inflection, these political realities 
are determined by the principes ciuitatis – not ‘the lawgivers’ as we might expect in a Greek 
treatment of the same issue (Rawson, 1985: 300). Might we go so far as to suggest that this is 
a distinctively Scaevolan inflection which offers the hermeneutic key to this passage’s real 
meaning? Who are these principes ciuitatis? Most translators identify them merely as 
‘statesmen’ or ‘politicians’. I have opted for ‘leading citizens’ because I concur with the view 
that Scaevola is referring to a particular class of statesmen and not some undifferentiated herd 
of politicians. There is, of course, a sense in which Scaevola himself is the quintessence of 
these principes: his personal credentials would place him in the highest stratum of public life. 
What is striking about this particular phase of the Republic is the extent to which many of its 
leading citizens were not statesmen in the mould of preceding generations. Even though they 
had pursued the cursus honorum, certainly the new generation of Roman leaders were not 
schooled in the traditions of political and civic engagement which had (more or less) 
successfully shaped their grandfathers.197 The irruption of civil conflicts and bloodletting had 
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 Cicero discusses these ideas in his treatment of the princeps and principes civitatis in de Republica 
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brought about a ground shift which, in turn, dislocated action from its traditional influences in 
speech, thought and persuasion. This meant that not only was violence more likely to be 
deployed in place of rhetoric (as we shall see), but that other practices, hitherto alien to the 
mos maiorum, threatened to become a reality in Rome itself. Although the younger Marius is 
a striking example of this (con)fusion, it is perhaps better illustrated in the life of his cousin, 
M. Marius Gratidianus. This younger man’s rise to prominence coincided with Scaevola’s 
pontificate and, I would argue, not only illustrated the pontiff’s theology but also fed into the 
narrative of religious murder which would also claim the pontifex maximus. 
 
Gratidianus made good use of the tribunate and, more particularly, the praetorship to heighten 
his profile among the urban plebs. He is perhaps best known for appropriating the edict to re-
stabilise the relative value of the as and the denarius, stealing a march on the tribunes and his 
fellow praetors who had collectively decided upon the measure and intended to promulgate it 
as a body from the rostra. His forthright handling of a problem which had long bedevilled the 
finances of ordinary citizens as much as it had weakened the state coffers earned him a 
particular kind of popular devotion. Grateful Romans set up statues to Gratidianus in every 
vicus and these monuments became a focus for cult practices such as the offering of libations, 
incense and candles.198  Although Cicero harboured no great philosophical or theological 
misgivings about the posthumous worship of great men, Scaevola had probably regarded the 
practice as dangerous (Rawson, 1973: 346).199 Moreover this was an altogether different 
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 Cicero, de Officiis, 3:80 
omnibus vicis statuae, ad eas tus, cerei. 
In every neighbourhood there were statues and before these burned incense and candles. 
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 Cicero, de Legibus, 2:27-28 
Quod autem ex hominum genere consecratos, sicut Herculem et ceteros, coli lex iubet, indicat 
omnium quidem animos inmortalis esse, sed fortium bonorumque divinos. Bene uero quod Mens, 
Pietas, Virtus, Fides consecrantur humanae, quarum ommum Romae dedicata publice templa sunt, ut 
illas qui habeant — habent autem omnes boni — deos ipsos in animis suis conlocatos putent. 
Now the law which determines the worship of those mortals who have been deified, such as Hercules 
and the rest, states that, while the souls of all people are immortal, the souls of the bravest and and 
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proposition. Purcell observes that, although such honours were bestowed upon the Gracchi 
after their deaths, extending such quasi-divine favours to a still-living individual was a radical 
novelty (Purcell, 1994: 678). After all, this was Rome not Asia. It has been argued, however, 
that Gratidianus was preceded down the path of divinity by his uncle, the elder Marius, some 
twenty years earlier (Beard, 1992: 752). Valerius Maximus records the public libations 
offered by the people after his defeat of the Cimbri tamquam dis immortalibus.200 There is, 
however, both a qualitative and a quantitative distinction to be made in the nature of the kind 
of honours paid to both men. Valerius’ account is suggestive of a relatively spontaneous – 
and collective – act of thanksgiving on the very day of a decisive victory. The setting up of 
Gratidianus’ statues and the (presumably sustained) nature of the acts of piety carried out 
there indicate an intensification of the ‘hero worship’ lavished on popular and successful 
figures. We must assume that the beneficiary himself posed no objection to the proliferation 
of statues and the paraphernalia of divinity.201 Mouritsen suggests that the erection of these 
monuments was the fruit of his ‘cultivation’ of the vici and not the other way around 
(Mouritsen, 2001: 83). Even if we dissent from Cicero’s description and accept Flower’s 
argument that the cult foci were actually the shrines of the lares compitales, this still 
constitutes a significant projection of genius veneration from the domestic plane to the city 
and beyond (Flower, 2006: 94). Flower does acknowledge the special status of Gratidianus in 
the manner of his death which, according to the accounts, was choreographed as a pastiche of 
sacrifice or presented as such in the lurid retellings (Flower, 2006: 95). His death, situated by 
Purcell (1994) in its ‘context of the popular spectacle and the institutionalization of violence’, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
best are divine. It is agreed that Intellect, Piety, Virtue and Faith should be deified and in Rome 
temples have been dedicated to them by the state so that those who have these virtues – and all good 
men do – should think that the gods themselves were seated in their own souls. 
200
 Valerius Maximus, 8:15 
postquam enim Cimbros ab eo deletos initio noctis nuntius peruenit, nemo fuit, qui non illi tamquam 
dis immortalibus apud sacra mensae suae libauerit. 
For after the news came through at nightfall of his destruction of the Cimbri, everyone offered a 
libation to him, as if to the immortal gods at their sacred banquet. Cf also Plutarch, Marius, 27. 
201
 However, Williamson (2005: 391) argues that such treatment was ‘neither expected nor sought’. 
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seems to have been directly related to the quasi-divinization he had enjoyed before Sulla’s 
emphatic return to the city (Purcell, 1994: 678). 
 
Although the death of Gratidianus was so shocking that even embellished accounts must 
surely record something of its brutality, the fact that he had been elevated to this particular 
form of hero status in the first place would have been just as disturbing to Scaevola. Although 
the cult practices of tribus and vicus lay beyond his strict purview, Gratidianus’ case may 
well have been referred to Scaevola in an official capacity.  This is certainly the view of 
Schiavone, who sees the theologia tripertita originating as an oral dictum (1974: 46) in 
response to a matter referred to him by the senate (Wolf, 1980: 20). When making an 
intervention on behalf of the pontifical college, the pontifex maximus was, following Cicero’s 
line of argument, the princeps publici consilii.202 Bauman goes even further, suggesting that 
Scaevola may have engineered the senate’s referral of the matter to the pontiffs in the first 
instance. It was in this capacity that Scaevola made his views on the ‘deification’ of 
Gratidianus known and that this particular question prompted his reflection on the gods of the 
principes ciuitatis (Bauman, 1983: 359ff). It is certainly the case that Gratidianus’ ascent 
coincides with Scaevola’s tenure as chief pontiff. Although deprived of the consulship, we 
know of the immediate iteration of his praetorship. Perhaps a consolation prize for 
Gratidianus (Sumner, 1973: 118), such iteration was considerably more unusual for the 
praetorship than the consulship and would have been interpreted as a clear extension of the 
Marian-Cinnan consolidation of power. Gratidianus certainly had mass appeal and it was, 
according to Bauman’s analysis, that manipulation of popular affection which violated the 
determination by the principes ciuitatis of ‘additions to the pantheon’ (Bauman, 1983: 360). 
The conferral of quasi-divinity by the people was, of itself, harmful to the people since it 
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brought the very notion of the gods into disrepute. Quite apart from the discussion about the 
images of the gods, the idea that Gratidianus could be ‘invoked’ in the same breath as 
Romulus or Hercules threatened to devalue their currency also – an ironic twist on his fiscal 
masterstroke. If Scaevola’s intervention was indeed occasioned by Graditianus’ living 
apotheosis, its success lay in its subsequent influence on philosophy and theology, not on its 
immediate effect on the situation in Rome. It was Sulla’s actions, not Scaevola’s words, 
which halted the rise of this Marian star. No sooner were Gratidianus’ statues overthrown 
than the images of Sulla took their place.  
 
Both Scaevola and Gratidianus were to meet their deaths in 82, the year of Sulla’s return. The 
Lucan scholiast traditions offer brief accounts of both murders. In the Adnotationes super 
Lucanum, the death of Gratidianus is briskly - but luridly - recounted with the breaking of his 
limbs and the gouging out of his eyes ut per singulos artus expiraret (Adn. 174); the Berne 
Commenta are even more detailed, mentioning the tomb of the Catuli ‘across the Tiber’ and 
recording the view, held by some, that Catiline carried out the execution at the behest of 
Sulla.203 It is the mention of the tomb in the latter commentum which emphasises the religious 
gloss applied to an act of considerable brutality (and which features in other accounts). A 
tomb was a sacred object – indeed virtually all matters relating to them pertained to the ius 
pontificium (Crook, 1984: 134) and the deliberate choice of the tomb of the Catuli would 




Scaevola the Martyr 
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Although – as we shall see - the accounts of Scaevola’s death do not entirely agree on the 
location of his murder – here too there is an even stronger evocation of sacred space. But 
before we consider the circumstances, we must briefly consider the events leading up to it. 
 
The motive for Scaevola’s continued presence in the city remains opaque. Rawson rightly 
critiques the temptation to assume that ‘anti-Marian meant Sullan’ and yet this may have 
been precisely the facile conclusions drawn by Scaevola’s contemporaries (Rawson, 1987: 
166). It was true that many of his political (and religious) positions were consistent with a 
lack of sympathy for the Marian cause; this does not mean, however, that he was 
ideologically hitched to Sulla’s chariot. Although he had endorsed Flaccus’ attempts to 
maintain the prestige of the senate and reach some accommodation with Sulla the year 
before, that decision had more to do with his personal convictions about the senate than his 
estimation of Sulla. It would of course have been eminently sensible to withdraw from the 
city to sit out the storm of retribution that was waiting to break upon Sulla’s return. Perhaps 
Scaevola carried out a risk assessment and decided that quitting was just as dangerous as 
staying: either course of action could have been interpreted as an indication of one’s loyalties. 
Then there was the matter of his office: he was pontifex maximus. Although the link between 
priest and city had been unintentionally broken by Nasica and more deliberately severed by 
his uncle, Mucianus, Scaevola had shown himself the sort of man who cared about such 
things. His awareness of duty may have been the determining factor in his decision to remain 
at the centre, no matter how perilous that centre now was. Added to this fractured state of 
affairs was the calamitous destruction by fire of the temple of Jupiter in July of 83. As Flower 
rightly suggests, the ruin of Rome’s chief cult centre, which had withstood the threats and 
near-misses of centuries past, must have been a cause for dread among the populace 
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(2010:171). Given that there was no priest of Jupiter, perhaps the pontifex maximus saw it as 
his unique responsibility to offer reassurance by staying behind. 
 
Keaveney argues that Cinna’s former policy of conciliation towards the senate had effectively 
been Scaevola’s shield, but that the extreme elements of the younger guard had no such 
preoccupations. Even though he had elected to remain at the centre, there was a sense in 
which there was no central point in the rapidly unfolding events – at least not the senate: 
 
(They) were attempting to defend a position which had long been rendered meaningless by the 
development of events. Rather than march in arms by the side of Sulla against their country, 
they preferred to stay in Rome and continue with Flaccus’ dated policy of maintaining, against 
all sides, the dignity and authority of the body to which they belonged (Keaveney, 2005: 118). 
 
We learn of Scaevola’s reluctance to set himself ‘against the walls of his native city’ in a 
letter of Cicero to Atticus, even though he must have had some idea of the outcome 
(Morstein-Marx, 2011: 274).204 Cicero sees his own predicament, against the backdrop of the 
civil strife of 49, in exactly the same terms as Scaevola’s dilemma (van der Blom, 2010: 
240). It is surely a bitter irony that the agent of Scaevola’s death was the urban praetor, the 
city’s ‘minister of justice’, L. Iunius Brutus Damasippus. Cornered in Praeneste, the younger 
                                                          
204Cicero, ad Atticum, 8, 3.6: 
at si restitero et fuerit nobis in hac parte locus, idem fecero quod in Cinnae dominatione (L.) 
Philippus, quod L. Flaccus, quod Q. Mucius, quoquo modo ea res huic quidem cecidit; qui tamen ita 
dicere solebat se id fore uidere quod factum est sed malle quam armatum ad patriae moenia accedere. 
aliter Thrasybulus et fortasse melius. sed est certa quaedam illa Muci ratio atque sententia, est illa 
etiam Philippi, et cum sit necesse seruire tempori et non amittere tempus cum sit datum. sed in hoc 
ipso habent tamen idem fasces molestiam. 
If I stay behind and find a place in this party, I will be doing what Lucius Philippus, Lucius Flaccus 
and Quintus Mucius did during the domination of Cinna – however it turned out for the last of those; 
yet Mucius used to say that he foresaw his fate as it turned out to be but that he preferred it to 
marching in arms against the walls of his native city. Thrasybulus did otherwise and perhaps better so.  
But there is certainly something in Mucius’ thinking and point of view, as with Philippus: make the 
most of things and not to missing out on the opportunity when it arises. But there too these same 
fasces get in my way. 
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Marius sent word to Damasippus to deal with his enemies: chief among these were Scaevola, 
C. Papirius Carbo Arvina, L. Domitius Ahenobarbus and P. Antistius. The other three men 
had some connection with Scaevola and could be said to have shared congruent views on 
many of the same issues, although he would easily have been the most prominent.205 To what 
extent this decision was made by the younger Marius alone is also open to interpretation: the 
other consul might have had a reason to find the death of the only surviving ‘insitigator’ of 
the Social War politically expedient. Was Cn. Papirius Carbo, by then on his third (virtually) 
consecutive term, using the fate of Scaevola to definitively signal his commitment to the 
‘new Italians’ and the scarcely enfranchised freedmen (Livy, Periochae 84)? If most Italians 
were indeed suspicious of Sulla (Frier, 1971: 589), the sacrifice of someone who had opposed 
the extension of their rights and may have been about to side with Sulla might well bolster 
Carbo’s position. 
 
In the consuls’ absence, the urban praetor convoked a meeting of the senate which may have 
had no substantive purpose beyond bringing the intended victims together in one place. It is 
possible that a vote was carried out to bring a hostis declaration against these men. This 
would certainly be consistent with the speed of their execution and the disposal of their 
bodies afterwards. Sources conflict as to the praetor’s advertising his intent: some choose to 
mention a ring of soldiers around the curia, others do not. Livy suggests that the list of 
‘enemies’ extended beyond these named individuals to other members of the nobility, 
although the surviving account in the Periochae no doubt exaggerates the scope of the 
massacre. 206  According to this version, Scaevola was pursued across the forum to the 
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 According to Ernst Badian, they ‘seem to have been preparing to join Sulla’ (2003: 1109).  
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 Livy, Periochae 86:5-6. 
L. Damasippus praetor ex uoluntate C. Mari cos. cum senatum contraxisset, omnem quae in urbe erat 
nobilitatem trucidauit.  Ex cuius numero Q. Mucius Scaeuola pont. max. fugiens in uestibulo aedis 
Vestae occisus est. 
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entrance to Vesta’s shrine which adjoined the sacral complex of the regia and domus publica. 
According to Appian, Carbo and Antistius were killed in the senate house, Domitius was 
felled by the door and Scaevola was run to ground just outside.207 The other accounts tend to 
accord with Livy’s mention of the shrine of Vesta. Lucan emphasises the religious dimension 




te quoque neclectum uiolatae, Scaeuola, Vestae 
ante ipsum penetrale deae semperque calentis 
mactauere focos; paruom set fessa senectus 
sanguinis effudit iugulo flammisque pepercit. 
(Lucan, Pharsalia, II:136)208 
 
Lucan deploys the language of sacrifice and juxtaposes it with the resulting desecration of 
Vesta’s sanctuary, the goddess herself being violated in this act. There are layers of resonance 
here: the pontifex maximus was Vesta’s only male ‘priest’ and he exercised a particular role 
over the household attached to her cult. For him to be cut down in the inner-shrine is a double 
outrage. Lucan may also be playing with the symbolism of the ‘proto-Scaevolan’ myth in 
which flames also loom large. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
At the wish of the consul Gaius Marius, the praetor Lucius Damasippus convened the senate and 
massacred every man belonging to the nobility living in Rome.  Among these was Quintus Mucius 
Scaevola, the pontifex maximus, who was murdered, as he fled, in the entrance to Vesta’s shrine. 
207
 Appian, BC 1:88. 
208
  You too, Scaevola, they sacrificed, unheeded, before 
the very inner shrine and ever-burning hearths 
of desecrated Vesta: your weary old age poured from your throat 
a trickle of blood and allowed the flames to live. 
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Brief mention is also made by Cicero in de Oratore, in which he refers to neque… pontificis 
maximi, sanguine simulacrum Vestae respersum esse vidit.209 Here the cult image of the 
goddess is spattered with blood, perhaps suggesting – at least in Cicero’s rhetorical 
imagination – the pontifex reaching out to claim sanctuary. The same image bleeds through 
into the Lucan scholiasts. The Adnotationes are constrained by a wrong reading of Lucan 
(‘dextrae’ instead of ‘Vestae’) and attempt to square the reference with Scaevola’s famous 
forebear, also conflating the elder and the younger Marius in the process. Preserved, 
however, is the image of the pontiff smearing Vesta’s image with his bloody hand. Both the 
Adnotationes and the Commenta Bernensia locate the killing ‘in templo Vestae’, leaving 
Appian the sole voice situating the deed away from the Vestal complex. There is a sense in 
which this disputed placement is entirely fitting: Scaevola’s death takes place within the 
precincts of the forum and the spaces he inhabited in his various public personae: consul, 
jurist, pontifex maximus. It is also ironic that one whose allegiances were so hard to pin down 
could not have eluded his executioners: if not those pursuing him on foot, then certainly those 
who sent them.  
 
Did Scaevola suspect that his end was imminent? After all, he had a scar to remind him of his 
vulnerability; but he did not remove himself from the reach of those who stood to gain from 
harming him. We may perhaps detect something of his Stoicism in accepting the inevitable 
and even suggest that there was an element of what would later be termed ambitiosa mors: 
political suicide achieved through an ‘ostentatious death’ (Hill, 2004: 9). It could be argued 
that Scaevola collaborated with his executioners and ended up surrendering his life in a way 
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 Cicero, de Oratore, 3:10: ‘Neither… did he behold the image of Vesta spattered with the blood of 
his colleague the pontifex maximus’. 
There are also strong parallels with the accounts of Merula’s suicide in the Temple of Jupiter: 
sacerdotisque sui sanguine uetustissimi foci maduerunt (Valerius Maximus 9.12: ‘the ancient hearth 
was drenched in the blood of its priest’); incisis uenis superfusoque altaribus sanguine (Velleius 2.22: 
‘having opened his veins and drenched the altars with blood’). 
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which was not so very different from Merula. Instead of fleeing the city, or staying within the 
domus publica (with perhaps a squad of curiate lictors in prominent defensive positions), he 
took the decision to venture out and make whatever ensued a spectacle for all to see. Even the 
public humiliation of his body, dragged to and cast into the river Tiber (Kyle, 1998: 220), 
would have made a clear statement about his killers. 
 
Although Scaevola was, in almost every sense, the personal antithesis of Julius Caesar - who 
dominates the next chapter210 – his demise mirrors the death of Caesar in several ways. The 
slain pontiff becomes a symbolic victim of impietas. The fact that he was the first pontifex 
maximus to be cut down in his own city by his own people provoked shock and lasting 
revulsion. It was probably the trigger for Cicero’s definitive abandonment of his familial ties 
to the Marians and his alignment with Sulla (Lintott, 2008: 422). Thereafter, Cicero’s own 
construction of Scaevola’s life is, legal activity aside, overshadowed by the manner of its 
ending. It furnishes him with a theological problem: how could the gods allow that 
temperantiae prudentiaeque specimen to be butchered before the statue of Vesta?211 Cicero 
puts the perennial question of evil on the lips of Cotta, the pontifex, not so much as a 
theological authority but as the representative of Rome’s religious traditions. It is the Stoic 
Lucilius Balbus who makes the rejoinder that the pontiffs surround the city with a protective 
cordon of religious rites, more so than the walls themselves.212 This is a curious note on 
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 Indeed there are many more similarities between Gratidianus and Caesar. 
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 Cicero, de Natura Deorum, III.80 
cur temperantiae prudentiaeque specimen ante simulacrum Vestae pontifex maximus est Q. Scaeuola 
trucidatus..? 
Why was that model of restraint and wisdom, the pontifex maximus Q. Scaevola, butchered in front of 
the statue of Vesta? 
212
 Cicero, de Natura Deorum, 3.94 
Est enim mihi tecum pro aris et focis certamen et pro deorum templis atque delubris proque urbis 
muris, quos uos pontifices sanctos esse dicitis diligentiusque urbem religione quam ipsis moenibus 
cingitis; quae deseri a me, dum quidem spirare potero, nefas iudico. 
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which to conclude since ‘altars, hearths, temples, shrines and even walls’ have not been 
spared by these observances. And yet, even though the efficacy of these prayers is in doubt, 
Balbus vows not to commit the sacrilege of deserting these places. Perhaps Cicero is making 
a statement of his own ideal position, one clearly modelled on his mentor – the martyred 
Scaevola. Although Cicero bemoaned both Scaevolas’ diminution of the auctoritas of the 
priests, Quintus Scaevola may actually have enhanced it. By that I mean that, while Nasica 
blurred boundaries by action, Scaevola blurred them by careful intellectual exposition. The 
distinction between pontifical and civil law, as well as the boundary between the mechanics 
of priesthood and the articulation of theology, were uniquely and permanently altered by him. 
Perhaps the modifications he made to these systems deprived him, at least in part, of their 
traditional protection. Fimbria’s prosecution of the pontifex maximus on the grounds of being 
‘insufficiently stabbed’ conjures up a scenario in which the failure of both laws and gods (as 




As we mentioned at the outset, it is perhaps inevitable that discussion of Scaevola’s death 
will continue to borrow the tropes of Cicero’s rendering of his mentor as an exemplum. It is 
perfectly possible, of course, that he already possessed something of this symbolic character 
during his lifetime. Scaevola is regarded as the first to develop the idea of societas in the 
abstract (Schiavone, 1987: 63-68 in Arena, 2012: 163); the matrix of roles and 
responsibilities created by society - and on which society itself relied – was sustained by the 
idea of fides (Burckhardt, 1990: 94). We have already noted that Scaevola embodied bona 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
For I have to struggle with you on behalf of our altars and hearths, of the temples of the gods and 
shrines and for our city walls which you pontiffs declare to be sacred and more carefully cordon the 
city with religious ceremony than fortifications; and I reckon it a sacrilege to abandon them while I 
still have breath. 
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fides (Harries, 2006: 25), making it the central construct of his provincial decree in Asia; it 
could be argued that the very concept of societas, which underwent such a brutal revision in 
the ‘80s B.C., also rendered fides an ideologically compromised virtue. Ideals of ‘integrity’, 
‘right dealing’ were less current and prominent in the wake of the struggles between Cinna, 
Marius and Sulla than the loaded connotations of fides and the principes civitatis (‘loyalty to, 
and trust in, our social superiors’, Rüpke, 2007: 55). In other words, Scaevola’s identification 
with a particular ‘vision’ of the res publica was enough in itself to make him an enemy. His 
consistency and fidelity to those ideals, rooted in law and religion, would make him a 
conspicuous and easy target. The metastasis of political murder was such that none of 










Pontiff and Dictator 
 
Sulla’s victory was achieved through a strange mix of butchery and clemency, with enemies 
proscribed yet strategic converts welcomed (Steel, 2013: 106). He quickly engineered the 
revival of the dormant office of dictator and embarked upon a programme of recalibrating the 
state according to the ancient provisions of the dictatorship (Arena, 2012: 94) but without the 
usual expiry date of six months. It would not have been difficult to claim that Rome had 
endured a period of unparalleled lawlessness – Quintus Scaevola’s murder being a lurid 
illustration of this disorder – and the range of Sulla’s activities attest to the scope of his 
freedom as dictator legibus scribundis et rei publicae constituendae (Vervaet, 2004: 38). As 
well as addressing ‘direct’ political issues, Sulla also made modifications to the priestly 
colleges. By virtue of his personal auctoritas, he also made a contribution to the wider 
landscape of Roman religious life (Orlin, 2010: 200) An augur and a man of heightened 
religious sensibility,213 he ensured (in that Sullan way) that a trusted ally was chosen to fill 
the vacancy at the head of the pontifical college: Metellus Pius. He also, in a way that he 
could not have foreseen (despite the prescient utterances attributed to him214), singled out the 
man who would succeed Metellus as chief pontiff and become the last dictator of Rome. The 
period of Sulla’s domination and the working out of his legacy raises some important 
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questions about the position of the pontifex maximus when one man has unrivalled power in 
the state and exercises that influence in matters of religion. The careers of Metellus Pius and 
Caesar might broadly be characterised as instances of the ‘passive’ and ‘active’ voice in the 




By the time of his death in 63, Quintus Caecilius Metellus Pius was arguably ‘the most 
distinguished man in Rome’ (Münzer, 1999: 290).215 His standing among his contemporaries, 
however, is not matched by his imprint on history: whenever he does feature in an index 
personarum, the likelihood is that he will be eclipsed by his forebears or his adopted son. The 
Caecilii Metelli were among the most celebrated Roman dynasties, reaching the zenith of 
their influence during the careers of the brothers Metellus Macedonicus and Metellus Calvus 
and their sons in the latter half of the second century B.C. (Beagon, 2005: 335). The variety 
of triumphal cognomina – Macedonicus, Delmaticus, Baliaricus, Numidicus, Creticus - 
associated with this branch of the gens Caecilia attests to the high profile of their 
achievements in the military sphere.  
 
Unlike his relatives, Metellus Pius acquired his cognomen for a display of filial piety – 
although he was not without some measure of military success during his comparatively long 
life. He had early experience of war, serving with his father during the Jugurthine campaign 
alongside Marius. According to Sallust’s account, it was during this campaign that relations 
between the elder Metellus and the rising star Marius began to undergo strain. Marius had 
petitioned Metellus for leave to stand for the consulship but was put off with the reply that he 
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could stand in the same year as his son. Given that Metellus’ son was only about twenty at 
this time, we can imagine how this rebuff played with the ambitious Marius.216 Plutarch 
retells the episode as a more calculated humiliation of Marius, since the two had already 
become enemies over the fate of Turpilius (Plutarch, Marius: 8). No matter what the precise 
occasion of estrangement was, there is no doubt that enmity between these men would come 
to have a direct influence both on the fate of Numidicus and on his son’s subsequent political 
choices. 
 
His father, Metellus Numidicus, had fallen foul of Saturninus (whom, as censor, he had 
previously sought to have expelled from the senate), going into voluntary exile in 100. This 
same year is the earliest putative date for Pius’ election to the pontifical college (Rüpke, 
2008: 581)217. It was his repeated efforts to ensure his father’s recall which bolstered his 
reputation for devotion and led to his being named ‘pius’. The reputation of the Metelli and, 
one presumes, the popularity which secured his pontifical election, would have helped keep 
up the pressure on his father’s opponents. No doubt he was able to use his extensive family 
connections to coordinate behind-the-scenes efforts to bring his father home. Alongside these 
subtle efforts were the opportunities for public entreaty. We know that the young Metellus, 
not yet a member of the senate, was not averse to maximising whatever dramatic displays 
came to hand – such as tearfully throwing himself at a tribune’s feet before the concilium 
plebis (Appian, BC I.33; Kelly, 2006:85).  Ultimately, it took the death of Saturninus and the 
eventual acquiescence of Marius to allow the recall motion to be carried late in 99.  Metellus 
Pius did not forget those who had supported him, just as those who had impeded him were 
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called to account for it.218 After his return from exile, Numidicus withdrew from public life 
and it is his dutiful son who plays a part in the disturbed years that were to follow. 
 
In the Social War Metellus Pius commanded a pro-praetorian army in the successful 
campaign against Venusia but was then ordered by the senate to deal with the Samnites, first 
militarily and then diplomatically (Appian, BC 1.68).219 The conditions set by the Samnites 
were too much for Metellus, who rejected them as insulting to the dignity of Rome. Although 
not quite the outcome they had hoped for, the senate recognised and supported his principled 
stance.220 Fimbria, acting on Cinna’s behalf, was only too happy to accede to these terms, 
thereby ramping up the pressure on the consuls Octavius and Merula. As a result, Metellus 
could only bring a fraction of his army to the relief of the city and the remainder of his troops 
soon fell prey to the Samnites who had flocked to Cinna’s standard (Keaveney, 1987: 182). 
Octavius had been haemorrhaging men for some time and the remaining soldiers begged 
Metellus to take the command from the consul. With what seems a characteristic sensitivity 
to the ‘proper order’, he refused their offer – a move which only prompted further desertions. 
The parlous state of morale even induced him to consider his own overture to Cinna, offering 
to recognise him as consul (Diodorus Siculus, 38/39.3-4.1, Granius Licinianus, 35.47-48; 
Seager, 1992:177). Given his recent exertions both in the Social War and as the senate’s 
military agent, this is, on the surface at least, a perplexing volte-face. It is probable that he 
stopped short of the further endorsements heaped upon Cinna or extracted at his command. 
Metellus chose instead to draw upon the reserves of goodwill attached to the family of 
Numidicus by removing himself to Africa. From there, he could contemplate the progress – 
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or deterioration – of the situation and monitor the weathervane politics of several leading 
citizens. Curiously, he was not immediately stripped of his imperium; according to Keaveney, 
this formal stripping of command only came in 83 or 82 as part of the outlawing of the 
Sullani (1987: 212).221 
 
His relations with Pompeius Strabo and Magnus are typical of his career. During the Cinnan 
stand-off of 87, Strabo had initially supported the beleaguered consul Octavius but later opted 
to soften his stance towards Cinna. According to Saeger’s analysis, this was due to his fear of 
being outshone by Metellus Pius should he gain the consulship for 86 (Seager, 2002:23). 
Sulla had already indicated that Strabo no longer enjoyed his favour and the elder Pompey 
demonstrated just how mercenary he could be when his shifting loyalties were tested.222 
Despite his temporary relinquishing of his proconsular command (while his troops murdered 
Sulla’s nominee as his replacement), he moved quickly to reassert himself once again. 
Strabo’s sporadic realignments came to an end with his death that same year. Metellus did not 
stand for the consulship (wisely, considering Marius and Cinna were both standing), 
preferring to sit out the approaching storm. When news of Cinna’s death reached him, 
Metellus made an unsuccessful attempt to wrest control of the province from the governor, C. 
Fabius Hadrianus. Once Sulla had landed in Italy in 82, Metellus Pius was among the first to 
put his own troops – what remained of his expeditionary army of 89 223 - at Sulla’s disposal; 
others, such as the young Pompey, followed suit. Still in his early twenties, Pompey had, with 
this move, demonstrated as much boldness as skill. Henceforth Metellus and Pompey would 
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be regarded as key figures in the new regime, with the younger man showing due deference 
to his senior.224 
 
As dictator, Sulla made a shrewd choice in giving Metellus Pius a place of singular honour in 
his new entourage. Metellus had done much to bolster the Sullan cause by association, 
despite his temporary vacillation over Cinna. He soon experienced a notable success in his 
career as a Sullan deputy: he defeated the praetor Carrinas in Cisalpine Gaul and was spared 
direct confrontation with Carbo, who withdrew before joining battle. 225  These military 
successes were exceeded by the honour of becoming pontifex maximus in 81 and, perhaps as 
early as mid-July of that same year, Sulla’s consular colleague for 80. One can presume that 
the support of the dictator was a factor in both promotions. 
 
Among the numerous constitutional reforms set in place during his dictatorship, Sulla turned 
his attention to three of the collegia amplissima and their recruitment. Mirroring his 
expansion of the senate, he increased the numbers of pontiffs, augurs and decemviri sacris 
faciundis to fifteen and removed the people’s right, given in the lex Domitia of 104, to elect 
the members of the priestly colleges (Livy, Periochae 89; Keaveney, 2005:148). The 
weakening of popular influence meant a return to the opaque practice of cooptation by the 
members of each college; this did not, however, extend to the pontifex maximus – although 
there is much confusion around the issue. Some have speculated that, in light of Sulla’s 
abrogation of the lex, Metellus Pius’ route to the chief pontificate may have taken a different 
path (Münzer, 1999: 329). There is, however, no evidence that the dictator interfered with 
what was a more ancient right of the populus than that which was accorded to them by 
Domitius Ahenobarbus (Taylor, 1942:421). Indeed Cicero’s second speech against Servilius 
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Rullus’ agrarian bill (which predated the lex Labiena of 63) describes the comitia pontificis 
maximi as a ‘going concern’ and not some defunct feature of the constitution.226 
 
So, while Metellus Pius’ elevation to pontifex maximus was enacted by traditional means, it is 
almost certain that he was the dictator’s preferred candidate. It is conceivable that his 
anointing by Sulla would have been enough to thin out or even wholly deter the competition: 
Metellus may well have become chief pontiff by a form of election by acclamation. The rapid 
succession of chief priesthood and consulship-elect (although we cannot be entirely sure 
which was first) complicates the attempt to form a clear opinion of what kind of pontiff 
Metellus would have been. His two immediate predecessors, his uncle Metellus Delmaticus 
and Quintus Mucius Scaevola, had served their consulships and proconsular terms before 
becoming chief pontiff. Thereby they avoided the potential conflict of interests between their 
political duties and the religious obligations of the pontificate, namely the requirement to 
attend to Rome’s principal cult observances in person. Metellus Pius did not have the luxury 
of separating these realms of activity into discreet career phases. While Metellus could, in 
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theory at least, indefinitely prorogue a proconsular posting, it seems unlikely that Sulla would 
fail to deploy an able deputy in a time of necessity. Moreover, we cannot underestimate the 
attraction of a renewed imperium for a fifty year old still hungry for military success.227 
 
Metellus Pius was allocated Hispania Ulterior as his province. Spain was the conspicuous 
exception to Sulla’s powers as dictator. The renegade Marian ‘proconsul’ Quintus Sertorius 
had led the Lusitanian and Celtiberian tribes in revolt and the senate hoped that the official 
incumbent would end the rogue status of this important province. Hopes of a speedy 
resolution were soon dashed. Pius made several attempts to dislodge Sertorius, who had the 
advantage of being at the head of a native army. Plutarch offers a detailed account of 
Metellus’ frustrated campaign. Outmanoeuvred and mocked by his opponent – he was even 
challenged to single combat by Sertorius – he eventually called for help.228 It was Pompey 
who came to his assistance. Yet not even Rome’s military prodigy could prosecute a swift 
end to Sertorius’ campaign of humiliating incursion. Both Metellus and Pompey were to 
complain of a lack of resources and support from Rome.229 Sertorius, on the other hand, was 
supplied by the Cilician pirates and may even have had access to the resources of Mithridates. 
The campaign rumbled on, with some very close calls for Pompey: after the battle of Sucro 
Sertorius boasted that ‘were it not for the old woman Metellus turning up, he would have 
thrashed the boy and sent him back to Rome’.230 In the end it was not so much Rome’s 
eventual gift of reinforcements (two fresh legions, money and supplies), so much as the older 
man’s frustration which led to Sertorius’ demise. Wearied by a seemingly interminable 
campaign, Metellus put a hefty price on his enemy’s head; this served to amplify the growing 
disaffection among Sertorius’ Spanish forces and a successful plot to dispatch him was 
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devised by Perperna, his closest ally (Seager, 1992:219; Southern, 2002:48). Alongside the 
promise of money and land, Metellus’ offer included amnesty to those ‘in exile’.231 Just who 
would be in the category of ‘exile’ is unclear; it is possible that Plutarch, on whom we rely 
for the details of the reward, has confused the status of hostes and proscripti (Konrad, 
1988:257). Perperna certainly stood to benefit, but chose to fight on instead. In the end, it was 
Pompey who captured and executed him. After their scant resourcing of the war in its earlier 
phases, the senate was more generous at its end; an agrarian bill was passed to reward the 
homecoming soldiers with grants of land (Cicero, ad Atticum, 1.18.6; Gruen, 1995:37). Such a 
hard-won victory (of sorts) gave Metellus and Pompey an opportunity to request a triumph; 
by recognising the Spanish war as a bellum externum, the senate set aside the technical issue 
of Sertorius’ Roman status (and that of the many supporters and Cinnan sympathisers who 
had defected to his cause). Although the victory was shared, it is certain that the two 
triumphatores decoupled their interests at this point. Appian records that Metellus returned to 
Italy after Pompey (1.121), and Eutropius lists their triumphs as chronologically separate 
(6.5). 
 
Posterity, however, has given Pompey the lion’s share of the glory. In his speech supporting 
Pompey’s Mithridatic command, Metellus is pointedly absent from Cicero’s account of the 
campaign against Sertorius: Pompey is undoubtedly the hero of the episode (Cicero, pro Lege 
Manilia; Seager, 2002: 50). It is fair to say that Cicero had nothing against Pius as such; his 
real aim was to dismiss the Metelli who had opposed the lex Gabinia and who were 
attempting to derail the proposed lex Manilia. Later accounts of the Spanish campaign are 
less sympathetic, if not positively scathing, towards the habitually ‘irreproachable’ Metellus 
(Seager, 1992: 212). He strays into Valerius Maximus’ treatment de luxuria et libidine for his 
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alleged acceptance of semi-divine honours in the thick of the Spanish campaign.232 This may 
have been part of a strategy of contrasting his supposed demerits with the qualities of his 
father, or the result of a campaign to exalt the role of Pompey (Gruen, 1971:7). Gruen is 
sceptical of a tendency of ancient historians and past scholarship to schematise the 
relationship between the two men and their supporters as emblematic of social or political 
rivalries.  
 
Given that he was a pontifex for nearly 40 years, it is tempting to look for indications of 
‘piety’ in a more overtly religious sense. Of these, there are few and even fewer which depart 
from what might be expected of any prominent Roman of his day. During his term as pontifex 
maximus he is thought to have built the Iseum Metellinum (Vout, 2003: 191); the 
construction of a cult centre for Isis within the pomerium would be an unusual project for the 
chief pontiff but less so for a wealthy consular. If Ovid is correct and Metellus Numidicus did 
indeed restore the temple of Magna Mater after the fire in 111 (Fasti 4.347-352),233 then we 
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Quid enim sibi uoluit princeps suorum temporum Metellus Pius tunc, cum in Hispania aduentus suos 
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quickly a love of opulence had swept in: his youth saw the old ways, his old age gave rise to the new. 
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might discern a family tradition of catering for recently imported but highly popular cults. 
This religious eclecticism may also have borne the imprint of the architect of the new 
political and religious dispensation, Sulla himself: as part of his symbolic refounding of the 
city, Sulla was as keen to draw upon ‘foreign’ religious ideas as he was to restore the 
traditional structures of the Capitol (Santangelo, 2007: 219). It is not inconceivable that the 
pontifex maximus bowed to the prevailing religious wind. Sulla was, by all accounts, 
genuinely interested in religious matters and this runs counter to the view (still held by many) 
that the last generation of Republican leaders was attentive only to the public utility of 
religion. Metellus may, therefore, have been charged with the repristination of Rome’s 
religious life. 
 
His public persona seems to have capitalised on his reputation for pietas, as well as his 
association with religious power. A coin issued early in his career as pontifex maximus 
clearly evokes these qualities and makes a robust statement of how he intends to be 
perceived. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
     'dic' inquam 'parva cur stipe quaerat opes.'                
'contulit aes populus, de quo delubra Metellus 
     fecit' ait; 'dandae mos stipis inde manet.' 
 
The name of her temple’s founder is lost: 
Augustus has re-dedicated it, and, before him Metellus.’ 
Here Erato ceased. There was a pause for me to ask more:  
I said: ‘Why does the goddess collect money in small coins?’ 
She said: ‘The people gave coppers, with which Metellus 





Figure 2: denarius of Metellus Pius 
 
The head of pietas on the obverse is accompanied by the stork, thought by the Romans to 
care for its parents: clearly a reference to that much vaunted filial piety. Clark interprets the 
religious symbols on the reverse – the lituus and the jug - as an accompanying motif to 
signify reverence towards the gods (Clark, 2007:154). Just as striking, however, is the 
inclusion of IMPER: either a reference to his claim to have maintained his Samnite command 
throughout the civil war (dating it to the end of the 80s) or the acclamation of his soldiers 
during the Sertorian campaign (placing it in the mid 70s). The purpose of the religious 
symbols has been a subject of some debate. Taylor interpreted both as being symbols of the 
augurate; she excludes the possibility that the jug is a pontifical capis (sacrificial pitcher) as 
this interferes with her central thesis that they refer to Pius’ father Numidicus (Taylor, 
1944:353). There is no evidence that Numidicus was an augur; Taylor surmises that, in view 
of his personal status and his family’s standing among the pre-eminent gentes of Rome, it 
was most likely that he was. Few would find this a convincing line of argument: there were 
other scions of the clan who had an equal ‘right’ to a place in the senior priestly colleges.  
There are, of course, other interpretations of the coin which merit more serious consideration. 
 
Firstly, there is the possibility that Metellus Pius was making a statement both of filial piety 
and political loyalty. While the head of pietas and the accompanying stork were a Metellan 
innovation, the pairing of ritual symbols had first been coined by Sulla some two years 
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previously at most (Crawford, 1974:359). The recycling of numismatic devices is a common 
feature of Roman coinage, but the repetition of what was a recent feature of Sullan monetary 
propaganda is surely significant. Given the extraordinary measures which had been taken to 
wrest back control of Rome, Sulla would have been anxious to invoke the iconographic 
shorthand of religious authority and legitimation (Crawford, 1964:148). For Stewart, Sulla’s 
purpose was clear: 
 
These rituals jointly sanctioned the actions of elected officials, suggesting an intelligible, 
political significance for the occurrence of the paired symbols. The pontifices and augurs 
sanctioned the ritual preliminaries to all public business, and their general jurisdiction was 
particularly important at the ceremonies of investiture which identified the authority of elected 
officials themselves as legitimate. (Stewart, 1997:178). 
 
He needed the stamp of respectability which these allusive symbols could confer: the 
juxtaposition of religious objects and military insignia is a deliberate statement. The issue of 
Metellus Pius’ coin is, she argues, part of a similar quest for legitimacy, especially in light of 
the military claims which are also being made at the same time (Stewart, 1997:180).234 There 
is, however, a sense which Metellus’ use of these devices may go beyond appropriating the 
symbolism of the new dispensation or obtaining religious sanction after the carnage of civil 
war. He was, by this time, pontifex maximus: he was nominally responsible for the proper 
exercise of those same religious functions which are being referenced on his coins. Metellus 
succeeds in advertising family position, personal virtue, military achievement and religious 
office without recourse to anything so vulgar as a name-check. Incidentally, Caesar will 
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deploy the same lituus and jug motif on a coin issued after Pharsalus, with perhaps some of 
the same aims in mind.235 
 
By the time Metellus was chief priest, the taboo of prolonged absence from the city had been 
definitively broken. It could be argued that Metellus’ own seldom equalled absence from 
Rome was occasioned more by the uncertain political situation than an express desire to 
relegate his pontifical duties. He was no sooner pontifex maximus than he was elected consul; 
and it was in the exercise of his proconsular command that he became embroiled in the 
seemingly endless Spanish campaign. The destabilising effect of Sertorius’ presence in Spain, 
acting as a magnet for some respectable opponents of the new regime, should not be 
underestimated. 
 
While he was away from Rome, the priestly colleges could maintain their own affairs but 
certain functions were reserved for him alone. Despite the intervening five centuries, one 
such function, the inauguration of the flamen martialis, is related by Macrobius in surprising 
detail – not least the bill of fare.236 He refers to the banquet following the inauguration of 
Lentulus Niger, helpfully listing the members of the pontifical college in attendance. 
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Refero enim pontificis uetustissimam coenam quae scripta est in indice quarto Metelli illius pontificis 
maximi in haec uerba: Ante diem nonum Kalendas Septembres, quo die Lentulus flamen Martialis 
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with ivory couches: the pontiffs reclined in two dining rooms, Quintus Catulus, Marcus Aemilius 
Lepidus, Decimus Silanus, the rex sacrorum, Publius Scaevola the sixth, Quintus Cornelius, Publius 
Volumnius, Publius Albinovanus and the augur who inaugurated him, Lucius Julius Caesar: in a third 
dining room were the Vestal Virgins Popilia, Perpennia, Licinia and Arruntia and his (Lentulus’) wife 
the flaminica Publicia and his mother-in-law Sempronia.  
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Attempts have been made to determine the exact date of the banquet, given that Macrobius 
offers an exact date (22 August) but uses an enigmatic formula ‘in indice quarto Metelli illius 
pontificis maximi’ for the year. Taylor constructed a plausible case for the years 70 or 69 
(since the pontifex C. Caesar is mentioned as being in attendance).237 Later revisions of her 
thesis have suggested that 70 is the likeliest year since the inauguration of the priest of Mars, 
vacant for some years, would be considered a priority for the returning pontifex maximus 
(Tansey, 2000:243). 
 
There is little to be said for Metellus Pius hereafter: the remainder of his life and pontificate 
has faded into relative obscurity. We have no evidence of him leaving the city after his 
triumphant return in 70 – by which time he would have been approaching or in his 60th year. 
Based on Macrobius’ comments, he seems to have kept up an index - perhaps the 
commentarii by another name - which formed part of the broader annalistic activities of the 
college (Rüpke, 2008: 33; 581). We know that he joined with other distinguished consulars in 
testifying against Pompey’s quaestor Cornelius in 65.238 This trial, at least in part an attempt 
to strike at Pompey himself, resulted in the acquittal of Cornelius and a victory for Cicero.  In 
his final years he would no doubt have observed the consolidation of Pompey’s influence 
with some concern and, with greater satisfaction, the burgeoning promise of his adopted son 
Metellus Pius Scipio. Ironically, it was in the Pompeian cause that Metellus Scipio would 
play a decisive role and against Caesar that he would strike the first real blow of the civil war 
of the 40s – albeit in the form of the senate’s ultimatum of 49 that Caesar should disband his 
legions. 
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In the intervening years, the pontifex who reclined at the first couch at that inaugural banquet 
had, against the odds, succeeded Metellus Pius as head of the state religion. ‘The most 
distinguished man in Rome’ had been replaced by someone who would change Rome and the 
pontificate for ever. However, we should not leap over Metellus Pius’ tenure as pontifex 
maximus in order to reach the culmination – or nadir – of the Republican office in the person 
of Julius Caesar. By dying (we presume) in his bed, Metellus successfully embodied a style 
of pontifex maximus which combined a protracted military career, occasionally impervious to 
prevailing senatorial winds, with a keen sense of the symbolic power of his priestly office. 
The fact that Metellus knew, like Sulla before him, that military success could not be 
divorced from the proper observance of religious ritual makes Caesar’s subsequent 
appropriation of the trappings of the pontifex-imperator less mould-shattering. Metellus Pius 
had, by the simple fact of longevity and survival, set the seal of pontifical gravitas on a life of 
political and military engagement. 
 
Gaius Julius Caesar 
 
Caesar is more than a historical figure: thanks, in part, to his own genius for self-promotion 
and self-preservation, he has become something of a motif which runs through most areas of 
scholarship on the late Republic. This is hardly a recent phenomenon, of course; the gradual 
evolution of the Augustan principate relied on the flexibility of Caesar’s memory to offer 
occasions for both opportunistic celebration and selective denigration of his ‘achievements’ 
to further the interests of the new order (Ramage, 1985: 224). It is my contention, however, 
that he not only symbolically represents, but actively brings about, the fusion of cultus and 
cultura which becomes the dominant motif of the Gottkaisertum of much of Rome’s imperial 
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narrative. Of course, we must also reckon with the culter, the role of the knife, in Caesar’s 
story.  
 
The religious dimensions of his public life are key factors in this assessment. It is, of course, 
impossible to reconstruct Caesar’s own views of religion. Some fairly recent presentations of 
Caesar continue to emphasise the Suetonian portrait of a man indifferent to religion.239 We 
would do well, however, to heed more nuanced opinions. Wardle, referring to an essay by 
Paladino, warns of attempting to access Caesar’s ‘thought life’ and his understanding of 
himself in religious terms (Wardle, 2009:100; Paladino, 1994:191). We will not repeat the 
earlier discussion of the content of Roman religion, save to say that its performative elements, 
hallowed by tradition, do not correspond neatly with modern notions of a ‘belief system’ 
(Feeney, 1998). In this light, Caesar is no different from his contemporaries: he does the right 
thing, the socially and religiously sanctioned thing – more often than not (Tatum, 2008: 64). 
That does not mean that we should regard Caesar’s (or anybody else’s) religious activity as 
simply ‘going through the motions’ as we would understand that phrase today (contra 
Dando-Collins, 2010:78). We should also be mindful that the old orthodoxy which 
characterised this phase of the declining Republic as intellectually disengaged from matters 
of religion has ceded to a more balanced view. Indeed the writings of Cicero, Lucretius and 
Varro attest to a lively interest in religious questions (Crawford, 1992:178). 
 
Early career, early priesthoods? 
 
Before we discuss Caesar’s term at the helm of Roman state religion, it is worth considering 
his first serious contacts with the priestly institutions of the Republic. Entry to one of the 
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priestly colleges was a significant avenue of career advancement for the sons of Rome’s 
aristocracy and it could also, as with Caesar, offer promising ‘outsiders’ a mechanism of 
association with the senior establishment. 
 
Rüpke, following Crawford, argues that Caesar was a salius (Rüpke, 2008:734; Crawford, 
1974:735). The salii were juvenile priests to whom were entrusted the shield(s) of Mars and 
who, during the month dedicated to the god, performed a leaping ritual dance around the city 
to mark the recommencement of the war season. They were an exclusively patrician 
priesthood dating, according to Livy, to Numa’s ordering of the city’s religious functions.240 
Although their relation to the other priestly colleges is not clear, their function was regarded 
as essential to Rome’s collective security and wellbeing (Beard, 1990:44-45). Crawford’s 
argument is based on the appearance of an ancile (the divine shield) on a quinarius issued by 
Caesar in 48/47.  The positioning of the shield mirrors that of a pontifical symbol on a 
corresponding denarius of the same issue, leading Crawford to argue that Caesar was making 
a statement of his priestly credentials as pontifex and salius. This in turn leads Rüpke to 
construct a chronology whereby Caesar would have been adopted into the salii before the 
death of his father, since the salius had to be patrimus matrimus, i.e. with both parents living 
(Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Antiquitates 2.71.4). While this is, on the surface at least, a 
plausible hypothesis, I am not convinced by the weight of this numismatic evidence. Why 
Caesar should choose to focus on such a minor priesthood at that late stage of his career is not 
convincingly demonstrated by Crawford. Would it not be just as plausible that the ancile acts 
as a reminder that the shields of Mars were housed in his regia (Alföldi, 1959: 3)? So, while 
evoking the success of the Gallic campaign in the middle of the civil war with Pompey, 
Caesar was restating his position as head of the pontifical college.   
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Although solidly patrician, Caesar’s immediate family had not been able to boast of a 
consulship for several generations, and recent proscriptions had robbed him of many of those 
supporters who might have pushed his candidature. Yet it would be thanks to the patronage of 
men outside his family that he would first rise to prominence. At the unusually youthful age 
of sixteen (Velleius 2.43 puts him at thirteen or fourteen), his future father-in-law Cinna 
nominated him for the highly prestigious but potentially constrictive flaminate of Jupiter 
which had fallen vacant in 87 with the suicide of Merula (Suetonius, Divus Iulius 1.1; Taylor, 
1941: 113). As Kamm points out, the flamen Dialis could sometimes be ranked alongside the 
rex sacrorum and the pontifex maximus in the hierarchy of honor (Kamm, 1995: 92). 
Although he would have revelled in the precocious distinction which such an office would 
have conferred upon him, Caesar may well have struggled with the foreclosing of other 
avenues in public life which came with that particular priesthood (Matyszak, 2006: 40). 
Gellius lists these restrictions in exhaustive detail, 241 but the prohibition on horse riding, 
absences from the city of longer than three days and the diminished likelihood of consular 
career (to name but a few) would have been enough to make an ambitious young Roman 
think twice. Inevitably the Roman genius for flexible interpretation of arcane ritual allowed 
some individuals to combine the priesthood with a career at the highest levels. Meier notes 
that Caesar was nominated to succeed Merula who had, in fact, risen to the rank of consul – 
albeit in fraught and extraordinary circumstances (Meier, 1995b: 85). The religious and 
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political implications of Merula’s consulship and suicide have been discussed in the previous 
chapter. 
 
Before he could accede to the priesthood, Caesar and his equally young bride Cornelia would 
have to go through the stipulated marriage ceremony of confarreatio. As we have already 
noted, this ancient ceremony would have been presided over by the pontifex maximus himself 
and, in the normal course of events, the flamen Dialis. Marriage by confarreatio was a 
significant step for two reasons: firstly, the presence of such high-profile priests would 
suggest that the event had not only a sacral but also a very public character. This form of 
marriage was required for those whose offspring were destined for the higher orders of 
priestly and civic life. 242 Given that the possession of a wife was intrinsic to the office (the 
flamen’s wife became the flaminica and the loss of his wife meant the forfeiting of the 
priesthood) the marriage was of considerable importance to all parties.243 Having satisfied 
this ritual requirement, the way should have been clear for the young Caesar to accede to his 
sacred office. Yet it is on this precise count that Taylor (1941) argues for the ineligibility of 
Caesar. He did not qualify for the ceremony since his own parents could not have entered 
upon a confarreate marriage, his mother Aurelia’s family being plebeian.  This, according to 
Taylor, is one of the reasons why the flaminate was not officially conferred on Cinna’s 
nominee. 244 Although most ancient and modern authorities agree on this lack of official 
conferral, there are differing opinions as to why the promotion did not take place. Suetonius, 
attributes it to the direct intervention of Sulla. He also refers to a further complicating factor 
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in the person of Cossutia who may (or may not) have been Caesar’s first wife.245  Her 
moneyed but non-aristocratic origins would have been incompatible with the status of 
flaminica and so, even if we agree with those authorities who hold that Cossutia was wife to 
the young Caesar and not simply betrothed (Deutsch, 1917: 94), this would have implications 
for his eligibility for the office. Tacitus and Dio mention Merula as the last flamen of the 
Republic, noting that Caesar was never formally inaugurated.246 Velleius Paterculus is a lone 
voice in observing that Caesar was actually stripped of his priesthood and not merely 
impeded from assuming it in the first place.247 It is the contention of Goldsworthy that there 
were a variety of constitutional factors which would have prevented Caesar from taking up 
the priesthood: his age, Aurelia’s plebeian origins and the possible hostility of the incumbent 
pontifex maximus, Quintus Mucius Scaevola, towards Cinna and his ‘party’ (Goldsworthy, 
2006: 51-52). From what we know of his character, it is likely that Scaevola would have 
resisted pressure from Cinna, a resistance which seems to have hardened after the attempt on 
his life by Fimbria. Cinna himself was to die in the year of Caesar and Cornelia’s marriage, 
whatever form it took.  
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An attempt has been made to square the conflicting language (destinatus or creatus) by 
arguing that Caesar’s accession to the flaminate had been interrupted during the formal 
process. His nomination had (in theory) come from the pontifical college and the pontifex 
maximus, Scaevola, had gone as far as the captio but, crucially, stopped short of the formal 
inauguration in the comitia calata (Wardle, 2009:101). This was a way of honouring the will 
of the college (albeit as directed by Cinna) but keeping his man waiting indefinitely. In such a 
scenario, Scaevola’s qualified ‘yes’ was tantamount to a procedural ‘no’. Others, such as 
Rüpke, contend that not only was Caesar ‘captured’ by the pontifex maximus but that he was 
also inaugurated as well (Rüpke, 2008:734). Basing his argument on the contributions of 
Leone (1976) and Liou-Gille (1999) but going further than either of them, Rüpke presents a 
scenario in which Caesar was stripped of his priesthood as part of Sulla’s programme of 
religious reforms in or around 81. By this stage Sulla would have the help of a sympathetic (if 
not pliant) pontifex maximus who could be relied upon to exploit any technical vitium in 
Caesar’s priesthood to achieve Sulla’s aims. Rüpke further suggests that a provocatio, 
successfully used by other flamines in conflict with chief pontiffs (Gladigow, 1970:374), 
failed owing to Sullan pressure on the assembly. Although the surviving evidence is scant 
and contradictory, I find Rüpke’s reconstruction, while intriguing, leaves us with too great a 
time frame for such a substantial priesthood to disappear without trace. Surely a three or four 
year period during which Caesar was at least technically the flamen of Jupiter would have left 
a more substantial imprint in his subsequent self-presentation?  
 
Although it seems more likely that he did not emerge from this protracted process as flamen, 
Caesar would have gained considerable experience of the deeply enmeshed worlds of religio 
and res publica. He would have seen for himself – and at close quarters – the influence of the 




Something of a veil of silence falls over the next few years. There is some confusion attached 
to Plutarch’s mention of Caesar standing for an unspecified priesthood and being obstructed 
by Sulla.248 Taylor is correct in challenging the view that this is simply another reference to 
the flaminate since the priest of Jupiter was not appointed by popular election (Taylor, 1941: 
116). It seems more prudent to read this page of Plutarch as an interpolation designed to ‘talk 
up’ Caesar’s determination to advance in spite of Sulla’s enmity. We are on surer ground 
with Velleius’ reference to a priesthood in 74 or 73. Zecchini follows Suetonius in attributing 
Caesar’s rehabilitation and priesthood to the good offices of his relatives, the Aurelii Cottae 
(Zecchini, 2001: 36). This vacancy in the college was probably created by the death of his 
uncle, Gaius Aurelius Cotta (Honnoré, 2009:30). Of course Caesar needed more than family 
favours: to have acquired priestly office required the support of the Sullan majority within the 
expanded collegium pontificum. Quintus Metellus Pius was Sulla’s nominee as pontifex 
maximus; other esteemed deputies were Publius Servilius Isauricus, Quintus Lutatius Catulus 
and Marcus Lucullus. All these men had served as consul (almost consecutively in fact) and 
the fact that a man in his early twenties was joining such an élite group is an indication both 
of Caesar’s precocity and of his success in ingratiating himself with the dictator’s inner 
circle. He had already undertaken military service under Isauricus and cut his forensic teeth 
before Lucullus. So although Caesar was hardly an unknown quantity, he had successfully 
managed to display his talents in an unthreatening way. Even his prosecution of Gnaeus 
Dolabella and Gaius Antonius, Sulla’s trusted aides, would have been understood as standard 
practice for an ambitious young aristocrat (Gruen, 1966: 387); any potential damage had been 
minimised by Sulla’s restoration of senatorial juries. 
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From Subura to Regia 
 
If one were scrutinising the earlier stages of Caesar’s public career for signs of his later 
dispositions, then his decision to run for pontifex maximus in 63 B.C. is a glaring instance of 
temeritas Caesaris.249 Although the office stood somewhat apart from the cursus honorum 
and did not have a minimum age threshold,250 the fact that Caesar announced his candidacy 
before holding even a praetorship was a mark of his readiness to take risks. Caesar might in 
fact be accused of playing a long game of political opportunism with regard to this ancient 
office. As has already been discussed, the lex Domitia (104 B.C.) giving the special assembly 
election rights over all the priestly colleges, was suppressed by Sulla. The death of Sulla’s 
chosen man, Metellus Pius, gave the Caesarian tribune Titus Labienus the opportunity to 
revive popular control over these elections without the undue influence of a Sulla (Cassius 
Dio, 37.37).251 When Cicero spoke against the rogatio Servilia agraria (in the early days of 
63), he chose to mention Domitius Ahenobarbus’ law and, while the chronology suggests that 
Labienus’ plebiscite had yet to be given approval by the concilium plebis (de Lege Agraria, 
2.18; Vallocchia, 2008: 233), it is possible that the restoration was already being discussed 
and that this Ciceronian mention is a signal of his support for Labienus. 
 
Perhaps fired by the success of his lieutenant in enfranchising the people in the election of 
pontiffs (or, as his detractors would suggest, instigating and manipulating it), Caesar 
promptly forwarded his own name for election as head of the collegium pontificum.252 As we 
have already discussed, it is commonly but wrongly assumed that the election of the chief 
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pontiff was also covered by the lex Domitia and that Sulla’s religious reforms had 
expropriated the people of this office (Étienne, 1997:46).  In a more recent work, Canali 
perpetuates this assumption but does make the valid point that Caesar would have had only 
the most slender of chances of obtaining the office under the Sullan dispensation (Canali, 
2006: 23). Apart from the fact he was scarcely half way up the cursus honorum, he stood out 
from the field for the wrong reason. Compared with the gravitas and experience of the other 
two contenders, Servilius Isauricus and Quintus Lutatius Catulus, both of whom had served 
as consul some fifteen years previously, Caesar must have appeared hopelessly optimistic in 
rating his chances of success.253 
 
While most sources are in agreement about the asperity of the election, there are differing 
accounts of the outcome and the extent to which bribery played a part in it. Plutarch suggests 
that Catulus, having just the edge over Isauricus in terms of seniority (and therefore most to 
lose in terms of face) took the initiative in offering Caesar a financial incentive to withdraw 
his candidature. If true, this would have been a shrewd tactic, given the considerable debts the 
junior candidate had already amassed. Caesar however was not for deferring, especially if he 
judged the tide of popular support to be turning in his direction. Emboldened by this, he 
seems to have plunged himself still further into debt to meet the expenses of the campaign. 
Suetonius is unambiguous in attributing his subsequent victory to prodigious expenditure: 
 
Deposita provinciae spe pontificatum maximum petit non sine profusissima largitione; in qua 
reputans magnitudinem aeris alieni, cum mane ad comitia descenderet, praedixisse matri 
osculanti fertur domum se nisi pontificem non reuersurum. Atque ita potentissimos duos 
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competitores multumque et aetate et dignitate antecedentes superauit, ut plura ipse in eorum 
tribubus suffragia quam uterque in omnibus tulerit. 254 
 
Although Cassius Dio makes no reference to financial inducement, he takes an even more 
antipathetic stance towards Caesar, attributing his success to a readiness to abase himself 
through flattery. 255  It is impossible to gauge the extent to which Caesar may have resorted to 
bribery. Accusations of corruption and the actual practice of it were perennial features of 
Roman political life and so provoked less opprobrium than they would today. Dumézil 
suggests that this particular office of Chief Priest had long been tainted by ‘cabal and 
corruption’ (Dumézil, 1996: 543). The logistical feasibility of widespread corruption is a 
further challenge to the traditional accounts of electoral impropriety. Given that the seventeen 
‘elector tribes’ were chosen just before the vote itself, there seems to have been little 
opportunity for collusion unless we are to believe that Caesar suborned all thirty-five tribes. 
Although his parting quip to his mother is almost universally read as a reference to his 
parlous financial status, it could equally be interpreted in terms of the social capital he had 
spent on the campaign trail. Much had been made of his Julian ancestry, especially the 
unverifiable claim that his mythical forebear Iulus had been pontifex maximus of Alba Longa 
(Taylor, 1961: 93). Despite Cassius Dio’s suggestion that Caesar was frequently prepared to 
compromise his dignitas, one imagines that conspicuous failure would have wounded Caesar 
as much as penury. Amidst all the voices, both ancient and modern, who voice their opinion 
on the reason for Caesar’s victory, it is good to pick out the dissenting voice which may in 
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fact come closest to common sense and reality. Gruen attributes Caesar’s success to the 
support of Pompey and his agents, who would have pulled out all the stops to undermine the 
candidacy of their old adversary, Catulus. Far from being the enfant prodige or the corrupt 
demagogue, Caesar simply benefited from being in the right place at the right time (Gruen, 
1995: 81). 
 
The breadth of Caesar’s margin of victory is another matter of ambiguity. Plutarch argues for 
a narrow win (Caesar 7) while Suetonius suggests that Caesar’s support dwarfed that of the 
other two candidates (Divus Iulius, 13). No matter how the votes fell, the fact remains that 
Caesar emerged the victor and assumed a position of enduring civic prestige. Although it 
took only a few minutes to walk from his home neighbourhood of the Subura to his new 
residence in the Domus Publica, the symbolic journey Caesar had made to the heart of 
Roman life was not to be underestimated. This new address was a prime indicator of his 
elevated dignitas (Meier, 1995a:24). He now lived and exercised his official duties in a 
physical setting which, more than any other in the city, was redolent of Rome’s regal past 
(Richardson, 1994). Unlike the other key offices of the state, the pontifex maximus was not 
encumbered by equal colleagues who were entitled to ‘a turn’ of presidency. Furthermore, 
given the ad vitam nature of the pontificate – barring extreme circumstances - Caesar had 
found himself an unassailable platform from which to campaign for the other magistracies. 
Unsympathetic commentators might find this precocious and heady experience of potestas 
sacra a key factor in explaining his desire for sole control of the state, as Cicero 256 did and 
others continue to do today. 257  
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Once he was installed as pontifex maximus, Caesar had the opportunity to influence the 
composition of the college. He nominated a member of the Claudian family to the prestigious 
but career-crippling post of rex sacrorum.258 Taylor finds it significant that Caesar did not 
move to fill the 15-year vacancy in the flaminate of Jupiter (Taylor, 1942b: 398). Was this a 
pointed omission, registering protest at his own abruptly terminated association with the 
office? He also demonstrated uncharacteristic animus towards his defeated rival Catulus. 
Perhaps smarting from the allegations of bribery, as praetor in 62 B.C. Caesar accused 
Catulus of embezzling funds for the rebuilding of the temple of Capitoline Jupiter. Despite a 
concerted effort, his attempt to have Catulus’ name struck from the dedicatory inscription 
failed.259 
 
Caesar as pontifex maximus 
 
As has already been noted, Caesar himself has little to say about the discharge of his priestly 
duties. This relative silence has led many to suggest that he wore this new role lightly. In the 
estimation of some commentators, attaining the office of chief pontiff - like much of Caesar’s 
wardrobe - was merely a fashionable accessory: the real substance of his plans lay elsewhere. 
Canfora (2005) asserts that Caesar’s Epicurean sympathies would have made him sceptical of 
the state religion. Quoting Polybius, who considered ‘a superstitious fear of superior beings’ 
260
 as the cement which bound the res publica together, Canfora opines that Caesar must have 
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derived no small measure of amusement from operating the machinery of state religion 
(Canfora, 2005: 26). Others, such as Weinstock (1971), argue that Caesar took a keen and 
genuine interest in all things religious, so meriting greater consideration as an innovator in 
the field. Warde Fowler is even more emphatic. He sees repeated glimpses of a deep 
fascination with religious caerimonia, the more arcane the better: the prosecution of Rabirius 
gave Caesar the opportunity to revive the symbol of the infelix arbor in the Campus Martius 
(Warde Fowler, 1916: 68). Some might attribute the increase in Caesar’s religious interests to 
cynical motives. It was, after all, 63 B.C. and there was an election for pontifex maximus in 
the offing.261 Yet earlier still, in 69, his celebrated funeral oration for his aunt Julia was 
replete with references to his ancestors’ cultivation of the gods through due attention to the 
sacred rites (Suetonius, Divus Iulius 6.1; Plutarch, Caesar 5.2; Schmidt, 2005:48).  
 
As we have seen, the dearth of contemporary sources makes modern attempts to reconstruct 
Caesar’s religious outlook problematic and often over-simplistic. The few existing references 
to the gods or cultic practices tend to bear contradictory interpretations and those who portray 
him as a cynical agnostic often over-simplify the complex phenomenon of Roman religion.262 
Varro dedicated Antiquitates rerum divinarum, his treatise on Roman religion, to Caesar as 
pontifex maximus. This may, of course, be nothing more than typical academic etiquette; it 
might, however, be a reflection of Caesar’s interest in the roots of religious beliefs and 
practices which he revived in various shapes and forms. Indeed, Varro encouraged Caesar to 
do precisely that (Tatum, 2008:74). Not that his interest was confined merely to the religion 
of the patria: Caesar seemed genuinely fascinated by the Druidic religion he encountered 
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during the conquest of Gaul.263 The presence of Diviciacus, archdruid of the Aedui, among 
his retinue of counsellors suggests that Julius was open to the fruits of a convergence between 
the pantheon of Rome and that of Gaul. Zecchini (2001:44) takes it yet further by speculating 
that Caesar sought to impose himself on the vanquished Gauls by virtue of his cultic status as 
pontifex maximus and archdruid. Although the Gallic commentaries come closest to offering 
some – but not many – religious details, there may be a sense in which in the whole process 
of commentary writing had a religious colour. There was something genuinely innovative in 
publishing these collated reports on a yearly basis in a widely accessible format. It is 
Wiseman’s contention that Caesar, who had already ensured that the written record of the 
senate’s deliberations was publicly available, was continuing in this recently established 
tradition in order to engage with the people (1998:3). Moreover, it could be argued that 
Caesar was simply introducing a secular (and admittedly self-serving) equivalent of the 
annales maximi which his pontifical predecessors had also drawn up on an annual basis until 
the time of P. Mucius Scaevola. While debate continues as to the ultimate fate of these 
pontifical records - and some suggest that they ‘disappeared’ around the mid-first century 
B.C. (Drews, 1998:295) – we have no reason to think that the pontifices ceased to maintain 
some kind of public record. 
 
In most respects Caesar emerges as a man typical of his age. Like most Republican generals 
he found it wisest to appease the gods and regularly besought the favour of his particular 
patrons, Venus and Mars. The regia, his priestly centre of operations, was home to the spears 
of Mars and the Province of Asia voted him special honours as the son of Ares. His 
grandmother was descended from the Marcii Reges who claimed Mars as their mythical 
ancestor (Wiseman, 1974:153; Étienne, 1997:71). After his victory over the Pompeian forces, 
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he honoured his promise to build a temple to Venus Victrix (Appian, BC 2.68). However, 
with one eye on emphasising his divine origins, the dedication was altered to the more 
suggestive Venus Genetrix. Besides, Venus Victrix had already been the dedication of the 
temple in the Theatrum Pompeianum (Ulrich, 1993:53). Orlin argues that Caesar had wooed 
Venus over to his side before the decisive engagement at Pharsalus, ‘almost in the manner of 
an evocatio’ (Orlin, 1997:197); the nomenclature of the temple would have been a way of 
emphasising all that distinguished him from Pompey. Moreover, it was commonly 
understood that his rival’s temple dedication was a pretext for building the ‘theatre-like’ 
complex which formed its impressive forecourt. The construction of a comparatively tiny 
temple was clearly a way of circumventing the various prohibitions on theatre building in the 
city. It was much more in keeping with his pietas and magnanimitas for Caesar to endow a 
temple to his divine ancestress for no other reason than the honour of the goddess. 
 
When it came to augury and the auspices, it must be admitted that Caesar did exhibit a 
selective attitude as to which signs he would lend credence. He dismissed the singularly 
inauspicious lack of a heart in one sacrificial beast as nothing out of the ordinary.264 In the 
same anecdote, Suetonius relates how quick thinking enabled him to ‘spin’ another ill omen, 
falling over while disembarking his ship on the shores of Africa, into an assertive seizing of 
the land that would soon be subdued. The tragic-comic spectacle of Caesar and Bibulus’ 
consulship in 59 B.C. yielded another instance of Caesar’s pontifical acumen. When Bibulus 
- either through obstructionism or an incipient mental collapse -265 retired to his house and 
invoked auguries to invalidate his colleague’s acts, Caesar blithely invoked his higher priestly 
rank to nullify his fellow consul’s interventions. Bibulus’ daily interventions, incorrectly 
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referred to as obnuntiationes, were not delivered in person and so failed to satisfy augural 
procedure (Linderski, 1965: 425). No matter how petty their respective behaviour might 
seem, Cicero questioned the constitutionality of Caesar’s actions on the basis of his disregard 
for Bibulus’ watching the heavens.266 To modern eyes, Caesar’s actions might simply lend 
weight to the characterisation of a ruthless politician usurping religious status for the 
furthering of his own agenda and a wider failure in the Roman religious system. Beard, 
however, cautions against this interpretation: it is hardly surprising that established religious 
principles were, with difficulty, being stretched to resolve unprecedented challenges (Beard, 
1994: 740). Nor would it be fair to apportion blame exclusively to Caesar. Taylor (1961: 95) 
regards a lack of cohesion and amity within the college of augurs during the 50s (especially 
between Lucullus and Pompey) as the factor which enabled Caesar and his tribunes to by-
pass their scrutiny of his laws. The augurs were just as divided by personal antipathies and 
conflicting loyalties as the senate as a whole. Who could blame Caesar for steering his 
policies clear of such obstacles? 
 
Pontifex maximus and demagogue 
 
Perhaps the blurred margin between Caesar’s priestly and political roles is best exemplified 
in his dealings with Publius Clodius Pulcher. Clodius, rakish scion of the noble Claudii, 
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presents the historian with a knot of contradictions and, for the student of Caesar in 
particular, a timeline of fluctuating prominence.267 He first comes into focus in the wake of 
what was perhaps the most tumultuous event of the sixties, the Catilinarian conspiracy of 63 
B.C. When, at the height of the crisis, Cicero appeared in the Senate conspicuously sporting a 
breastplate, Clodius was numbered among the retinue of young nobles who acted as his 
bodyguard.268 Yet in his later treatment of the episode, Cicero was keen to suggest long-
standing collusion between the young Clodius and the fallen enemy of the State. Caesar only 
enters the drama somewhat after the fact, standing out as a dissenting voice against the 
passing of the senatus consultum ultimum. Although his intervention might be interpreted as a 
pitch to his popularis support base, there is a view that Caesar’s appeals to law and precedent 
were a genuine manifestation of his ethical and juridical sensibilities as pontifex maximus 
(Zecchini, 2001: 38). Similarly, in 58 B.C., Clodius was to echo Caesar’s high-minded 
concerns, basing his legislative assault on Cicero for his use of the ultimate decree to bring 
the crisis to a speedy end (Tatum, 1999: 153).  
 
Clodius’ next brush with notoriety involved Caesar’s public and private lives much more 
directly. The Bona Dea scandal of 62 B.C. not only involved the violation of sacred rites 
being held in the domus publica but also cast a shadow of impropriety over Caesar’s wife, 
Pompeia. As the wife of the urban praetor, that year it had fallen to Pompeia to make the 
arrangements for this gathering which, by its very nature, precluded any male presence. 
Whatever possessed Clodius to transgress the ceremony, whether the prank of a delayed 
adolescent or an assignation with the hostess, the upshot was a very public scandal. Moreau 
argues against reading too much into these events as an assault on ‘priestly nobilitas’ and ‘the 
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religion of the patres’ (Moreau, 1982:25). Regardless of motive or consequence, the uproar 
surrounding the Bona Dea violation proved to be an inauspicious start to Caesar’s tenure as 
Chief Priest. The fact that a particularly important sacrifice had been interrupted meant that 
the apparatus of Rome’s political and religious authority was brought to bear on the matter. In 
a famous letter, Cicero recounts the process and the personalities involved in coming to a 
decision about what to do about Clodius.269 Alongside the prosecution which, if successful, 
might have deprived Clodius of his sight,270 the senate passed the matter on to the pontifical 
college for their view on the religious implications. The Vestals were then charged with 
making good the polluted ritual since all interrupted sacrifices required repetition and the 
circumstances of this disruption were exceptionally grave. We do not know if Caesar recused 
himself from these deliberations or whether he guided the college and their Vestal consorores 
in reaching their decision. It has been suggested that the unanimous declaration that the act 
was nefas and that the accused should indeed answer before a special quaestio implies that 
the religious ‘court’ fully expected a conviction in the civil forum (Wildfang, 2006:98). 
Nevertheless, Caesar’s attitude remains problematic. His decision to divorce Pompeia 
followed on from the consuls’ decision to promote a senatus consultum on the issue. There 
has long been a degree of speculation over Caesar’s motives. Plutarch (Caesar, 10) suggests 
that Caesar’s decision to put aside Pompeia was as much a political judgement in Clodius’ 
favour as a statement of his own domestic probity. We are left with the impression that the 
full facts of the case were not allowed to emerge. This may have been a result of pressure 
within the senate or a sense of foreboding about the ‘gangs’ which were beginning to appear. 
Tatum is somewhat understating things when he suggests that Cicero did not make overt 
political comment at the time (Tatum, 1999: 108). He is most definitely focused on Clodius’ 
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actions and contacts, even if he does reserve his most explicit invective for later.271 Men like 
Cicero, who had little love for Caesar and less still for Clodius, were apt to recall how such a 
singularly nefarious act was allowed to unfold at the very heart of Roman religious 
institutions and on Caesar’s watch. After this storm, Clodius withdraws from the Caesarean 
narrative until 59 while Caesar himself undertook his first prolonged absence as pontifex 
maximus, as governor in Hispania for 61. 
 
Apart from the unedifying spectacle of Caesar and Bibulus’ war of mutual obstruction,272 this 
was also the year in which Caesar, by means of a lex curiata, sanctioned Clodius’ plebeian 
adoption. Clodius took this bold step to secure the plebeian tribunate, but the move may also 
have served the Triumvirate’s intention to isolate Cicero (Tatum, 1999: 108). Wiseman links 
Caesar’s ‘fast-tracking’ of the transfer with Cicero’s defence of C. Antonius on extortion 
charges and his criticism of the ‘political situation’ (Wiseman, 1994: 372). We have already 
described this particular process of adoption in the Introduction. In his capacity as consul, 
Caesar convened the thirty lictoral representatives of the curiae and proposed the adrogatio 
which would transfer Clodius from his formerly sui iuris status to the potestas of Publius 
Fonteius (who was twenty years his junior). The adoption still required the formal approval 
of the pontifex maximus, conveniently the same Caesar, with Pompey fulfilling the role of 
augur. No sooner had Clodius undergone the transition to plebeian than he attempted to assert 
his independence by distancing himself from Caesar and eventually threatening to annul laws 
passed by him – his own adoption excepted.273 Naturally he relied on the support of Bibulus’ 
omen-watching to substantiate his claims.  
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Clodius’ prosecution – or persecution - of Cicero led to that contentious dedication of the 
shrine to Libertas on the site of Cicero’s house. Writing in the de Haruspicum Responso, 
Cicero gives a list of those members of the pontifical college who ruled on the matter of his 
house in 57.274 Conspicuous by his absence was the head of the college, Caesar himself – 
although he was not to be exempt from the ‘indiscriminate blame’ Cicero cast on those who 
had abandoned him or connived against him (Sabben-Clare, 2002: 26). Although he was in 
Gaul, Caesar must have been kept informed of the increasingly erratic behaviour of Clodius 
and the running skirmishes in which he seemed habitually involved. 
 
Given that both Caesar and Clodius had exhibited broadly pro-Catilinarian sympathies and 
both had performed adroit distancing exercises after the scope of the conspiracy became 
apparent, there is debate as to the precise nature of their relationship. Did Caesar make 
allowances for the younger man’s excesses because they were, at heart, cut from the same 
cloth? Was he trying to cover up his own political miscalculation over Catiline with a series 
of (apparently) magnanimous gestures? The line taken by Lintott 275 is that Caesar (as well as 
Crassus, who bankrolled them both) realised that Clodius could not be controlled and so had 
to be mollified. Whatever the motive behind his actions, Caesar kept a safe distance from 
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Clodius (at least in public). Julius was soon immersed in his Gallic campaign and, while 52 
B.C. was infamous in Rome for Clodius’ bloody end, Caesar’s thoughts were firmly set on 
the taking of Alesia. 
 
The Civil War and its Aftermath 
 
The convulsive events of 49-47 B.C. and the ensuing uneasy peace offer some of the most 
interesting insights into Caesar’s understanding of the role of pontifex maximus. Ancient 
sources offer differing interpretations of the events leading up to the decisive crossing of the 
Rubicon (Tucker, 1998:247), but we may infer that Caesar fully understood the religious as 
well as the legal import of this particular boundary transgression. His decision to enter Italy 
may or may not have been preceded by the taking of auspices – the sources are unclear. 
Suetonius does however mention a dedication or consecration of horses (which were to 
feature among the prodigia portending Caesar’s death). 276 Even if the gods chose to turn a 
blind eye, he would have known full well how his unprecedented action would play with 
those unsympathetic elements in the senate. It is really against this factio paucorum, not the 
senate as a whole, that Caesar was advancing in defence of his dignitas (Morstein-Marx, 
2009:139). Although only numbering some twenty-two senators, the faction had successfully 
manoeuvred Caesar into a position of extreme recklessness or vulnerability (Wiseman, 
2009:192). According to the best available reconstruction of the chronology, scarcely seven 
days elapsed between the crossing of the Rubicon and Pompey’s withdrawal from the city, 
with the consuls and like-minded senators in tow (Balland, 2002; Malye, 2007: 424). 
Although we cannot know the actual scale of this tactical withdrawal, we do get a sense of 
the unease it brought Cicero. Whilst bemoaning a lack of decisiveness on Pompey’s part, he 
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seems even more unsettled at the symbolic desertion of ‘altars and hearths’ (ad Atticum, 
7:11.3). Perhaps it is on this precise count that Caesar’s advance on the city might be re-
evaluated: while Cicero’s letter waspishly suggests that Caesar’s guiding divinity is ‘sole 
power’, we should not overlook some of the religious implications of his actions during the 
ensuing campaigns. 
 
We have already noted that the pontifex maximus was absent from the city for the preceding 
nine years; while he was able to influence some of the nominations to the collegium 
pontificum, his political opponents were also at liberty to press for their own candidates. The 
college appears to have been at or near its full complement at the time of Caesar’s departure. 
Cicero gives us the names of thirteen pontifices who were involved in the deliberations over 
his house in 57.277 The absent pontifex maximus brings the number to fourteen, leaving us 
with one absence, omission or vacancy. We do know of one other pontifex around this time: 
L. Pinarius Natta was Clodius’ brother-in-law and directly involved in the original 
consecration. He may have absented himself from the hearing or, as is also possible, he may 
have died in 57 (although most place his death in 56). Brutus, the future assassin, was added 
to the college during this period. While Szemler (1971:135) is more conservative in his 
dating, c. 51, Rüpke (2008:126) places Brutus in the college as early as 55 B.C. C. Scribonius 
Curio, a loyal Caesarian, must also have been added sometime between his father’s death in 
53 and meeting his own at the battle of Bagradas in 49. By the time of Caesar’s entry into 
Italy, we can name twelve members of the college.  
 
The Pompeian-senatorial withdrawal from the city must have occasioned a parallel split in 
the pontifical college itself. Though he shared Cicero’s political views, P. Servilius Vatia 
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Isauricus did not follow him in the exodus. Aemilius Scaurus, a former lieutenant of Pompey, 
was already in exile by this point.278 We do know that at least four pontifices vacated the city 
– either with Pompey or shortly afterwards: Domitius Ahenobarbus, Metellus Scipio, 
Lentulus Spinther and the young Brutus. Domitius and Lentulus had initially gone north to 
take the fight to Caesar, but they soon found that they could not match the level of support for 
Caesar and his commitment to Italian enfranchisement (Billows, 2009: 206). Lentulus 
eventually took refuge with Domitius at Corfinium and, after a week’s siege, both men 
surrendered to Caesar. This was Caesar’s first meeting with the men in nearly ten years and it 
gave him an opportunity to exercise his famed clemency towards them, particularly Domitius, 
who was allowed to go to Pompey without surrendering the six million sesterces he had 
brought to pay his men. This was the same Domitius who, as praetor in 58, had sought to 
overturn Caesar’s consular acta as a consequence of his disregard for the auspices (Suetonius, 
Nero 2.2; Burns, 1966:76).279    
 
We do not know if, in addition to the treasury, the departing Pompeian and senatorial forces 
gave consideration to removing the key symbols of the city’s religious life such as the 
palladium or the Sibylline books. This would certainly have addressed some of Cicero’s 
concerns: what was being left to Caesar would have been, in religious terms, something less 
than Rome. But what was left in the city? Did the split in the pontifical college bring about a 
caesura in the religious functions of the state? On one level this seems unlikely; at least 
Isauricus would still have been in Rome and some other public duties could be delegated to 
the rex sacrorum and the pontifices minores. Yet while the essential functions could be 
maintained during the senate’s evacuation, there was a serious depletion of personnel to carry 
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out the necessary religious functions, from dedications to the priestly comitia. A religious and 
political crisis of this kind was without precedent, even during the struggles of Sulla and 
Marius. Even the decision to uproot the senate would have had religious consequences and it 
is possible that the senate sought the formal opinion of its priestly members before acting: 
after all, this was precipitate action in need of some moral authority. Van Haeperen notes that 
the office of a pontifical promagister, who presided in the absence of the chief pontiff during 
the Empire, may have had its informal origins during this period (2002:197-198). We do not 
know if Isauricus ruled on behalf of the college in the matter of Cicero’s house or if he 
offered an authoritative opinion on the senate’s actions in January 49, but it may have fallen 
to this elder statesman (and Caesar’s rival for the chief priesthood in 63) to do so. 
 
Perhaps it was precisely because he had lost the respectability of senate-sanctioned authority 
that Caesar chose to emphasise his sacral functions: it was the faithful servant of Rome – and 
its high pontiff – who was returning to the city, not some aggressor. As we have seen, 
Crawford (1974) notes that the coin Caesar minted by way of a campaign statement played 
heavily on his priestly functions. In particular, the reverse of the coin features priestly 
implements, specifically the aspergillum with which the priest would ritually cleanse the 
troops before battle. We know that Caesar himself undertook the lustratio in 48 B.C. before 
the decisive battle of Pharsalus. No doubt the potency of this image of the imperator-pontifex 
sprinkling his troops was carefully calculated: Pompey might have had that retinue of Roman 
nobility at his back, but Caesar had the gods. This demonstration of pietas would also have a 
galvanizing effect on the faith his soldiers reposed in him (Zecchini, 2009:183). With what 
looks in hindsight like tremendous presumption, we now know that while Caesar was 
carrying out these priestly tasks his senatorial opponents were busy discussing who should 
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succeed him as pontifex maximus (Goldsworthy, 2002: 48). Caesar laconically remarks on 
this ‘conduct unbecoming for a Roman senator’ (Batstone & Damon, 2006: 24): 
 
Iam de sacerdotio Caesaris Domitius, Scipio Spintherque Lentulus cotidianis contentionibus ad 
gravissimas verborum contumelias palam descenderunt, cum Lentulus aetatis honorem 
ostentaret, Domitius urbanam gratiam dignitatemque iactaret, Scipio affinitate Pompei 
confideret. 280 
 
Given the remarkable nature of the victory at Pharsalus, against considerable odds, it would 
seem that Caesar’s confidence-boosting ritual paid off. He chose to repeat it, personally 
carrying out the lustratio before the successful engagement with the forces of Cato and Scipio 
at Thapsus in March of 46 B.C. (de Bello Africo, 75). The decision to preside at the ritual 
himself may have been influenced by the mutiny which followed Pharsalus when a 
significant contingent of his soldiers demanded their pay and overdue discharge. Although 
his famous ‘citizens speech’ had the desired effect in terms of discipline, there may have been 
a lingering doubt even in Caesar’s mind as to whether the damage had been assuaged and 
purged by the symbolic cleansing. 
 
The Primacy of Caesar 
 
After the remnants of the Pompeian and Catonian forces had been mopped up, it could be 
said that Caesar had attained his oft-quoted ambition: to be first man in Rome (Plutarch, 
Caesar, 11). Even before the war had ended he had begun that process of accumulating 
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offices which so antagonised and discomfited his contemporaries – even as they voted for 
them. In 48 he was awarded the consulship for a five-year period, a year-long (second) 
dictatorship and tribunician potestas. Setting aside the provisions of the lex Domitia which 
prohibited the concurrent possession of major priesthoods, he became augur in 47 B.C. and 
used his position in both colleges to impose order and unity. As Taylor observes: 
 
The symbols of the pontificate and the augurate on his coins, one of his chief media of 
propaganda, attest the importance of the official religion in his reorganisation of the state 
(Taylor, 1961: 97). 
 
Caesar would indeed bring the full weight of religious authority to bear on his drive to 
overhaul the Republic. As we have seen, he was not above conflating religious ritual and 
military discipline to make his point – however unsettling the product. In the midst of the 
revels accompanying his triumphs and the long-delayed funeral games for his daughter Julia 
281(again, it is not clear which), some of his veterans grumbled at his lavish generosity 
towards the urban populace and rioted. They complained that such wealth should have flowed 
to the veterans, even though Caesar had probably given his soldiers more than they had been 
promised (Goldsworthy, 2006: 471). To quell the mutiny before it got a grip, he had one of 
the ringleaders executed; a further two were publicly sacrificed in the Campus Martius before 
the flamen Martialis and the other pontiffs, their heads displayed at Caesar’s official 
residence as pontifex maximus. Although human sacrifice was not a Roman custom (Kamm, 
2006: 132) - at least not one that was commonly or lately practised - the initial shock seems 
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to have been quickly absorbed in the ongoing festivities.282 He had judged the mood and the 
moment well. Yet, despite the fact that this incident is scarcely discussed (if at all), 283 it 
seems a curious course of action. Why resurrect an ancient religious practice to dispatch 
troublemakers, when the standard procedure of the Legions was more than adequate? Does 
the answer lie in the connection between the funeral games and the religious ceremonies 
attached to them (remembering that human sacrifice had originally played a part and indeed 
continued to do in the more formalised ‘sacrifice’ of gladiators)? Was Caesar’s action a 
glimmer of that seldom mentioned but deeply-rooted fascination with religious ceremonial so 
doggedly argued by Warde Fowler? 284 Is Bennet Pascal correct in connecting the deaths of 
these soldiers with the sacrifice of the October Horse (1981: 262-263)? The Equus October 
ritual probably started off as an agricultural sacrifice and then, because of its proximity to the 
formal end of the war season, was gradually imbued with military significance (Scullard, 
1981:193). Certainly the date of the October sacrifice (the Ides) falls within the known time 
frame of Caesar’s celebrations. There are also some clear parallels in what we are told of the 
circumstances of the ‘sacrifice’: the location, the presence of the flamen Martialis and the 
pontiffs, the exhibitio capitis at the regia. It is hard to conceive how Caesar could have 
inflicted such an unusual punishment were he not also at the head of the religious 
establishment (Freeman, 2008: 332). All this seems to chime with the view, expressed by 
Scullard (1981: 194), that the October horse had become associated with the cleansing of the 
army and that Caesar, looking to warn as well as purify his men, hit upon this particularly 
gruesome hybrid. In any event, Southern argues that his actions successfully appealed to 
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popular religious sentiment but also served as a reminder that, clementia aside, Caesar was 
not a man to cross (Southern, 200: 136).  
 
We have already mentioned the dedication of the temple to Venus Genetrix during Caesar’s 
season of triumphs in 46 B.C. Rives (1994) notes that in elevating his domestic cult to public 
status he was not only exalting his own lineage but demonstrating his unique status in 
society: 
 
Caesar vowed a temple as a general during a battle, dedicated it as a Roman magistrate, and 
presumably entered an annual sacrifice into the civic calendar as pontifex maximus (Rives, 
1994: 294).  
 
This religious intervention takes on particular significance when we consider Caesar’s policy 
of exporting the cult to his veteran colonies overseas. This aspect of Caesar’s activity is 
frequently overlooked and yet, in his assiduous attention to detail and the careful replication 
of Roman priesthoods in these new foundations, he showed himself more than marginally 
engaged in religious questions. 285 
  
Caesar now embarked upon what, with hindsight, we know as the final stage of his life. As 
Momigliano notes, while Cicero’s writings attest to an increasing scepticism, ‘Caesar and his 
direct entourage were becoming more religious or at least more concerned with religious 
questions’ (Momigliano, 1984: 210). Once he was in effective control of the legislative 
machinery of the Republic, Caesar began a dizzying programme of legal activity and public 
reforms. Of these, we will briefly mention two: the lex Julia de sacerdotiis and the reform of 
the calendar. 
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The lex Julia de sacerdotiis (47 B.C.) is thought to be the measure by which Caesar increased 
the numbers of the pontiffs, augurs and quindecemviri by one: the only contemporary 
reference is a mention of the most recent priestly legislation in a letter from Cicero to 
Brutus.286 Yavetz (1983) displays impressive argumentative legerdemain in suggesting that 
Caesar’s intervention was not a demonstration of his clout so much as an expression of his 
failure as pontifex maximus. Since he could not wield sufficient influence over his pontifical 
colleagues  
 
the only reason for the increase in the priestly offices was to make room for the followers to 
whom Caesar felt he had an obligation (Yavetz, 1983: 110).  
 
Gordon offers a slightly more plausible motive for this enlargement: when Caesar became 
augur (and also Quindecemvir) in 47 B.C., his sense of fairness prompted him to open up 
these new spaces in the colleges by way of compensation (Gordon, 1990: 182). The timing of 
the measure would at least lend some credibility to Gordon’s construction. Although Caesar 
had amply demonstrated his popularis credentials throughout his career, it is significant that 
he did not use this lex Julia to broaden the composition of the colleges beyond senators 
(Várhelyi, 2010:62). Perhaps he felt that his additions to the senate itself rendered such a 
change unnecessary. Either way, this was another modest (but significant) way of going ‘one 
better’ than the dictator Sulla.  
 
By far the most celebrated innovation of Caesar’s last phase of activity was the reorganisation 
of the Roman calendar which came into effect on January 1st 45 B.C. We have noted the 
particular connection between the pontiffs and the reckoning of time. The politically-
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motivated abandonment of the practice of inserting intercalary months had brought about a 
substantial misalignment of months and seasons (Fantham, 2009:153; Suetonius, Divus 
Iulius, 40:1). In redressing this disorder – for which he was partly responsible - Caesar 
enlisted the help of the Alexandrian astronomer Sosigenes, whose acquaintance was an added 
benefit of his sojourn at the court of Cleopatra (Kamm, 2006: 135). This new ‘Julian 
calendar’ attested to Caesar’s intense pragmatism and his readiness to fix what was so 
obviously broken. In the process he set his imprint on both the seasons of nature and 
government. Yavetz argues that Caesar implemented this reform by virtue of his office of 
Dictator, not as pontifex maximus whose authority, he contends, extended purely to 
intercalation (Yavetz, 1983: 114). To support his assertion he relies on a fifth century account 
of the Calendar reordering by Macrobius (I.14.2) who refers to Caesar as ‘dictator’ not 
‘pontifex’. Whilst the new calendar was imposed by an edict (and Caesar happened to be in a 
position to issue such an edict), it requires a somewhat contrary mindset to maintain that he 
was undertaking this project in any capacity other than that of pontifex maximus. 287 
Commenting on a pungent celestial witticism attributed to Cicero (that the constellation of 
the Lyre was rising by Caesar’s decree)288 Feeney observes  
 
Cicero’s joke captures very well the intuition that Caesar’s revolutionary reform is part of a 
larger revolution of systematizing and personal control in many departments of Roman life, by 
which Caesar’s name and presence were made indispensably central (Feeney, 2007: 197).  
 
It should also be remembered that this reform effectively ended one of the key pontifical 
privileges: intercalation (Wardle, 2009:104). Under different leadership, such a move might 
                                                          
287
 Cf. Lewis & Reinhold, 1990: 553; Dillon & Garland, 2005: 134; Feeney, 2007: 197. Although 
antique, Warde Fowler’s effusiveness is no less accurate: ‘He probably little thought at this time that 
he would live to make his pontificate the most famous and fruitful in Roman history, by reforming the 
calendar, and laying a new and solid basis for chronological calculations.’ Warde Fowler, 189: 78. 
288
 Plutarch, Caesar, 59.3 
220 
 
have provoked outrage and resistance among the pontifical college; the fact that this was not 
some diktat imposed from above but a measure introduced by the head of the college may go 
some way to explaining the lack of opposition. 
 
The remaining phase of Caesar’s life seems to have witnessed a curious tension between his 
old role as pontiff and his newer and more controversial role as the recipient of divine 
favours. Kahn (1986) suggests that the pressures of reshaping or replacing the Republic were 
beginning to stretch his much vaunted ability to do several things at once. He would now 
meet with advisers to determine which of his public duties, especially pontifical and augural 
ceremonies, could be delegated to colleagues (Kahn, 1986: 427). This need not be interpreted 
as a repudiation of his religious responsibilities, more an acceptance of the reality of being 
simultaneously (and seemingly permanently) at the head of the State’s political and religious 
institutions.  
 
The Cult of Caesar 
 
Perhaps the most religiously controversial aspect of the dictatorship was the blurring of the 
margins between Caesar the man and Caesar the god. Beard correctly argues that this 
‘blurring’ had been a feature of Roman politics for at least a generation – as we have seen 
with his uncle Marius and Marius Gratidianus – and that Caesar merely represents the high 
point of this tendency (Beard, 1994: 751). Besides, it is more accurate to speak of 
‘assimilation’ to the gods rather than divinisation (Beard, 1994: 750); Rome had a rich 
mythology of mortals who had undergone such an apotheosis. More unusual was the 
dedication of a temple to Clementia Caesaris, again voted by the senate. Caesar set great 
store by his clemency – even when it provoked the indignation of those towards whom he 
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was mercifully disposed (Mackay, 2009: 301). Of all individuals, it is Cicero who has been 
proposed as the unlikely ‘architect’ of this temple. Weinstock has plausibly suggested that it 
was Cicero’s fulsome praise of this very quality which legitimised – indeed rendered 
inevitable – the senate’s action (Weinstock, 1971: 241). There may be some validity in 
Clark’s suggestion that Cicero (and the senate) would have seen the worth of such a measure 
(Clark, 2007: 248). Creating a public space and dedicating it to this most desirable quality in 
a dictator was a way of keeping it foremost in his mind: in other words, it was a perennial 
invitation to Caesar to be as forebearing as this dedication suggested. In what appears a 
reference to this temple, Appian (BC 2.106) describes statues of Caesar and Clementia 
reaching out to each other (although it is impossible to say if the commissioned cult statues 
were ever completed - Zanker, 2009: 294).289 
 
The status of Caesar’s public cult is difficult to disentangle from the question of his regal 
aspirations. A common feature of political controversy, the charge of adfectatio regni 
certainly attached itself to Caesar’s name both in the conspiracy to end his life and its 
dramatic aftermath (Gabba, 2003: 189). Some have argued that the Hellenistic fusion of 
divinity and monarchy had been imported to Rome via Alexandria: Caesar would have found 
the prospect no more of a strain on his credulity than any other aspect of his priestly 
activities. 290  Perhaps the designation of his own flamen – Mark Antony - would have 
occasioned both murmuring and alarm: this was a genuine novelty in Rome’s evolving 
religious milieu. It has been observed that such developments shaped subsequent religious 
discourse. Varro’s de gente populi Romani of 43 included a discussion of divinised mortals, 
clearly with Caesar in mind (Crawford, 1992:186). 
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It would be wrong to suggest that Caesar himself instigated the process of ‘divinisation’ more 
than any of the other honorific measures passed by the senate in what Carson describes as ‘a 
not very edifying rush’ (Carson, 1957: 46).291 He did not, in his official capacity as pontifex 
maximus, do anything to implement any of these honours – such as inaugurating his own 
flamen (Wardle, 2009:106); 292  indeed it has been argued that this torrent of senatorial 
obsequiousness was designed precisely to embarrass and alienate Caesar (Lintott, 2009:76). 
His thwarted attempt to have the name of Catulus struck from the entablature of Capitoline 
Jupiter was finally realised when the senate voted to excise ‘Catulus’ and put ‘Caesar’ in its 
place.293 Statues with flattering dedications proliferated throughout the sacred precincts of 
Rome. His house, in which Cicero had pleaded in defence of Deiotarus and litanised the 
regiae laudes to Caesar’s face (Ehrenberg, 1964: 153), was embellished with a pediment in 
the manner of a temple. 294  Along with the title of pater patriae, the senate took the 
unprecedented step of making all his priestly offices – including the chief priesthood - 
hereditary, so that any son of Caesar would also be pontifex maximus (Cassius Dio 44.5.3; 
Kamm, 2006: 142). In some ways this move is altogether more astonishing than the supposed 
deification of the living Caesar: the senate was choosing to make what was essentially a 
quasi-magistracy – albeit one of particular prestige – the personal possession of one man and 
his descendants. The line of Caesar would become a line of priests in perpetuity, a detail 
Octavian would later exploit.  
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The death of Caesar somehow manages to take up some of the motives of earlier outbreaks of 
violence, while remaining in itself a moment of decisive transition. The watchword of 
Libertas and the overthrow of a tyrant by a band of the Roman élite (whose loyalty he failed 
to secure: Woolf, 2006: 49) stands in continuity with the murder of Tiberius Gracchus. But 
this was another pontifex maximus whose blood spattered the image of Pompey, just as the 
statue of Vesta was supposed to have been polluted by the blood of Scaevola. Attempts have 
been made to read Caesar’s covering himself with his toga as a velatio capitis: a devotio for 
the good of the people (Perea, 1998: 9).295 This apotropaic gesture is seen, then, not as an 
effort to shield himself from his inevitable fate but rather to underscore his pietas against the 
charge of being an adfectator regni. 
 
Whether or not Caesar intended to become rex (or divus for that matter) need not detain us at 
this point. What is of importance is that, by the dawn of the Ides of March, Caesar had 
constructed his pontifical persona in such a way that the office of pontifex maximus changed 
forever. A key tactic in the ‘cold war’ of rhetoric which followed his murder 296 was the 
ability of Caesar’s followers to answer those shouts of ‘Liberty’ with the cry of ‘sacrilege’. 
Although they bear the unmistakable imprint of the Augustan regime, these words of Ovid 
capture something of the highly charged polemic that followed Caesar’s death: 
 
Praeteriturus eram gladios in principe fixos, 
    cum sic a castis Vesta locuta focis: 
'ne dubita meminisse: meus fuit ille sacerdos; 
     sacrilegae telis me petiere manus.                      
ipsa virum rapui simulacraque nuda reliqui: 
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     quae cecidit ferro, Caesaris umbra fuit.' 
ille quidem caelo positus Iovis atria vidit, 
     et tenet in magno templa dicata foro; 
at quicumque nefas ausi, prohibente deorum          
     numine, polluerant pontificale caput, 
morte iacent merita: testes estote, Philippi, 
     et quorum sparsis ossibus albet humus. 
hoc opus, haec pietas, haec prima elementa fuerunt 
     Caesaris, ulcisci iusta per arma patrem. 297         
 
This was a crime against the civil, natural and supernatural orders: assassination, parricide 
(Gaughan, 2010: 86) and sacrilege. Not only had these senators broken their solemn oath to 
protect Caesar’s life, they had taken up arms against someone whose person was sacrosanct. 
There was even the possibility that Caesar’s body might be subject to the indignities usually 
visited upon fallen tyrants.298 Antony and Piso managed to win support for a public funeral 
during a heated session in which Piso complained that the conspirators were preventing him 
from burying the pontifex maximus (not the perpetual dictator).299 By all accounts the funeral 
was unlike anything Rome had ever seen, surpassing even the exsequia of Sulla. The journey 
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of the bier from the domus publica to the rostra was a short one and the pressing crowds 
ensured that the whole ceremony, including the cremation, took place in the heart of the 
Forum. 
 
There is something fitting in this improvised change to the plan. It meant that the last act of 
Caesar’s life was played out in the square he had come to dominate. The journey began and, 
if the archaeological evidence is correct, ended at the residence of the pontifex maximus. In 
this way it closely reflected his public career (Sumi, 2011: 210).300 Of course Caesar had 
become something more than pontifex maximus, or perhaps he had made the office of 
‘greatest pontiff’ greater than it had been. Like no other pontiff before, he had exercised 
unparalleled influence over virtually every facet of life in the Republic. The porous 
membrane between the worlds of religion and politics was effectively absorbed in his person. 
That is why it is so difficult to separate his actions into clear cut categories or competences. 
In a way that surpassed Scaevola, whose murder shocked the world of Caesar’s youth, he had 
become the embodiment of the res publica with all its attendant contradictions. Even after a 
bloody half century, his murder felt different: the difference he made would still be asserting 
itself long after his funeral. One of the most notable changes would be in the nature of the 
office of high pontiff itself. Caesar had so completely inhabited the role that it would, after an 
interlude caused by the circumstances of his own death, become unthinkable for anyone to be 
pontifex maximus who was not also Caesar. 
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Lepidus and Augustus 
 
The foregoing chapters have argued that the office of pontifex maximus underwent a series of 
transformations stemming from the character of the holder and the political circumstances of 
his day. A key idea is that, by the end of the republic, the office had become so ideologically 
and politically associated with ‘Caesar’ that the titles would eventually become synonymous. 
It is here that the thesis must confront two issues: one conceptual, the other evidential. The 
conceptual difficulty is common to much scholarship on the late republic; namely, where 
precisely do we locate the ‘end’ of the republic? The death of Caesar is an obvious point of 
rupture, but the break is less clean from our perspective. Perhaps more so than most aspects 
of the Augustan programme, the defining characteristics of Rome’s religious culture were 
scrupulously preserved and restored by Augustus; he could point to the traditional forms of 
the republic as being safe in his hands. If we are to do justice to the office of the pontifex 
maximus in the late republic, we must take account of its absorption into the principate (itself 
a term which would not be recognised by its architect). This brings us to the challenge of the 
evidence: if we are to examine the high water mark of the chief priesthood, how do we 
explain Lepidus? If, as has been argued, the death of Caesar had left the office in a position of 
almost unrivalled prestige, what can be said of Lepidus’ ‘lame-duck’ pontificate? Does the 
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marginalisation of the ‘tarnished triumvir’ (Weigel, 1992) actually demonstrate that the office 
was really only as significant as the man who held it? Or did the meticulous process of 
restoring tradition under Augustus, with all its accompanying rhetoric, mean that even the 
usurper had to be given even token respect? 
 
In addressing these questions, this chapter necessarily bears the names of both Lepidus and 
Augustus; we cannot discuss the tenure of either one as chief priest without recognising the 
presence – or shadow – of the other. This in itself makes Lepidus a figure of unique 
significance in our survey of the pontifices maximi.  
 
‘Finding’ Lepidus 
A recurring difficulty in any discussion of Lepidus is the extent to which we rely on Augustus 
and Augustan sources. The purge of the triumviral records at Augustus’ behest in 36 (Appian, 
BC 5.132.) means that we are dependent on Cicero for our information about Lepidus’ 
movements in 44/43 B.C. and thereafter we are at the mercy of reconstructions based on 
officially sanctioned accounts. As Gowing has observed, Augustus’ claim to restore the 
Republic was inextricably bound up with a habit of ‘controlling memory’ (Gowing, 2005:18). 
Perhaps the best example of this is the Res Gestae, which, from the very first line, establish 
Augustus not as a usurper but as the saviour of Rome (Yavetz, 1984:8). It goes without 
saying that individuals (such as Lepidus) who complicated this programme of salvation do 
not do well by this account – if they even merit inclusion in the first instance. Although he is 
pointedly not named, an emblematic reference point is the tenth chapter:  
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pontifex maximus ne fierem in vivi conlegae locum, populo id sacerdotium deferente mihi, 
quod pater meus habuerat, recusavi. quod sacerdotium aliquot post annos, eo mortuo demum 
qui civilis tumultus occasione occupaverat, cuncta ex Italia ad comitia mea confluente 
multitudine, quanta Romae nunquam fertur ante id tempus fuisse, recepi, P. Sulpicio C. Valgio 
consulibus.301 
 
The telling phrase is civilis tumultus occasione occupaverat, recalling the immediate 
aftermath of Caesar’s murder. ‘Occupare’ embraces both ‘seizing’ as well as an opportunistic 
‘stealing a march on someone’; there has been some debate as to the extent of the unrest 
which allowed Lepidus to appropriate the office. Taylor (1942a: 423) envisaged a more 
protracted window of opportunity, perhaps as long as eight months between nomination and 
inauguration; more recent attempts at reconstruction take Augustus’ own narrative, albeit 
composed fifty years after the fact, at face value and locate it in the tense days following the 
Ides (Weigel, 1992:4). Such a compressed timescale does, in fact, tend to emphasise 
Antony’s role in the process. As surviving consul, Antony was understandably keen to defend 
his own position, as well as divert the flow of any credit from the conspirators. His initial 
policy exemplifies a conciliatory approach, especially with regard to Caesar’s memory and 
the divine honours which had been accorded him. While Octavian pressed for these honours 
to be paid in full, Antony preferred a different tactic. His first coin issue after the 
assassination makes prominent use of Caesar’s status as pontifex maximus (not as dictator). 
As well as recording Caesar’s longest-held office, this may be read as a subtle attempt to 
scupper any prospect of Brutus succeeding the man he had murdered as the next head of the 
                                                          
301
 I rejected the proposal that I become pontifex maximus in place of my colleague who was still 
living, even though the people were offering me the priesthood which my father had held. After some 
years, after the death of the man who had seized the opportunity of civil unrest to obtain it, did I 
accept this priesthood; from the whole of Italy a crowd – such as it is said has never been at Rome 
before this time – flooded in for my election, when Publius Sulpicius and Gaius Valgius were consuls. 
229 
 
pontifical college. It certainly suited Antony to have a Caesarian in the post and, despite the 
cumulative detractions of later historians, Lepidus was by far the strongest candidate. His 
pedigree was beyond question: the Aemilii Lepidi were a ‘pontifical’ family, and his 
namesake, the consul of 187 and 175 B.C., was chief priest between 180 and 152. To 
underscore this connection, in 61 Lepidus issued a denarius which recalled his ancestor’s role 
as tutor to Ptolemy V; the tutor’s future designation as pontifex maximus appears almost a 
prescient anachronism. 
 
Figure 3: denarius of M. Aemilius Lepidus, Rome c. 61 B.C. 
(Crawford RRC 419.2) 
Lepidus himself had already been a member of the college for nearly twenty years, co-opted 
in 63 or shortly thereafter (Rüpke, 2008:515).  In addition, his role as Caesar’s magister 
equitum and the part he played in the pacification of the city made him an obvious choice for 
Antony. Furthermore, as Brutus’ brother-in-law, Lepidus also represented something of a 
helpful compromise. Appian’s account suggests that the offer of the priesthood actually came 
from the crowd outside the senate house, since Lepidus had spoken so movingly about his 
fallen friend that they naturally began to associate him with ‘Caesar’s priesthood’.302   
Appian’s isolated mention of the crowd’s involvement draws our attention to the factor which 
has caused much of the controversy attending Lepidus to this day: namely, that he was 
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Antony’s choice. The reasons for Antony’s apparent circumvention of the comitia are 
opaque. Removing the people’s right to elect the pontifex maximus would clearly expose 
Lepidus to charges of being furto creatus (Velleius 2:63.1). If, however, Antony did set aside 
the proper assembly, he could claim that his actions were consistent with the oldest form of 
selecting the chief pontiff, at least as it was practised in the third century (Ridley, 2005:293). 
Cicero, who would have been quick to identify any subversion of the state by Antony, is 
conspicuously silent on any irregularity surrounding Lepidus’ claim to the chief priesthood. 
On the contrary, consul Antony could claim that he had simply overseen the smooth transfer 
of the office from its prior occupant to his trusted deputy; in his additional capacity as augur, 
he had ensured that the ritual requirements had been observed.303 Indeed Cicero seems to 
have been more than happy to work with Lepidus and was keen to maintain good terms with 
him, moving the senate in January 43 to vote him their thanks for the successful negotiations 
with Sextus Pompey; in addition, the gilded equestrian statue voted by the senate was an 
unprecedented gesture. No objection was forthcoming when Lepidus addressed a letter to the 
senate in May 43 as ‘imperator for the second time, pontifex maximus’ (Cicero, ad familiares, 
10.35); on the contrary, Cicero places great emphasis on Lepidus’ pontifical credentials in the 
Thirteenth Philippic (Cicero, Philippica, XII.15; Weigel, 1992:55). No-one, least of all the 
nineteen-year-old Octavian, would have been able to mount a serious challenge.  
 
From where, then, does Augustus’ sense of entitlement to the chief priesthood come? The Res 
Gestae refers to the events of 36 B.C., when Lepidus effectively went into exile and Augustus 
was offered the office which ‘his father’ had held. Something important is in play here: 
besides being a statement of his own family connection with the highest religious office 
(albeit through adoption), it also alludes to the controversial suggestion that in 46 the senate 
                                                          
303
 Antony’s brother, Gaius Antonius, had also been recruited to the pontifical college a year earlier. 
231 
 
had given Caesar’s heirs the right to succeed to all his priesthoods in perpetuity (Cassius Dio 
44.5.3). Although Mommsen dismissed the reliability of such a claim, others, such as Meyer, 
have argued that a senatorial decree of that nature exactly mirrored Caesar’s own 
preoccupations at the time (Fraschetti, 1988:943); this was precisely the period in which 
Caesar was emphasising his own descent from Iulus and his family ties with the Alban 
priesthood. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that the senate, aware of how the 
Dictator’s mind was working, duly obliged by formalising the status of the Julian gens as 
Rome’s priestly clan. After all, it is to such rhetoric that the Augustan writers would return, 
time and again, after Augustus became pater patriae and pontifex maximus; it was also to be 
a major iconographic motif in the buildings and adornments of the forum of Augustus (Price, 
1996b:833-834).  Levick is one of the more recent opponents of this ‘hereditary priesthood’ 
decree, arguing that had such a provision existed, Octavian would have insisted on its 
implementation from the outset (Levick, 2010:153). But such a forthright dismissal is not 
necessarily supported by the circumstances of Lepidus’ accession. Firstly, Octavian’s status 
as Caesar’s heir was not formally confirmed until quite some time later: an appearance and 
declaration before the urban praetor would have been sufficient to secure his share of 
Caesar’s inheritance (Toher, 2004:184). In order, however, to effect his adoption (since he 
was sui iuris) and acquire the all-important name of Caesar, the whole procedure of 
adrogatio had to be observed.304 It is here that Octavian encountered his own issue of form: 
the comitia curiata in 43 was convoked in the absence of the pontifex maximus, who was its 
sole president (Lepidus was with his army: Cassius Dio, 46.47.4).   Perhaps he felt it wiser 
not to raise procedural objections at such a delicate stage in his career, given that Lepidus 
could equally point to irregularities in the young triumvir’s adoption. If he were not, from a 
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technical viewpoint, Caesar’s legitimate heir, then his claim to the vacant priesthoods was 
unsound anyway. One irregularity balanced out the other, as it were. Augustus’ sense of 
having been deprived may have grown over the years, but it is unlikely that it held sway over 
his early plans. By the time a realistic opportunity to ‘unseat’ Lepidus presented itself – in 36 
– Augustus probably felt that forbearance sat better with the image he was creating for 
himself. It has been suggested that he was also checked by a ‘law’ which prohibited the 
replacement of a living pontifex maximus; Appian and Dio are the sources for this view, but it 
is not mentioned elsewhere.305 It seems just as – or rather more – plausible that Augustus 
understood the prize which was the office of chief pontiff. This is a mark of his ‘continuing 
self-interest’ which gave him every reason to maintain the prestige of the office (Simpson, 
2006: 633).  
 
Figure 4: Triumviral denarius of 42 B.C. 
(Crawford, RRC 495/2) 
 
Ironically, one of the earliest artefacts of Lepidus’ tenure as pontifex maximus comes in the 
form of a denarius issued in 42 B.C. Ostensibly an affirmation of mutual loyalty between 
triumvirs, the coin features Lepidus as ‘PON(T). MAX.’ on the obverse, with Caesar ‘IM(P).’ 
on the reverse. Lepidus’ mature profile is accentuated by the boyish features of the young 
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imperator; the denarius represents a curious symbol of the relationship which will endure, 
after a fashion, for the next thirty years. How, then, did Caesar effectively reverse their roles? 
 
It is commonplace to regard Augustus as pontifex maximus in all but name, but such a view 
grossly oversimplifies many important issues. First of all, although Lepidus went from being 
the honorific senior colleague306 to the least powerful of the Three Men, for the better part of 
ten years his position had been relatively secure – even strong by some measures. As Everitt 
(2006:149) has observed, the war in Sicily had considerably strengthened the proconsul of 
Africa’s position and his optimistic estimation of his chances led to what was perhaps the 
pivotal decision of his career: to lay claim to Sicily. It was this political miscalculation which 
enabled Octavian effectively to neutralise Lepidus thereafter; the offer of the chief priesthood 
in 36 simply demonstrated the extent of his rival’s weakness. Octavian’s refusal, albeit 
studied, made him look all the stronger. But that was about all that he refused. The 
accumulation of priesthoods by Caesar’s heir during this period is remarkable: in addition to 
his pontificate, he became an augur in 41, XVvir by 32, a fetial by 21, epulo by 16 and sodalis 
Titius at an undetermined point (Price, 1996b:824). Ridley (2005:295) echoes the view, held 
by Pierre Gros and others, that this steady accumulation of the priesthoods was a protracted 
exercise in self-compensation for not having the glittering prize of the chief priesthood. 
Beyond assuaging the need for the senior position, his virtual omnipresence in the priestly 
colleges also brought him the practical advantage of exercising unparalleled influence over 
religious matters. According to Dio, in 29 B.C. he received the privilege of nominating 
candidates to all vacant priesthoods, even beyond the established limit (Dio 51:20); compared 
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with the pontifex maximus, this would appear to be something of a ‘super-prerogative’. 
Although it is not clear, the implication is that these were effectively single candidate 
elections (a sign of things to come) or straightforward appointments. Whatever the mechanics 
of the process, this new privilege underscored the importance of the priestly colleges as 
centres of power, made up of men who had been on different sides in the civil wars (Scheid, 
2000: 50). Over the years, Augustus would have the power to restock the colleges with loyal 
or grateful younger men; given the gradual foreclosure of other routes to prominence for the 
nobiles, such appointments would become increasingly valued. Other aspects of his intense 
religious activity at this time merit closer examination: the year 29 also saw the reconstitution 
of the fratres arvales and either the revival or the creation of the sodales Titii; the augurium 
salutis was also enacted for the first time since 63 (Linderski, 2003: 214). These (mostly 
archaising) interventions have been associated with the privileges he granted to the public 
priesthoods, as well as the aforementioned expansion and reorganisation of the senior priestly 
colleges which also occurred during this period (Scheid, 2005:182). It must be remembered, 
however, that Augustus carried out these changes in his capacity as censor. He was therefore 
able to instigate a policy of substantial religious reform without reference to the chief priest 
or the rest of the pontifical college; this was typical of his approach throughout Lepidus’ 
tenure. 
 
A restrained pontificate 
Although he most certainly coveted the chief priesthood, Augustus demonstrated a quite 
remarkable ability to cordon off the functions of the pontifex maximus, without causing 
institutional inertia within the collegium pontificum. As the senate’s principal adviser on 
religious matters, the chief pontiff could be consulted at any time; therefore Augustus had to 
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ensure that Lepidus was kept far from the senate. His attempt to have Lepidus struck from the 
senatorial roll failed, but he ensured that his appearances in the house were few, tightly 
managed and, by asking his opinion last, occasions of carefully orchestrated insult. With head 
and body kept in stasis, day-to-day priestly activities – vows, dedications, the giving of 
uncontroversial advice - could be carried out without interruption. An example of this 
concerned Augustus very intimately: Cassius Dio records that in 38 an anxious Octavian 
consulted the priests as to the licitness of marrying the heavily pregnant Livia (Cassius Dio, 
48.44.2). Scheid (2005:189) observes that the last pontifical decrees date from 38 and 37 
B.C.; is it coincidence that the pontifices appear not to have been approached for a ruling 
after the ‘containment’ of Lepidus in 36? In other areas Augustus was to carry out a range of 
religious activity in ways which did not need the involvement or sanction of the chief pontiff. 
The celebration of the secular games in 17 B.C. is a case in point: his role as senior XVvir 
gave him all the necessary powers to resurrect the games and subtly revise their form and 
content. 
 
And yet these decisive actions on Augustus’ part only serve to emphasise his conspicuous 
lack of action in other areas of Rome’s religious life: those privileges which did indisputably 
belong to the pontifex maximus. The domus publica, official residence of the chief pontiff, 
seems to have remained pointedly vacant. We have no evidence that Lepidus ever took up 
residence there, but for short periods in the late 40s, he may have used it. Of greater symbolic 
importance was the regia, the pontiff’s office, which formed part of the same complex of 
religious buildings at the east end of the forum; as the name implies, the regia evoked 
memories of Rome’s royal past and the most archaic phase of the city’s religious 
development. As with the domus publica, there was little opportunity for Lepidus to make 
much use of this venerable building. If Augustus had really wished to be chief pontiff ‘in all 
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but name’, he could easily have found some pretext to take over the office; as it stood, he did 
not. If the symbolic vacancy of the regia suited him to some degree, it might be argued that 
the fire which destroyed it during Lepidus’ annus horribilis of 36 actually suited him more. 
The gutted shell of the chief priest’s office would have appealed to his eye for symbolism and 
his ability to ‘spin’ events for his own purposes. Here, surely, was a golden opportunity for 
the restitutor to repair the damage which had been done to Rome’s highest religious office? 
Yet for all his prodigious building work, it is especially striking that Augustus did not try to 
initiate and fund the restoration himself. This fell to Domitius Calvinus, a former consul and 
pontifex under Julius Caesar – perhaps as a reward for his shift in allegiance (Rüpke, 2008: 
660). It may have been at Calvinus’ house on the morning of the Ides that Caesar performed 
his last duties as pontifex maximus (Valerius Maximus 8.11.2; Suetonius, Julius 81.4). While 
it has been argued that Augustus ordered his fellow pontiff to undertake this rebuilding work, 
- and Calvinus may have already been carrying out some of the tasks normally entrusted to 
the chief pontiff 307 - there is a suggestion that he had little fear of Augustus and no great 
interest in currying favour (Simpson, 1993:69). Dio mentions Calvinus’ refusal to return the 
statues loaned by Octavian for the adornment of the regia (48.42.5-6). As we have said, given 
the ideological weight he attached to building projects and the restoration of temples, to 
forego direct involvement in repairing the ruined regia untouched is little short of startling; 
indeed, there is no record of Augustus’ restoring the regia at any point during his reign 
(Boatwright, 1987:105). There is only one other clear indication of another general restoring 
a temple – that of Saturn by Munatius Plancus sometime after 27 308 – but the sheer resonance 
of the chief priest’s office for Augustus was so great that the decision to leave it can only 
have been deliberate calculation.  
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Another conspicuous lack of activity on Augustus’ part concerns the replacement of key 
religious personnel: the Vestals and the flamines. The pseudo-familial connections between 
the pontifex maximus and the Vestals have been described elsewhere. At this point it is 
sufficient to note that the chief priest had a unique role in the captio of new Vestals. As this 
captio was a literal ‘seizing’ of the candidate, the physical absence of the chief pontiff 
rendered the process impossible and so, to the best of our knowledge, no new Vestals were 
inducted during the three decades of Lepidus’ tenure. Wildfang (2006:101) observes that the 
Vestals also ‘largely disappeared from view’ during this period, but this is not to say that they 
were not considered important from a symbolic viewpoint.309  They (however many they 
were) played a prominent role in the public rituals attending Augustus’ return to the city after 
Actium in 29; the senate, no doubt with the approval of the triumphator, ensured that the 
Vestals headed the procession out of the city to greet him. As we can see from his subsequent 
attitude to the cult of Vesta and its associations with the religious life of the city, Augustus 
took a particular interest in them.  Although their numbers must have dwindled over these 
years, Augustus’ decision not to intervene is another of those measured omissions which says 
as much about the priesthood as it does about him. A scrupulous refusal to overstep his 
powers, even when doing so would be explained away by the demands of pietas, is a mark of 
the powers of the office he desired and his own power to derive benefit from the 
circumstances. Even if Lepidus had been hindered from giving the house of the Vestals new 
blood, he could not have publicly said so. It would appear that, weakened by the events of 36, 
he was definitively undermined by the plot engineered by his son against Octavian in 30 
(Suetonius, Augustus 19.1; Livy, Periochae 133). Although he seems to have had nothing to 
do with the conspiracy (and the intended victim was still away from Rome at the time of its 
discovery), the resonances of the plot against Caesar were clear (Woolf, 2006:97) and, from 
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Augustus’ viewpoint, politically useful in further marginalising Lepidus (Stepper, 2003:115). 
After his post-Actium return to the city, we can detect a distinct phase of consolidation on 
Augustus’ part. 
 
The value of his status as divi filius took on greater significance at this time. By the time of 
his return the temple of Caesar had been completed and the way was clear to initiate properly 
the cult of his divine father. The aedes itself was dedicated on 18th of August 29, sufficiently 
close to the anniversary of his consulship (19 August 43) to allow the celebratory games to be 
conflated into a celebration of both events (Sumi, 2011:221). One issue remained to be 
addressed, however: the now vacant flaminate of Julius. With Antony’s death, the recently 
established priesthood required a new appointment to oversee the cult of the deified Julius. 
We know that Augustus appointed Sextus Appuleius to succeed the triumvir (not, as some 
have argued, the brother-in-law of Augustus, but his son) and that it is in this capacity that he 
is depicted on the frieze of the ara pacis Augustae (Pollini, 1986:457; Rüpke, 2008:540). 
This appointment challenges the thesis that Augustus scrupulously avoided encroaching on 
the pontifex maximus’ prerogatives – especially the selection of flamines. On the one hand, it 
has been argued that Augustus did indeed make such appointments (Bowersock, 1990:393) 
and that the complement of flamines on the ara pacis is evidence of this. It should be 
remembered, however, that the altar of Augustan peace has long ceased to be read as a 
‘snapshot’ of an actual event in the life of Augustus: figures and offices are gathered together 
in an idealised religious context. The flamen of Julius, while classified by later imperial 
sources as one of the flamines maiores, may not have enjoyed this status from its inception. 
As the creation of the senate, and the first flamen associated with the cult of a divus, it may be 
that the senate’s religious authority was used to sanction this appointment without prejudice 
to the pontifex maximus’ traditional powers. In addition, Augustus’ own personal association 
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with the object of the divine honours may also account for his own involvement in the 
process. Bowersock contends that Augustus also appointed a flamen Dialis in 14 B.C., basing 
this on the Medicean manuscript of Tacitus which gives the date of 14 instead of 11 
(Bowersock, 1990:392-393; Tacitus, Annales, 3:58). In this, although courageous, he is 
surely mistaken. It is much safer to remain with the otherwise unchallenged established 
chronology and consider the appointment of the new flamen as part of the conspicuous range 
of reforms and amendments which accompanied Augustus’ own accession to the chief 
priesthood. 
 
The issue of chronology, finally, brings us to that other ‘neglected’ field of oversight: the 
calendar. Caesar’s revision, while ostensibly reducing to near zero the pontifices’ control of 
the calendar, did leave the intercalation of the leap year in their hands. In the aftermath of the 
upheavals following Caesar’s assassination and the power struggles which ensued, the 
pontiffs had been inserting the extra day every third year instead of the intended four year 
cycle. After 36 years of haphazard adjustment, the Julian calendar was in dire need of 
correction. Once again, it is significant that Augustus, who was a member of the pontifical 
college throughout this period, made no move to re-establish the proper running of the 
calendar until 8 B.C. Old attempts to saddle Lepidus with the blame – Merivale (1882:3.456) 
attributes the priests’ error to their ‘inefficient chief’– now appear typical of a lingering 
nineteenth century Augustanism. It seems more reasonable to detect a concentrated burst of 
‘calendar activity’ in the period following the death of Lepidus. Scheid (2005:190) notes that 
the senate-decreed feria for Augustus’ birthday (from 30 B.C. onwards) does not appear on 
calendars until after his accession to the chief priesthood; the same is true of the renaming of 
the month of Sextilis to Augustus which, although decreed in 27, was not officially ratified 
and entered into the calendar until 8 B.C. Finally, as if to signal the definitive restoration of 
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order to time and to the associated rhythms of life in the city and the empire, Augustus 
commissioned his great sundial in the Campus Martius. The gnomon for the meridian was an 
obelisk (now in Piazza Montecitorio) which had been brought to Rome among the spoils of 
the Egyptian conquest. This solarium, part of the same monumental complex as the ara pacis 
and the mausoleum, unambiguously affirmed Augustus’ sway over the Graeco-Roman 
military and cultural world (Feeney, 1998:127). Even though doubt has been cast on the 
purported scale and precise nature of the horologium Augusti (Heslin, 2007:16), there is little 
doubt that its meridian represented something of an ideological dividing line between the old, 
perilous dispensation and the renewed saeculum aureum. 
 
Pontifex Maximus at last 
The death of Lepidus, around the age of seventy-five, can only have been greeted by 
Augustus with a sense of relief: the decision to wait for this natural termination to his old 
rival’s presidency had demonstrated the extent of his patience. His election as pontifex 
maximus marks something of a new beginning for Augustus: the convergence of enthusiastic 
tribes recorded in the Res Gestae (cuncta ex Italia ad comitia mea confluente multitudine, 
quanta Romae nunquam fertur ante id tempus fuisse, RG 10) allowed him to lay claim to 
popularity as well as legitimacy. Van Haeperen is among those who regard the great friezes 
on the ara pacis as representing a supplicatio for this long-anticipated event rather than the 
princeps’ homecoming (Van Haeperen, 2002: 418) and we are free to imagine an infinite 
number of joyful participants celebrating this religious victory. The date of Augustus’ 
election – March 6 – became something of a touchstone for his imperial successors, who, 
with a handful of exceptions, dated their own priesthoods from this date. Augustus himself 
allowed the anniversary to be marked by an annual festival which, as Ovid’s description in 
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the Fasti demonstrates, neatly captures the essential features of Augustus’ religious ideology: 
310
 
  Sextus ubi Oceano clivosum scandit Olympum 
      Phoebus et alatis aethera carpit equis, 
quisquis ades castaeque colis penetralia Vestae, 
      gratare, Iliacis turaque pone focis. 
Caesaris innumeris, quos maluit ille mereri, 
      accessit titulis pontificalis honor.                
ignibus aeternis aeterni numina praesunt 
      Caesaris: imperii pignora iuncta vides. 
di veteris Troiae, dignissima praeda ferenti, 
      qua gravis Aeneas tutus ab hoste fuit, 
ortus ab Aenea tangit cognata sacerdos                
     numina: cognatum, Vesta, tuere caput. 
quos sancta fovet ille manu, bene vivitis, ignes: 
      vivite inexstincti, flammaque duxque, precor.  [Ovid, Fasti, 3.415-428]311 
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 Millar regards Ovid as ‘the prime exponent of Augustan ideology’, more so than Vergil, Livy and 
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 When the sixth sun climbs the slope of Olympus from the ocean 
and through the air makes his way on winged steeds, 
all you, whoever you are, who worship at the sanctuary of chaste Vesta, 
wish her joy and offer incense on the Ilian hearths. 
To Caesar’s countless titles, which he has preferred to be worthy of, 
has been added the pontifical honour. 
Over the eternal fires, the divine powers of Caesar preside: 
you see the pledges of empire as one. 
You gods of ancient Troy, most worthy trophy for the one who carried you, 
whose weight kept Aeneas safe from the enemy, 
a priest sprung from the line of Aeneas handles the kindred divinities: 
Vesta, guard his kindred head. 
You fires, tended by his sacred hand, live well: 
live on undying, flame and leader both, I pray. 
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The pontificalis honor is thoroughly enmeshed with the numina Caesaris; here too we are 
reminded of the Julian claim of descent from Iulus and, through him, to Aeneas and Troy. 
There is a tone of intimacy in the way in which the priest is described as handling the 
‘kindred divinities’, as well as in the plea to Vesta to safeguard the ‘kindred head’ of 
Augustus. This is, of course, deeply characteristic of what Ovid is expected to do; after the 
military exploits of Augustus have been duly praised, this later phase of his life is devoted to 
restoring peace and order: the pax romana is the pax deorum. Habinek (2002:58) observes 
that ‘the tension between the Caesar of the arms and Caesar of the altars is implicitly 
explained with the immediate juxtaposition of Romulus and Numa’. Augustus synthesises 
these two constituent principles of the Roman character – skill in arms and dutiful cultivation 
of the gods – and so becomes the ‘bridge builder’ between Rome’s past and the golden age 
which is to come. And it was the decisive appropriation of the cult of Vesta which best 
exemplified how Augustus the pontifex maximus went about this. 
 
We have already observed that the Vestals had entered a phase of relative obscurity during 
the pontificate of Lepidus which may have something to do with a relative decline in their 
numbers. It is uncertain at what point after his accession Augustus decided to intervene as 
chief priest: he moved relatively quickly to fill the significant vacancy of the flamen Dialis 
(after a 76-year vacancy) in 11 B.C., but we have no mention of recruitment of Vestals until 
AD 5. Suetonius attributes the dwindling numbers to a reluctance among aristocratic families 
to put their daughters forward (Augustus, 31.3), an attitude which led Augustus to exert moral 
pressure as well as allow libertinae to enter the college for the first time (Dio 55.22). In 
addition, enhanced privileges were bestowed on the Vestales, another feature of Augustus’ 
‘reforming innovations’ which ensured a closer association with his own person as pontifex 
maximus and first citizen. Although primarily charged with the cult of Vesta, they had 
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increasingly become involved in the public rituals attached to the ara pacis Augustae and the 
ara numinis Augusti. By far the most significant piece of religious realignment, however, 
came almost immediately after Augustus’ election to the chief priesthood. It began scarcely 
two months later when a new shrine to Vesta was dedicated within his own house (Insc. Ital. 
13.2). This represented a decisive shift away from the traditional religious heart of the city, 
the Via Sacra and the Capitol, to the Palatine.  
 
The process had begun in the late 30s when Augustus vowed a temple in thanksgiving for his 
victories at Naulochus and Actium; after surviving a lightning strike on his house – an 
intervention he attributed to Apollo – this new temple was dedicated in 28 to a god who 
technically belonged outside the pomerium (Adkins, 1996:13). This translation of Apollo to 
the Palatine reflects not only Augustus’ attachment to the god as his tutelary deity, but also 
his readiness to redraw the boundaries of religious life in Rome. Although it is inaccurate to 
claim that any of this was intended as a slight to Jupiter, or even, as Feeney (1998:31) 
suggests, that Apollo was ‘encroaching on the prerogatives of his father’,312 it does indicate 
Augustus’ determination to broaden traditional practices for his own ideological purposes. 
Hall notes the inclusion of Apollo in the rites for the Secular Games in 17 B.C., a novelty, 
and suggests that Augustus was further underscoring a link between the gens Iulia and 
Apollo: it was a Cnaeus Iulius who dedicated the first (and only) temple of Apollo in the city 
in 481 (Hall, 1986:2584). The iconography of Augustus’ Palatine temple, replete with vivid 
allusions to righteous killing (the Danaids) and Apollo’s punishment of the disobedient, 
invited reflection on the social and political attributes most conducive to peace and prosperity 
in the Rome of Augustus (Beard et al., 1998a:199). It was the building of this temple which 
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first led to the partial designation of Augustus’ house – since the aedes was merely an 
extension of it – as a domus publica. After a fire in AD 3 led to its rebuilding by subscription, 
the whole thing became a domus publica. As to the other buildings associated with the 
functions of the chief priest, an oblique reference in Suetonius - in which he quotes Augustus’ 
description of a snatched lunch ‘dum lectica ex regia domum redeo’ (Augustus, 76) - suggests 
that he made some use of the chief priest’s traditional office, at least initially. Indications are 
that this too was given to the Vestals by Augustus on account of its proximity to their own 
house (Festus, 279). If this is true, it prompts the question as to how Augustus envisaged the 
future of the chief priesthood: if he could dispose of its property, was this because he 
envisaged the future holders of the office to be associated with the domus Augusti?  
 
This meant that Augustus’ house took on the threefold function of the atrium Vestae, the 
regia and the domus publica; the presence of the temple of Apollo added a further element of 
sacrality: 
 
aufer, Vesta, diem: cognati Vesta recepta est 
      limine; sic iusti constituere patres.                
Phoebus habet partem: Vestae pars altera cessit: 
quod superest illis, tertius ipse tenet. 
state Palatinae laurus, praetextaque quercu 
     stet domus: aeternos tres habet una deos. [Ovid, Fasti 4.949-954]313 
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  Take the day, Vesta: Vesta has been received at the threshold of her kinsman; 
thus the just Fathers have decreed. Phoebus has one part, 
another part has gone to Vesta; he himself occupies the third part, which is left over from 
them. 
Stand, Palatine laurels: and let the house stand, bordered with oak: 




Apollo has become domesticus Phoebus (Fraschetti, 1988: 951).  
 
Ovid’s verses allude to the fact that Apollo’s residence in the house of Augustus preceded the 
arrival of Vesta. The precise details of Augustus’ resettlement of the cult of Vesta are 
sometimes opaque. It is clear, however, that he regarded the relationship with the cult of 
Vesta as central to his refashioning of the chief priesthood. The pontifex maximus had, as we 
have seen, a particular jurisdiction over the Vestals, but the notion of the chief priest as 
sacerdos Vestae is an Augustan innovation. Although this was, as Price (1996: 826-827) 
rightly points out, part of the deliberate ‘confusion’ of the public hearth of Rome and the 
private hearth of Augustus, the emphasis on the Vestal priesthood was also part of his laying 
claim to the ideologically purged memory of Caesar. Once again Ovid’s commentary on the 
12th May, anniversary of the vow to Mars Ultor, is illustrative of this campaign [Fasti 5.570-
578]. The young Caesar takes his authority for war from pater…Vestaeque sacerdos, as Vesta 
herself had called him in Book Three. A subtle elision of paternity and priesthood may be 
detected here, one which will become established as a leitmotiv in subsequent propaganda, 
most enduringly in the Res Gestae. This is indicative of Augustus’ whole approach: a clever 
and, more importantly, plausible, retrojection of aspects of the new settlement onto figures 
and institutions from the past.  
 
The links between Augustus and the Vestals came to be more widely disseminated, the 
Feriale Cumanum noting the required supplication of Vesta on the anniversary of his 
accession to the chief priesthood. Precisely where this supplicatio took place is uncertain: the 
shrine of Vesta in the forum was maintained throughout antiquity, even though a cult statue – 
there being no statue of the goddess in the aedes - and an altar had been erected in Augustus’ 
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house on 28th April 12 B.C.314 The Feriale Cumanum also records similar supplicationes for 
the birthdays of the male members of the Augustan household, Tiberius, Germanicus and 
Drusus Caesar (Gradel, 2002:96). This signals a further stage in the colonisation of Roman 
religious life, both at the conceptual and physical level, by the house of Augustus with 
Caesareos penates and Caesarea Vesta (Ovid, Metamorphoses 15.864-865). The utility of 
this Caesarian expansion for Augustus’ own dynastic purposes is well documented. 
 
So within months of his attaining the position as high pontiff, Augustus had created a sacral 
complex on the Palatine, with a new domus publica and replicas of the penates and the 
Palladium installed in the new shrine of Vesta.315 While all this was redolent of the regal 
period (Fishwick, 1990:478), the heir of Caesar had both absorbed the lessons of history and 
attained a key role in reshaping it. His clear-sighted programme of innovation, restoration and 
replication throws other aspects of his activity into sharp relief.  
 
In whatever capacity - although Suetonius clearly associates it with his freshly acquired 
powers as chief priest in 12 B.C. (Suetonius, Divus Augustus 31.1) - Augustus embarked on a 
campaign of purging the vast body of religious texts which were in circulation. A 
considerable number of Greek and Latin prophecies, including, according to Suetonius, some 
of the Sibylline verses were expunged.316 It could be argued that control of prophecy and the 
activities of freelance diviners merely served the interests of public order (Rives, 2007:189), 
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but the timing of this intervention suggests that Augustus regarded this sifting of Rome’s 
religious writings as part of his pontifical jurisdiction. Such a perception is only underscored 
by his decision to relocate the remaining Sibylline books to the temple of his ‘domestic 
Phoebus’. 
 
Augustus’ subsequent attitude to the pontificate as bound up with his own ideas of succession 
may be guessed at in his decision to appoint Gaius Caesar, his grandson and presumed heir, 
as a pontiff upon his coming of age in 5 B.C. (Richardson, 2012:153). His younger brother, 
Lucius, was named an augur on his assumption of the toga virilis three years later. His 
stepson Tiberius had been a pontifex since the late 20s B.C. (Rüpke, 2008:615) and it surely 
not a coincidence that those most closely concerned with Augustus’ long-term plans were 
associated with him in the pontifical college – although he was present in most of the other 
collegia as well. 
 
The centrality of the chief pontificate in Augustus’ religious activities owes a great deal to its 
usefulness in the wider project of what has come to be known as ‘the Augustan cultural 
revolution’. Religion is key to Roman self-understanding and it is hardly surprising that it 
constitutes a central motif in the restoration of the Republic by the princeps. The whole 
edifice of Roman public religion, its rites and personnel, can be reassumed under the acronym 
‘P.M.’ on the coins issued by Augustus and his successors (Belloni, 1986:1853). The other 
widely diffused image of Augustus, that of the dutiful servant of the gods, capite velato, was 
to become the model for honorific statues around the empire. Augustus’ determination that he 
should be represented in this way is seen as a mark of his shrewdness in (literally) veiling his 
power in an attitude of piety (Zanker, 1988:127). Octavian had already experimented with 
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this in the coin depicting the temple of Divus Julius, issued in 36, which depicts the divinised 
pontifex maximus in that same ritualised posture.317  Later coins, altar reliefs and frescos 
would further elide this iconographic shorthand with the genius Augusti and the lares 
Augusti. Augustus was able to carry out something of a cultic revolution by ensuring that the 
worship of his own hearth gods extended throughout the city and the empire. It seems he 
approached the promotion of this nuanced restoration with the meticulous eye of an expert 
town planner: beginning with the restoration of the temple of the lares on the Sacra Via, he 
ensured that the fourteen regiones and 265 vici were part of a matrix of city-wide religious 
observance and Augustus was able to set himself at the heart of this ‘religion of the 
crossroads’. By encouraging and patronising the plethora of altars throughout the city and 
seeing to it that the lares compitales were effectively indistinguishable from the lares 
Augusti, he was, as Galinksy puts it, the author of ‘a triumph of theologia civilis (Galinksy, 
1996: 308). Although the élite maintained its monopoly of the main priesthoods, Augustus 
successfully ‘coopted’ all ranks of society, both men and women, into this project of 
collective piety. To what extent this facilitated the personal cult of Augustus and paved the 
way for his own (some would say inevitable) apotheosis, is not of pressing concern here. 
More interesting is the extent to which Augustus’ far-reaching religious policy was self-
consciously referred to the colonies and provinces of Rome.  
 
The fact that he was so anxious to emphasise the unprecedented crowds of people ‘ex cuncta 
Italia’ (Res Gestae 10) who were present at his election as pontifex maximus, hints at 
Augustus’ self-perception as chief priest of Rome in the broadest sense. It is probably only 
coincidence that the first inscription mentioning magistri Augustales dates from the year of 
the accession to the chief pontificate, 12 B.C. Its place of origin, Nepet (Nepi), is perhaps a 
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first marker of a pattern of disseminating such images throughout the provinces which will 
continue throughout the remainder of Augustus’ life (Taylor, 1914:235). Soon all the 
principal towns of the empire would have their own colleges of Augustales with the pontifex 
maximus as their nominal colleague. 
 
Analysts of the Roman revolution have been paying particular attention to the place of 
knowledge and science in the subtle but substantial shifts taking place during the early 
principate. Wallace-Hadrill uses the paradigm of ‘priestly control of time’ as a signifier for 
other, less obvious, realignments in Roman culture. Augustus, like Caesar before him, 
intervenes in a way which ostensibly diminishes the influence of the pontifices while leaving 
his own power intact - indeed enhanced. A process of rationalisation, whereby the expertise 
of mathematicians, astronomers and astrologers becomes a point of reference for the whole of 
society, is also a mechanism of control (Wallace-Hadrill, 1997: 17). It is by the authority of 
the pontifex maximus that these new specialists are allowed to reassert order to the passing of 
time. Elsewhere Wallace-Hadrill also identifies a trend in late Republican intellectual life 
which might serve as a justification for Augustus’ symbolic and practical strengthening of the 
chief pontificate. While augury suffered something of a decline during this period, other 
‘predictive sciences’ apparently more rooted in rational practices (such as astrology) were 
gaining a higher profile (Wallace-Hadrill, 2008:251). The pontifices, and more especially the 
pontifex maximus, were directors of religious affairs rather than practitioners in the strict 
sense. Rome’s high pontiff was the collator of expert opinions and his own promulgation of 
such opinions rendered him something of an expert-in-chief. No threat was posed to his 
office or his prestige by these new academic and scientific currents. Of course religion itself 
had become an object of scientific scrutiny and research: Varro’s dedication of his work to 
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the then pontifex maximus is a sign that this intellectual role was well established and not 
merely Varro’s pandering to Caesar’s presumed antiquarian instincts.318 
 
Conclusion: The Trajectory of Augustan Religion 
It has been argued that Augustus’ religious innovations were not as revolutionary as some 
have claimed and that, in particular, there is scant evidence for Augustan ‘religious 
revivalism’ beyond a few notable instances such as restoring the flamen Dialis (North, 
1986:254). In that analysis, it is the notion of ‘religious revival’ which is problematic: we 
have seen that Roman religion did not require resuscitation in the way that has sometimes 
been described. Certainly what Octavian did do, especially once imbued with a title steeped 
in the sacral vocabulary of Rome (Klauck, 2003:299), was to deftly exploit the possibilities 
created for him by previous incumbents of the office. 
 
Although the recurrent issue of Lepidus almost certainly influenced the development of 
Octavian’s religious policy, we should not overlook the fundamental tension which existed 
between his own identity and the man to whom he owed so much: Caesar himself. We have 
already discussed the ambiguities around the use of Caesar’s memory. In 41 B.C. Octavian 
subjected three hundred of the surrendered élite of Perusia to a form of sacrificial execution 
at an altar dedicated to the deified Caesar.319 In its fusion of religious forms with a cruel 
punishment for opposing him, Octavian echoed many aspects of Caesar’s own ritualistic 
treatment of his mutinous soldiers. Várhelyi reads this as an instance of ‘pushing the notion 
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 Although, as Green correctly acknowledges, Caesar (and Augustus) were beneficiaries of this 
climate, she is incorrect in describing this ‘theological concept of Rome grounded in her inherited 
civic, intellectual and religious traditions’ as a ‘creation’ of Varro (2002: 73). We have already 
demonstrated Scaevola’s contribution to this culture. 
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of sacrifice to its limits’ (2011: 137), but it is unlikely, as she suggests, that he was attempting 
to act as a priest of his adopted father.320 What it may suggest, however, is the extent to 
which the younger Caesar learned important lessons from the elder in terms of the scope of 
religious forms being adapted – or even created – for political ends. The fact remains that 
Caesar’s memory was as much a constraint as an enhancement. One of the principal tasks for 
the apologists of Augustus would be to effect the surpassing of Caesar by his heir: despite the 
obstacles and the near-misses, he was the beloved of the gods (Powell, 2009: 193). In the 
midst of this process of exaltation and distinction, Augustus’ role as high pontiff would be 
crucial. The autocracy of Caesar was bound up with his position as chief pontiff. As Steel 
observes, this ‘potent mix’ of personal power and religious authority could not be yet be 
controlled by any one of the contenders in the power struggle following Caesar’s murder 
(Steel, 2013: 253). Ultimately, Octavian’s encroaching monopoly was, in part, rendered less 
threatening because so much of it was blended with his pontifical persona (Stepper, 2003: 
44). This pervasive autocracy was mirrored, I believe, by the spread of buildings around the 
house of Augustus on the Palatine. As we have seen, Vesta and Apollo were neighbours and, 
in a sense, guests of in house of the princeps: the distinction between the sacra privata of this 
ostentatiously simple house and the sacra publica was, in another instance of a pattern we 
have been discerning for a century, blurred. That is why this office was so crucial to 
Augustus: as the father was in the family, so the pontifex maximus would be in the life of the 
restored Republic: an inviolable figure of authority, discipline – indeed the power of life and 
death – but also a symbol of pietas, stability and respectful love. Now every almost every 
street in the city was an extension of the lararium of Caesar and his house was Rome. 
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We tend to think of chaos as the opposite of order. Fixity is a benevolent static situation; its loss 
results in chaos. But in Rome of the Republic, the principles of order and disorder were the 
same. Reciprocity and satisfaction created society’s strongest bonds – but also threatened to 
bring about their destruction. In healthy conditions, fluctuations were small and capable of 
being balanced; in civil war they became the extreme ends of a pivot. Both sacrifices and 
executions occupied the dangerous space between the small reciprocities of everyday life and 
the violent reciprocities of the vendetta. (Barton, 2003: 359) 
 
 
Barton offers, correctly in my opinion, a way of understanding one of the main causes of the 
disintegration of the Republic: the ‘small town’ framework of the Roman system relied so 
heavily on maintaining a balance between competing interests. A relatively stable 
accommodation between the political élite and those dependent upon them, as well as 
between the senate and the people, had held good for centuries. As I have discussed in the 
Introduction, this accommodation upheld the city’s social stratification as well as providing a 
focus for unity during periods when the safety of the republic was endangered. Such a system 
simultaneously inhabited what we would now term ‘political’ and ‘religious’ dimensions. As 
a consequence, this civic balance was reflected in – and maintained by – the structures of 
Roman religion: the gods discharged their responsibilities, like any other good citizen. The 
priests of Rome, especially the chief pontiff, were engaged in serving and promoting this pax 
through the performance of sacred rites and the application of laws which governed the 




In Chapter Two I argued that a pontifex maximus deliberately used his authority and the ‘veil’ 
of his office to carry out one of the most revolutionary acts the city had yet seen. By lending 
the weight of religious forms, no matter how improvised these were, to the destruction of a 
tribune, Scipio Nasica not only initiated a cycle of political murder, but plunged Rome into a 
disquieting period of recrimination and uncertainty as to what (and who) was sacred any 
more. The logic of reciprocity and satisfaction meant that there had to be victims on both 
sides – even the high pontiff himself could not stay in his own city. Efforts to reset the 
balance would only be partially successful and of brief duration. I believe that the underlying 
damage was essentially irreparable because of the nature and novelty of the transgressions 
involved. This was a clash of sacrosanct persons, the rewriting of the language of the mos 
maiorum and all of it in full view of gods and men. 
 
Yet what is central to this thesis is that Nasica’s actions made the pontifex maximus a 
qualitatively different office from the one held by his father before him and that this 
difference was perceived by all. Partly on Nasica’s own initiative and partly due to the 
decisions made by the senate in the wake of Tiberius’ death, the pontifex maximus could do 
what others could not. Of course there had always been prerogatives attached to his office, 
but Nasica achieved two things: firstly, he redefined the boundaries of sacred violence and, 
secondly, caused the chief pontificate itself to be exposed to politically motivated killing. 
 
We have seen that, from its origins, this priesthood already had qualities and prerogatives 
which distinguished it, even subtly, from the collegiality which usually characterised Rome’s 
institutions: as Scaevola would have it, he was the pontentifex – ‘the priest with power’ (c.f. 
Varro, 5.83). A pontifex maximus enjoyed a stable prominence in the life of the Republic 
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which no other position could equal. The constitutional changes which came to bear on the 
office, especially the tense relationship between co-optation and election, ensured that the 
perception of the office among both the artistocracy and the people could undergo shifts in 
emphasis. As we saw, the lex Ogulnia in 300 B.C. had legislated for the inclusion of plebeian 
pontifices and the first plebeian pontifex maximus, Tiberius Coruncanius made his responsa 
public. In 104 B.C. a future chief pontiff, the plebeian tribune Domitius Ahenobarbus 
extended the system of election of the pontifex maximus by the minor pars populi to all the 
other pontifices and so it remained until Sulla revoked the lex Domitia, restoring co-optation. 
It would require the lex Labiena to wrest the right of election back to the people. Despite 
these vagaries of electoral procedure, the chief pontiff was left in a position of comparative 
stability and this most certainly brought advantages to the incumbent.  This is especially true 
of the extent to which, as we have seen on a number of occasions, the kind of power the high 
pontiff possessed could be represented as somehow analogous to that of consuls and praetors, 
with the accompaniment of lictors. Indeed the lictors offered the pontifex maximus not just 
some vague allusion to the power over life, but to a connection with Rome’s earliest form of 
democracy. It is such archaic resonances as these which led Mommsen to make a case for a 
‘high’ conceptualisation of the office, replete with a species of imperium and other powers. 
While the intervening scholarship has rolled back from this emphatic position – some, like 
the extreme ends of Barton’s ‘pivot’, have gone too far in the opposite direction – the 
underlying thesis of Mommsen is, I believe, sound in its essentials. There is more to the 
office than has been recently claimed. 
 
This ‘more’ has been arrived through a process of change which is both tidal and 
incremental: the murder of the tribune ‘by’ the chief pontiff and its consequences constitute a 
forward surge which opened up all sorts of possibilities for the next to occupy the office. 
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Chapter Three described how, after the misadventure of Crassus Mucianus, the pontificate 
appears to enter into a recessive phase under Publius Scaevola and the pontiffs up to and 
including his son, Quintus. But the office has been changing both from outside and from 
within: the dynamic of popular election for the priesthoods, the collation of the Annales 
Maximi and the various intellectual innovations of the Scaevolae had a discernible effect. The 
chief pontiffs were performing important tasks of systematising and ordering broad areas of 
history, law and theology just as the wider ‘system’ of society was plunged into disorder. The 
coincidence of Quintus Scaevola’s tenure with one of the most violently disrupted periods in 
Rome’s history 321 meant that the office took on an ever more symbolic profile, as murder 
and (self) sacrifice intruded upon places and people once considered sacrosanct. 
 
In Chapter Four I showed how Civil war and the politics of vendetta did certainly influence 
the styles of Metellus Pius and Julius Caesar, whom I have described as ‘passive and active 
voices’ in the articulation of their priestly office. But even Metellus, who might be regarded 
as another ‘quiet’ pontifex was showing how this ancient priesthood, the creation of a 
monarchy, could work within the constraints of dictatorship. Of course it helped that the 
dictator in question, Sulla, was respectful both of the office and the man he helped to fill it.322 
That Caesar was able to combine the chief priesthood with his own exercise of sole power 
demonstrates how unlike Sulla he was: Caesar had no scruples about being in both the 
pontifical and augural colleges. It is that same relationship between priesthood and autocracy 
which ultimately defines what became of the office under Augustus. As Chapter Five made 
clear, for the princeps, this office would be one of the main conduits for restoring order after 
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 Cinna displayed the severed head of the murdered consul Octavius on the rostra, the first time such 
an indignity would be inflicted on a consul – but not the last (Appian Civil Wars, 1: 7;  Blits, 2011: 
123). Since the rostra constituted a templum, Cinna took the pollution of consecrated spaces to a new 
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 I believe that Sulla’s membership of the college of Augurs (from around 88 B.C.) explains why he 
himself did not assume the vacant pontificate in 82. 
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the chaos of the previous century, both through his own persona as high pontiff and through 
the ‘respectful’ containment of the man who had followed Caesar. The imperator-pater-
pontifex was conspicuously successful in bringing the previous century of ‘blurring’ to a 
conclusion by once again ensuring that sacrifices and executions were no longer confused. 
This legacy of clear boundaries may be seen in that oath of Titus, acceding to the chief 
priesthood after the death of his father Vespasian, ‘to be the cause of no man’s death’ 
(Suetonius, Titus, 9). Although such an aspiration has more to do with rhetoric than realism, 
nevertheless it demonstrates how the pontifex maximus, protagonist of so much of the violent 
upheaval of the Republic, was now synonymous with benign autocracy. 
 
As I stated at the beginning, the trajectory of this ‘benign autocracy’ of Augustus should be 
traced – not from the calculated acquisition of the chief pontificate by Julius Caesar – but to 
the gamble taken by his predecessor Scipio Nasica. Alongside the conventional hermeneutics, 
I believe that the transition from republic to principate can (and should) be read through the 
ways in which such disparate figures embraced the pontificalis honor and the auctoritas 







Q. Servilius Caepio: pontifex maximus? 
The compilation of priestly Fasti is an imprecise science. The normally ad vitam duration of 
priesthoods means that according these men their proper place in the timeline can often be a 
matter of best guesswork and inserting question marks after terminal dates. Even with the list 
of pontifices maximi, the head of the pontifical college, we are not on entirely solid ground – 
at least not before the first century B.C. Little attention has been given to the appearance of 
one ‘newcomer’ to the list of chief pontiffs – Q. Servilius Caepio. Jorg Rüpke, in his lapidary 
Fasti Sacerdotum 2005/ 2008), inserts Caepio between Metellus Delmaticus and Domitius 
Ahenobarbus (Rüpke, 2008: 889). In this respect he parts company with the judgement of 
Szemler (1972: 125), who considers that even ‘his membership of the pontifical college 
remains questionable’ and Broughton (1951), who does not even list a priesthood for Caepio. 
The only mention we have of Caepio in this regard is in a contested passage of Valerius 
Maximus: 
Crassum casus acerbitate Q. Caepio praecucurrit: is namque praeturae splendore, triumphi 
claritate, consulatus decore, maximi pontificis sacerdotio ut senatus patronus diceretur 
adsecutus in publicis uinculis spiritum deposuit, corpusque eius funestis carnificis manibus 
laceratum in scalis Gemoniis iacens magno cum horrore totius fori Romani conspectum est. 
(Valerius Maximus, 6.9.13)323 
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 Q. Caepio surpassed Crassus in the bitterness of his lot: for, by the distinction of the praetorship, 
the glow of his triumph, the adornment of his consulship, the priesthood of chief pontiff, he was 
declared protector of the senate. Yet he breathed his last in public chains and his body, gouged by the 
fell hands of the executioner, was seen lying on the Gemonian steps to the great revulsion of the 
whole Roman forum. 
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Rüpke is of course within his rights to argue, as he does, that solitary authorities are not 
unheard of and of course we should not dismiss them simply because they challenge the 
communis opinio. He does seem to be on less solid ground in attempting to justify the fantasy 
of Valerius’ version of Caepio’s demise, complete with its detail of the butchered corpse on 
the Gemonian steps. The mundane fact appears to be that Caepio disappears into exile and 
thereafter we hear no more about him. Why should we push back Metellus Delmaticus’ 
tenure to accommodate a period between ‘107 and about 103’ (Rüpke’s estimate) when 
Servilius Caepio was pontifex maximus? 
107 was certainly an auspicious year for Caepio, as he celebrated a triumph after his 
campaign against in Hispania and it no doubt established a strong platform for his successful 
bid for the consulship of 106. Thereafter, however, things went precipitously wrong for him: 
charges of military misjudgement and the claim that he had misappropriated the treasure of 
Tolosa led to an ignominious termination of his imperium and the sentence of exile. There is 
no mention of a priesthood being terminated, still less of his being stripped of the chief 
pontificate. Only tangentially might we argue that such a calamitous end to Caepio’s public 
career might also have included the position of chief pontiff. Although conjecture, it is 
consistent with Rüpke’s view that Domitius Ahenobarbus might well have predicated his law 
to radically alter the mechanism of entry to the pontifical college upon the demise of Caepio; 
so rather than acting to assuage bruised pride (at being unsuccessful in his own attempt to be 
coopted in his father’s place) the lex Domitia was a public-spirited attempt to restore the 
prestige of the college, which could only have been damaged by the unprecedented treatment 
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of the pontifex maximus.324  In this hypothesis, not only was there a mood to introduce 
elections to the college, but a willingness to elect Domitius directly to the vacant presidency. 
There are, however, many more reasons to question Rüpke’s defence of Servilius Caepio and 
have him struck from the list. Firstly – and most directly – who benefits from this 
meddlesome insertion in the Fasti? It is not as though there is a troubling gap in the 
chronology which would be conveniently filled by this overlooked incumbent: there is simply 
no need to find someone to bridge the pontificates of Metellus Delmaticus and Domitius 
Ahenobarbus. Moreover, one would imagine that Cicero, a child of the consulship of Q. 
Servilius Caepio, would have had more to say about him (even as a cautionary exemplum) of 
a chief pontiff had forfeited his office in such unprecedented circumstances. Such a fall 
would indeed have been without precedent. It is widely known that P. Cornelius Scipio 
Nasica Serapio, incidentally a hero of Cicero, was sent into a species of exile after his 
involvement in the killing of his cousin Tiberius Gracchus. Yet, for all the unusual 
circumstances which attended Nasica’s removal from the city, there had been no suggestion 
that he would have been deprived of his office. 
Such treatment of Caepio would undermine the unique nature of the office and seriously 
compromise its status as an ad vitam office without parallel in the Republic. It is less likely 
that Caesar would have gambled everything on his election to the chief priesthood if its limits 
had been so clearly exposed in the treatment of Caepio scarcely two generations before; by 
the same measure, how likely is it Lepidus, the thorn in Augustus’ priestly side, would have 
been left with that coveted title if Caepio had been so easily divested of it? 
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Case Study: Cicero, Clodius and the pontifices 
Publius Clodius Pulcher has already featured quite extensively in the analysis of Caesar’s 
pontificate and his political career serves a helpful focus to demonstrate the inextricable links 
between political and religious realities. I think it is worthwhile abstracting Clodius’ activity 
during 63 B.C. (and immediately afterwards) as a specific ‘case study’: in this way we can 
better understand the way in which the competence of the pontifices was invoked, debated 
and understood by Clodius and his great enemy, Cicero. 
The Bona Dea scandal, in which Clodius Pulcher – disguised as a woman – profaned the 
female-only rites of the Good Goddess provoked outrage and necessitated the involvement of 
the Vestals and the pontiffs. Cicero recounted the process for Atticus: 
postea rem ex senatus consulto ad virgines atque ad pontifices relatam idque ab iis nefas esse 
decretum; deinde ex senatus consulto consules rogationem promulgasse; uxori Caesarem 
nuntium re misisse. In hac causa Piso amicitia P. Clodi ductus operam dat, ut ea rogatio, quam 
ipse fert et fert ex senatus consulto et de religione, antiquetur. (ad Atticum 1.13)325 
The instauratio of the rites would be sufficient to undo the damage done by Clodius’ impiety. 
Addressing the action which had vitiated the ceremony was the limit of the pontiffs’ 
recommendation: they did not stand in judgement over Clodius as in a trial and his 
subsequent prosecution had nothing to do with them (Tatum, 1990: 204). In this instance, it 
was not the pontiffs’ task to forensically seek out the facts, rather to make an evaluation 
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 It was then referred back to decree of the senate to the vestals and the college of pontiffs, who 
found that this occurrence did constitute a sacrilege. Then by a decree of the senate the consuls 
brought forward a bill; and Caesar sent his wife a writ of divorce. In this matter Piso, on account of 
his friendship with P. Clodius, is working for the rejection of the bill which he himself is proposing – 
and proposing on the back of a senatorial decree on a matter of religion. 
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based on whatever was put before them (Watson, 1992: 6). We do not know if the pontifex 
maximus in this instance would have recused himself from presiding over the investigation: 
although Caesar was deeply – and embarrassingly - involved in the circumstances of the 
Bona Dea scandal, it would have been politically risky to allow someone else to act as judge 
over matters of religious propriety, as well as the ability of the urban praetor to secure his 
own house. 
The incestum trial of Clodius resulted in an acquittal. This was in spite of Cicero giving 
testimony which undermined Clodius’ alibi (Mackay, 2009: 244), ensuring that the formerly 
friendly relations would be irreparably damaged. This hostility would eventually lead to the 
confiscation and destruction of Cicero’s house on the Palatine, while the ex-consul was sent 
into exile in 58 B.C. With calculated irony, Clodius had a temple to Libertas erected on the 
site of his opponent’s house and it was to address the questions of compensation and 
‘deconsecrating’ the space that Cicero made his famous speech to the pontifices (North, 
2000:31). In his opening sentences Cicero gives not only a flavour of religious rhetoric but 
also offers a helpful summary of the legal purview of Rome’s priests. 
Cum multa divinitus, pontifices, a maioribus nostris inventa atque instituta sunt, tum nihil 
praeclarius quam quod eosdem et religionibus deorum immortalium et summae rei publicae 
praeesse voluerunt, ut amplissimi et clarissimi cives rem publicam bene gerendo religiones, 
religiones sapienter interpretando rem publicam conservarent. Quod si ullo tempore magna 
causa in sacerdotum populi Romani iudicio ac potestate versata est, haec profecto tanta est ut 
omnis rei publicae dignitas, omnium civium salus, vita, libertas, arae, foci, di penates, bona, 
fortunae, domicilia vestrae sapientiae, fidei, potestati commissa creditaque esse videantur. [2] 
Vobis hodierno die constituendum est utrum posthac amentis ac perditos magistratus 
improborum ac sceleratorum civium praesidio nudare, an etiam deorum immortalium religione 
armare malitis. Nam si illa labes ac flamma rei publicae suum illum pestiferum et funestum 
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tribunatum, quem aequitate humana tueri non potest, divina religione defenderit, aliae 
caerimoniae nobis erunt, alii antistites deorum immortalium, alii interpretes religionum 
requirendi; sin autem vestra auctoritate sapientiaque, pontifices, ea quae furore improborum in 
re publica ab aliis oppressa, ab aliis deserta, ab aliis prodita gesta sunt rescinduntur, erit causa 
cur consilium maiorum in amplissimis viris ad sacerdotia deligendis iure ac merito laudare 
possimus.  (Cicero, de Domo 1) 326 
Cicero wished to challenge the decision to consecrate his house, literally making it a 
templum. Only the pontiffs had the power to rescind the consecration and Cicero is applying 
some moral leverage in his speech, alluding to the fact that many of them sat in the senate 
and did little to counteract the vendetta waged by the tribune of the plebs. Gildenhard offers a 
novel and plausible analysis of the process which exemplifies the relationship between 
religious and political power in Rome (2011:299-325). In the de Domo, Cicero addressed his 
audience, the pontiffs who were judging the case as citizens and senators: but, as Gildenhard 
observes, ‘role differentiation was highly developed’ (2011:307). Cicero shrewdly appealed 
to them both as pontifices and senators, since this served to emphasise the double distinction 
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 Among the many ordinances which our forebears decreed and set out through divine inspiration, o 
pontiffs, none is more illustrious than the decision to entrust to the same people the worship of the 
immortal gods and the highest interests of the State, so that the most notable and prominent citizens 
might look after our religion through the good governance of the State and look after the State through 
the wise interpretations of religious laws. And if ever an important case were submitted to the 
judgment and power of the priests, this truly is of such import that the prestige of the entire State, the 
safety, life, freedom, altars, household hearths and gods, the goods, fortunes and homes of all its 
citizens might be seen to be handed over and entrusted to your wisdom, faith and power. [2] Today 
you are called upon to decide if you wish from this moment onwards to strip these insane magistrates 
who have been corrupted by the support of the lowest and meanest citizens or whether you prefer to 
arm them with the sacred authority of the immortal gods. For if that disaster, if that firebrand of the 
State will succeed in defending his pestilential and deadly tribunate by means of divine religion, 
which human justice could not begin to defend, then we must seek other rites, other servants of the 
immortal gods, other interpreters of religion; if however, o pontiffs, by your authority and wisdom the 
consequences of these actions are to be annulled, actions which were only carried out because of the 
fury of the wicked while the Republic was oppressed by some, deserted by others, betrayed by yet 
more, then we shall excellent reasons to praise the decision of our ancestors to select for the priestly 
tasks men of the highest renown. 
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of their position; it was also helpful as a leverage strategy: the suggestion that religio had 
compromised ius (in this instance, ‘justice’) would be a cause of personal dissonance. For all 
their ‘highly developed role differentiation’, this struck at the heart of their competence as 
arbiters of the sacra (publica et privata) and guardians of the res publica. 
He pointedly refuses to name those who most directly abetted Clodius by sanctioning his bid 
for the plebeian tribunate, but everyone knew that one of the most prominent individuals was 
the pontifex maximus himself, Julius Caesar.327 
As we have seen, Cicero called into question the competence of the junior pontiff who had 
supervised the dedication of the shrine: by drawing attention to his less than secure auctoritas 
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 Cicero (pro Sestio, 16) refers to Caesar’s action as consul (‘solvit subito lege curiata consul’) not 
pontifex maximus – although the text may be corrupt (Ridley, 2005: 283). 
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